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I. INTRODUCTION1
“LITTLE SPACE CULTURE is ready to take over a largeshare of future unmanned activities in space.”2 Recent
plans to place a large number of small satellites in orbit present
a host of new legal issues. Previous discussion of law and regula-
tion of outer space has assumed use of large complex satellites
like the military satellites launched by the United States, Russia,
and China, and the communication satellites launched by IN-
TELSAT, SES, INMARSAT, and EUTELSAT. These satellites can
be the size of multistoried buildings and may cost $400 million
to build and $100–200 million to launch. But many tasks in
space that formerly required complex, expensive satellites can
now be performed by very small satellites.3 These miniaturized
satellites are sometimes called “cubesats” because they are only
ten centimeters tall, wide, and deep.4 Whereas the large satel-
lites are built to perform multiple tasks and last a long time, the
small satellites are less complex and last a much shorter time.5
Since small satellites are so much less expensive than existing
large satellites, they may be treated as being disposable. They
can also be mass-produced, whereas existing large satellites are
planned and built individually, one at a time. Small satellites
tend to be used in low Earth orbit (LEO) where they have an
inherent advantage of clock speed over the large satellites in ge-
ostationary Earth orbits (GEO).6 In the current high-technology
world, that is a significant advantage.
We are at a stage of tension between older, proven technology
of large, expensive, complex, and durable satellites and their
likely replacement by inexpensive, expendable, short-term satel-
lites. There is an expectation that this new technology will need
1 SMALL SATELLITES, REGULATORY CHALLENGES AND CHANGES (Irmgard Marboe
ed., 2016). This book is an important resource on the special legal problems of
small satellites. It is a collection of essays authored by small satellite experts, and
presented as a briefing for the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee.
2 Freeman Dyson, The Green Universe: A Vision, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 13, 2016),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/10/13/green-universe-a-vision/ [https:
//perma.cc/6LVX-ZUCB].
3 SMALL SATELLITES, REGULATORY CHALLENGES AND CHANGES, supra note 1, at
68.
4 Id.
5 See id. at 68–70.
6 Jono Anderson, The Coming Satellite Revolution, AVIATION. & SPACE TECH., Aug.
12, 2016; see Marco Villa, Builders of Satellites Large and Small Must Work Together to
Benefit Science, SPACE NEWS MAG. (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.spacenewsmag.
com/commentary/builders-of-satellites-large-and-small%E2%80%A8-must-work-
together-to-benefit-science/ [https://perma.cc/27YN-WA5T].
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new operating principles.7 The current plans for deployment of
small satellites will drastically change the outer space environ-
ment. As of 2016, there are about 1,400 functioning satellites in
orbit, in addition to non-functioning satellites, and almost incal-
culable amounts of space debris.8 To this already crowded envi-
ronment, one expert estimates the launch of an additional 3,800
small satellites by 2020.9 On November 17, 2016, Elon Musk,
President of SpaceX, requested permission from the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) to launch 4,425 small
satellites in LEO using the Ka/Ku-band radiofrequency spec-
trum.10 And yet others have indicated interest in launching
small satellites.11 Thus, within a few years, satellite navigation
and tracking will become more complex. New launches will have
to be planned more carefully, particularly in LEO, in order to
avoid interference. Space situational awareness will become
even more important than before this new development. The
cumulative consequences of launching thousands of these tiny
satellites will be great.
The fact is that the commercial space industry is growing sig-
nificantly.12 There are dozens of new private launch companies
either already operating or on the drawing board. Chief among
them is SpaceX, which is able to launch significantly more
7 Villa, supra note 6.
8 Goktug Karacalioglu, Impact of New Satellite Launch Trends on Orbital Debris,
SPACE SAFETY MAG. (June 2, 2016), http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/space-
debris/impact-new-satellite-launch-trends-orbital-debris/ [https://perma.cc/5JA
9-EWZB]; Brian Weeden, Insight – Small Satellites and Space Situational Awareness,
SECURE WORLD FOUND. (Sept. 1, 2016), https://swfound.org/news/all-news/20
16/09/insight-small-satellites-and-space-situational-awareness [https://perma.cc/
46WD-U357]; see also Technology Quarterly: A Sudden Light, ECONOMIST (Aug. 25,
2016), http://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2016-25-08/space-2016
[https://perma.cc/C4A7-6D5Y] [hereinafter Technology Quarterly].
9 Karacalioglu, supra note 8.
10 First Take: Space, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 21, 2016, at 11; Peter B.
de Selding, Enough Satellites to Darken the Skies, SPACE NEWS MAG. (Nov. 21, 2016),
https://www.spacenewsmag.com/the-bottom-line/enough-satellites-to-darken-
the-skies/ [https://perma.cc/K9TE-J8GF]. SpaceX plans to launch these satel-
lites during the next ten years, offering a global satellite Internet service. SpaceX
will also act as launcher for small satellite companies. See Technology Quarterly,
supra note 8.
11 See de Selding, Enough Satellites, supra note 10.
12 See Dylan Taylor, Smallsats and the Multi-Trillion-Dollar Data Set, SPACE NEWS
MAG. (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.spacenewsmag.com/august-1-2016/smallsats-
and-the-multi-trillion-dollar-data-set/ [https://perma.cc/NS6A-63NP]. A billion
dollars was invested in small satellites from 2013 to 2016.
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cheaply than other launch operators.13 SpaceX is a multiple-use
launcher serving a mix of large and small satellites. SpaceX’s
large Falcon 9 launch rocket is able to launch ninety small satel-
lites in one launch.14 The September 1, 2016, destruction of a
Falcon 9 rocket during launch at Cape Canaveral will delay
some of the planned launches in the short term.15 However,
SpaceX is expected to recover its pace of launches.16 Other
launch operators such as Arianespace, Blue Origin,17 and Vector
Space Systems are eager to jump into the small satellite launch
business.18
A California company, Planet, is an example of the start-ups
engaged in building small satellites.19 The small satellites of
Planet each carry a telescope that is able to observe the Earth.
Planet currently operates sixty-three small remote sensing satel-
lites in LEO. Each satellite lasts nine to eighteen months. The
satellites are inexpensive and their frequent replacement is part
of the business plan. Even existing large space companies are
beginning to take notice of low-cost small satellite technology.
Expert estimations of the number of small satellites to be
launched in the next decade vary.20 Euroconsult estimates the
launch of 3,600 small satellites. A small satellite company called
One Web is being established jointly by INTELSAT, Virgin Ga-
lactic, and Airbus. One Web plans to launch 648 small satellites
in LEO. These satellites will provide continuous and simultane-
ous communication service to and from anywhere on Earth.
13 See Technology Quarterly, supra note 8.
14 Mike Wall & Calla Cofield, SpaceX Returns to Flight with 10-Satellite Launch,
Rocket Landing, SPACE.COM (Jan. 14, 2017), http://www.space.com/35338-spacex-
return-to-flight-rocket-launch-landing-success.html [https://perma.cc/Y44H-QS
LX].
15 Peter B. de Selding, The White Knight is Talking Backwards, SPACE NEWS MAG.
(Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.spacenewsmag.com/the-bottom-line/the-white-
knight-is-talking-backwards/ [https://perma.cc/WGK5-JWW6].
16 See Mission, Interrupted, ECONOMIST (Sept. 10, 2016), http://www.economist.
com/news/business/21706560-expensive-rocket-accident-puts-pressure-spacex-
mission-interrupted [https://perma.cc/2RHV-RFF6].
17 See Frank Morring Jr., When to Reuse, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 7,
2016, at 52. Blue Origin and SpaceX are both developing reusable launch vehi-
cles to reduce the cost of launches. Reusable launch vehicles are particularly
favorable for launches into LEO.
18 See Technology Quarterly, supra note 8; see also de Selding, The White Knight,
supra note 15; Jeff Foust, Big Markets for Small Rockets, SPACE NEWS MAG. (Aug. 15,
2016), https://www.spacenewsmag.com/foust-forward/big-markets-for-small-
rockets/ [https://perma.cc/FH67-PXCM].
19 See Technology Quarterly, supra note 8.
20 See id.
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Thus, the developing countries would have the same communi-
cation access as do the developed countries.21 In 2016, Space
Safety Magazine surveyed the commercial space business and as-
certained that the following remote sensing and weather compa-
nies planned to launch small satellites during the next four
years: Blacksky, CICERO, EROS, and Landmapper.22 Addition-
ally, the following communication satellite companies planned
small satellite launches: Leosat, Northstar, O3b, OmniEarth,
One Web, OuterNet, Planet, Radarsat, Terra Bella, SpaceX, and
Spire. Of these companies, Planet plans to launch 450 small
satellites; Spire will launch 300 satellites; One Web will launch
750 satellites; and SpaceX will launch 600 satellites.23 Space Safety
Magazine estimates the currently planned launches to be as fol-
lows: 493 launches in 2016; 388 launches 2017; 743 launches in
2018; 1,189 launches in 2019; and 993 launches in 2020.24 Be-
cause small satellites last only nine to eighteen months, it is as-
sumed that this high volume of launches will continue at the
same rate beyond 2020. Other experts estimate even higher
numbers of small satellites in outer space.25 As mentioned
above, SpaceX now plans to launch and operate a network of
4,425 small communication satellites.26
Space debris caused by launch rockets and non-functional
satellites remaining in outer space must also be considered. One
expert estimates that “from 2036 collisions [will] start to occur
regularly,”27 and there will be numerous close encounters,
which satellite operators will seek to avoid. At that point in time,
21 Id.
22 See Karucalioglu, supra note 8.
23 Id. This estimate does not include Elon Musk’s plan to launch 4,425 small-
sats. See Technology Quarterly, supra note 8; de Selding, Enough Satellites, supra note
10.
24 Karacalioglu, supra note 8.
25 2016 International Astronautical Congress (IAC) Panel Discussion, Projec-
tion and Stability of the Orbital Debris Environment in the Light of Planned
Mega-Constellation Deployments (Sept. 29, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 IAC Panel
Discussion]. Elon Musk, Chief Executive Officer of SpaceX, applied to the FCC
to launch a satellite-based global internet system consisting of 4,425 small satel-
lites. See Sue Halpern, The Man for Mars, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Aug. 13, 2015),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/08/13/elon-musk-man-mars/ [https://
perma.cc/A56B-5CQD]; see also de Selding, Enough Satellites, supra note 10; Frank
Morring Jr., Collision Course, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 10, 2016, at 18.
26 de Selding, Enough Satellites, supra note 10; see also Technology Quarterly, supra
note 8 (discussing SpaceX plans).
27 Karacalioglu, supra note 8; see also Section VIII, Space Debris and Environ-
mental Issues, infra.
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the operators may become overwhelmed by traffic “conjunc-
tions.” It will be difficult to maneuver all the satellite traffic
adequately.
All these small satellite activities bring into issue the Outer
Space Treaty articles I, II, VI, VII, and IX;28 the Liability Conven-
tion;29 the Registration Convention;30 the Search and Rescue
Convention;31 U.N. resolutions on remote sensing and space
debris; the ITU legal regime;32 as well as implementing national
laws and regulations and their administration.33
II. USES OF SMALL SATELLITES
Earth observation and communication are currently the two
most important commercial satellite activities.34 There will be
extensive use of small satellites for these tasks. Thousands of
small satellites all around the globe will be present and available
for communication to and from all parts of the world. Small
satellites are excellent for Earth observation of disasters, and can
report on changing weather conditions. They will be essential
for administration of the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate
Change. Small satellites also serve the military through various
offensive and defensive tasks, including observation of military
installations and collection of intelligence information.35 They
can be used for scientific research and exploration both on
Earth and in outer space.
The major focus of this discussion will be on small satellite
activities in LEO because that is where small remote sensing and
communication satellites will be predominantly located. A few
28 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
29 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention].
30 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14,
1975, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention].
31 Agreement on Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Re-
turn of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 672 U.N.T.S. 119
[hereinafter Search and Rescue Convention].
32 COLLECTION OF THE BASIC TEXTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICA-
TION UNION ADOPTED BY THE PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE 3–54 (2015 ed.)
[hereinafter ITU Constitution].
33 See Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Treaty].
34 See Taylor, supra note 12.
35 See ITU CONSTITUTION, supra note 32; infra Section X, Small Satellite Na-
tional Security Issues.
2017] SMALL SATELLITE LEGAL ISSUES 281
small satellites are planned for exploration of the Moon and as-
teroids and for possible mining36 and military uses.37
III. LICENSING OF SMALL SATELLITE OPERATIONS
The launch of Sputnik in 1957 was a government military op-
eration, and the first deployments of satellites in outer space
were government operations. While military satellite activities in
outer space continue, the predominant nature of small satellite
deployment is now by private commercial operators.38 About $1
billion is currently being invested in small satellites.39 Thus, in-
vestments in outer space are moving from government spending
for large projects to small private activities.40 The nature of pri-
vate commercial operations differs significantly from govern-
ment operations because private operators are driven by the
profit motive, whereas government operations are motivated by
public service and for military requirements.
Private entrepreneurs are dependent on their governments.
Private operators can only operate in outer space by the author-
ity of their governments, which are holders of the legal rights to
use outer space as parties to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.41
Thus, private operators derive their operating authority to use
outer space from their individual governments, subject to their
continuous oversight. Pursuant to Outer Space Treaty article VI,
private small satellite operators must apply to their governments
for licenses to launch into, and operate in, outer space.42
Most of the current small satellite applicants are located in
the United States, and thus, the U.S. government will be the
recipient of most applications. Applicants’ first licensing initia-
tive is usually to apply to the FCC for permission to use radiofre-
quencies and orbital slots under the Communications Act.43
U.S. legislation has been enacted giving the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) authority to license launches and reentry of
36 Technology Quarterly, supra note 8.
37 See infra Section X, Small Satellite National Security Issues.
38 Technology Quarterly, supra note 8.
39 See Clay Dillow, Here’s Why Small Satellites Are so Big Right Now, FORTUNE (Aug.
4, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/08/04/small-satellites-newspace/ [https://
perma.cc/87KV-7WRQ].
40 Technology Quarterly, supra note 8.
41 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 28, arts. III, VIII.
42 Id. art. VI.
43 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 301 et seq. (West 2017); see
infra Section IV, Radiofrequencies and Orbits Must be Licensed by their National
Governments and Regulated by the International Telecommunication Union.
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satellites.44 Consequently, U.S. private small satellite operators
need FAA launch operating licenses for each small satellite in
accordance with FAA regulations. The FAA has adopted licens-
ing criteria pursuant to the U.S. Commercial Space Launch
Act.45 These criteria include FAA examination of whether the
launch accords with U.S. national interests, public health and
safety, and the applicant’s ability to launch from a particular
launch site. The FAA also reviews the application for reentry
from outer space.46 The applicant must show understanding of
the safety rules and have a safety plan for each launch, including
plans for accident investigation and emergencies.47 The appli-
cant must convince the FAA of the safety of the payload and its
eventual safe reentry and the applicant’s ability to meet possible
environmental effects of the launch, including compliance with
the space debris rules described below.48 The National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) manages U.S. remote
sensing satellites, as well as authorizes small satellite commercial
remote sensing satellites.49 The oversight over outer space oper-
ations has not yet been delegated by implementing legislation.
Thus, the Outer Space Treaty’s article VI treaty obligation re-
mains the responsibility of the U.S. Department of State
(USDOS).
Other countries require licenses for private launches, either
pursuant to the direct authority of the Outer Space Treaty or by
authority of national laws adopted in conformity with the Outer
Space Treaty. Some small satellite operators may consider
launch in so-called flag of convenience states, a practice that is
common in maritime shipping.50 Flag of convenience states may
not be well equipped for government oversight of launches and
oversight over their operations. Thus, they may not be able to
police compliance with the Outer Space Treaty’s article VI treaty
obligations effectively and may present a danger to the outer
space operations of other states.
44 Commercial Space Launch Act, 51 U.S.C.A. § 50904; see infra Section III,
Licensing of Small Satellite Operations.
45 51 U.S.C.A. § 50904 et seq.
46 Id.
47 Id. § 50905.
48 Id. § 50904.
49 51 U.S.C. § 60101 et seq.; see infra Section V, Small Satellite Remote Sensing.
50 See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note *, at 94–95 (discussing the problem of flags
of convenience states in space law and the need for a genuine link between the
real home state and space objects).
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IV. RADIOFREQUENCIES AND ORBITS MUST BE
LICENSED BY THEIR NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND
REGULAGED BY THE INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATION UNION51
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) manages
the radio spectrum. Operating satellites, including small satel-
lites, in outer space requires ITU clearance of radiofrequencies
and related orbits.52 Under the ITU legal regime, each individ-
ual small satellite operating in outer space will have to obtain
cleared radiofrequencies in order to be placed in orbit, to com-
municate with its earth stations, and to be given instructions to
de-orbit at the end of its useful life. For those purposes, the
satellites need to be navigable (in the past, amateur and experi-
mental small satellites have often not been navigable, and thus
not able to circumvent other traffic).
The operator will also need an exclusive orbital slot which is
free of all obstructions. The operator’s satellite would be useless
without a cleared radiofrequency and an exclusive orbit. Outer
space is subject to neither national nor private appropriation by
virtue of Outer Space Treaty’s article II.53 Thus, the operator
cannot obtain property rights in radiofrequencies and orbital
slots. All that ITU can provide is an ITU-recognized exclusive
use. The ITU legal regime enables small satellite operators to
obtain the necessary frequencies and orbits in accordance with
and subject to its regulations. The ITU Constitution’s article
4(3) establishes international standards to ensure unhindered
global communication.54 Applying those standards, ITU records
a cleared radiofrequency in its public frequency register. It will
monitor and protect it from radio interference by non-recog-
nized operators. ITU may even allocate radiofrequency bands to
51 See generally id. at Chapter 8: Radio and the International
Telecommunication Union.
52 See ITU CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, art. 44, para. 2.
In using frequency bands for radio services, Member States shall
bear in mind that radio frequencies and any associated orbits, in-
cluding the geostationary-satellite orbit, are limited natural re-
sources and that they must be used rationally, efficiently and
economically, in conformity with the provisions of the Radio Regu-
lations, so that countries or groups of countries may have equitable
access to those orbits and frequencies, taking into account the spe-
cial needs of the developing countries and the geographical situa-
tion of particular countries.
53 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 28, art. II.
54 ITU CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, art. 4, para. 3.
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secondary operators, but only on the condition that they will not
interfere with the use of the primary operators. Small satellite
services have, until recently, utilized the more lenient and per-
missive legal regime set aside by the ITU for amateur satellite
services. However, small satellites have now graduated to as-
signed services in the regular service regime. Small satellites are
now processed in the same way as large satellites, in accordance
with article 5 of the ITU’s radio regulations.55
ITU is an international treaty organization. Individual opera-
tors cannot obtain cleared radiofrequencies or orbital slots di-
rectly from ITU. Only their national states and agents of the
governments can request radiofrequencies and orbital slots be-
cause only they are parties. Individual operators must apply for
ITU-recognized operating rights through their national states.
Furthermore, the ITU Constitution’s article 6 obligates the
states to comply and enforce the ITU legal regime on all inter-
national services that may cause harmful interference with ITU
allocated rights in outer space.56
Considering the multitude of small satellites that are planned
for orbit57 and the continuous stream of replacement satellites,
the administration and oversight of cleared individual radiofre-
quencies and orbital slots will be a very time consuming task for
the operators, their governments, and for the ITU administra-
tion. Therefore, the 2012 ITU World Radio Conference as-
signed a special ITU working group the task of reviewing the
radio regulations, and ascertaining whether small satellites
should be treated differently from large satellites. In 2015, the
working group recommended that small satellites should “com-
ply with the applicable international and national laws, regula-
tions and procedures, indispensable to guarantee the long-term
sustainability of small satellite projects, the avoidance of harmful
interference and proper management of space debris.”58
Launch of small satellites without the ITU’s clearance is not a
recommended option because operators will not have assured
55 INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, RADIO REGULATIONS RR5-1 (2016 ed.).
56 ITU CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, art. 6, paras. 1–2.
57 de Selding, supra note 10; Karacalioglu, supra note 8.
58 Prague Declaration on Small Satellite Regulation and Communication Sys-
tems as reprinted in SMALL SATELLITES, REGULATORY CHALLENGES AND CHANGES,
supra note 1, at 263. It may be noted that the focus of the Prague Declaration
appears to be on small satellites launched by universities, governments, and radio
amateurs, rather than on the avalanche of commercial small satellites subse-
quently planned by private industry.
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interference-free access and control over their satellites. Harm-
ful interference complaints would quickly be filed with the ITU,
which in turn would obligate individual governments to enforce
their treaty obligations to enforce the ITU regime because the
ITU Constitution’s article 45 requires states to respect existing
ITU registrations.59 Furthermore, small satellite operators would
likely have difficulty obtaining financing for such unreliable op-
erations. It would not be good business.
Since private small satellite operators cannot directly initiate
applications for use of radio frequencies and related orbital
slots, they must first request that their national governments ask
the ITU for allocation of specific frequencies and orbital slots.
For example, in the United States, the FCC would be the desig-
nated agency. Under the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 301
and 307, the FCC determines whether an application to provide
commercial satellite service within the United States is in the
public interest.60 Section 301 states: “No person shall use or op-
erate any apparatus for the transmission of energy or communi-
cations or signals by radio” to, from, or within the United States,
except in accordance with the Communications Act and “with a
license granted in that behalf [by the FCC] under the provisions
of this [Act].”61 The FCC will require the applicant to provide all
relevant information for the FCC to decide whether grant of the
application is in the public interest.62 In determining public in-
terest, the FCC considers: availability of spectrum, effect on
competition, technical characteristics, possible interferences, el-
igibility requirements, as well as impacts to national security, law
enforcement, foreign policy and trade. The FCC will make ma-
jor decisions only after an invitation for public comments and a
public hearing.
The regulatory authority of the FCC may be illustrated by the
following case.63 Two small satellite companies, Planet and Spire
Global, contracted with SpaceX to launch ninety small satellites
into a single elliptical orbit presently used by another company,
Orbcomm. The ninety satellites were supposed to be launched
59 ITU CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, art. 45.
60 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–308.
61 Id. § 301.
62 See id. § 307(c)(1).
63 See Peter B. de Selding, Spaceflight’s 90-Satellite Mission, a Boon for Smallsats, is
a Nightmare for Orbcomm, SPACE NEWS MAG. (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.space
newsmag.com/feature/spaceflights-90-satellite-mission-a-boon-for-smallsats-%E2
%80%A8is-a-nightmare-for-orbcomm/ [https://perma.cc/ATQ8-PEPR].
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at once, in a kind of swarm of satellites, immediately to be navi-
gated into a specific order. Orbcomm expected to receive a con-
junction of potential collision warnings from the U.S. Air Force
satellite trackers immediately after the ninety satellites were
launched. Consequently, Orbcomm petitioned the FCC to halt
the launch until it could be assured that the launch would not
interfere with Orbcomm’s assigned orbit.
Small satellite operators planning to launch communication
satellites will not only need FCC license to obtain radiofre-
quencies for satellite navigations purposes, but they will also
need to obtain FCC permission to use and to beam radiofre-
quencies into the United States. Subsequent to an FCC decision
to coordinate with the ITU, the applicant may provide specific
details to the ITU as part of the frequency registration. ITU allo-
cation is based on a first-come-first-served principle; thus, as
soon as the applicant makes its formal request, it is placed in
line for available frequencies and slots. The request starts an ex-
amination with the ITU of whether the requested frequencies
and slots will result in harmful interference with existing uses.
Thus, when the request is made public by the ITU, any existing
users examining the request must file protests if they suspect
harmful interference. The contesting national parties will then,
with the assistance of the ITU, seek to resolve possible conflicts.
Existing users of radiofrequencies and orbital slots need to be
forever vigilant because their rights are subject to interferences.
Thus, they may employ private companies, such as HawkEye360,
that specialize in finding radio frequency interferences.64 To-
ward that purpose, HawkEye360 will itself launch small satellites
to locate any radiofrequency interferences. Other communica-
tion companies are also beginning to launch special satellites to
detect interference.65
In the absence of protests, the ITU will assume that there is
no harmful interference. Only at that point can the allocation
be recorded in the ITU Master International Frequency Regis-
ter.66 This register of all the assigned radio frequencies with re-
lated orbital slots is perhaps the most important ITU institution.




66 Note the multiple registration requirements for small satellites: they must
register radiofrequencies with the ITU and separately have their location regis-
tered nationally and with the U.N. pursuant to the Registration convention. See
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It is an open registry, and small satellite operators would be wise
to examine the register before making any plans to launch satel-
lites. The actual allocation will be made by the national adminis-
tration. Thus, the private operator will also be subject to the
regulations and decision-making of the national administration.
Getting cleared frequencies and orbital slots may take years,
not only because of the multitude of bureaucracies, but also be-
cause clearances involve many other countries that may have a
claim to particular frequencies and slots.
V. SMALL SATELLITE REMOTE SENSING67
The following U.S. small satellite remote sensing and weather
companies plan to launch small satellites during the next four
years: Blacksky, CICERO, EROS, and Landmapper.68 Remote
sensing by satellite triggers Outer Space Treaty’s article I, which
provides that outer space is free for use.69 That includes Earth
observation. Unrestricted Earth observation previously troubled
many countries that wanted to protect their sovereign territories
from view by foreign satellites. However, in 1986, the United
States and similarly inclined countries managed to persuade
those countries to accept the principle of freedom of satellite
Earth observation by adopting U.N. Resolution 41/65, contain-
ing fifteen principles related to remote sensing.70 The Resolu-
tion broadly defines remote sensing as “making use of the
properties of electromagnetic waves emitted, reflected or dif-
fracted by the sensed objects, for the purpose of improving natu-
ral resources management, land use and the protection of the
environment.”71 The most profitable remote sensing products
are detailed high-resolution images. However, the highest reso-
lution products require more complex and sharper remote sens-
ing equipment than small satellites can presently accommodate.
Countries have adopted all or parts of the U.N. principles in
their national legislation. As small satellites sense all of the
Earth, they are subject to varying national rules and regulations.
infra section VI, Small Satellites Must Be Registered in their National Registry and
in the U.N. Registry.
67 See generally LYALL & LARSEN, supra note *, Chapter 13: Remote Sensing.
68 Karacalioglu, supra note 8.
69 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 28, art I.
70 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, G.A.
Res. 41/65, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/65 (Dec. 3, 1986).
71 Id.
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In particular, many countries restrict access to their territories
for reasons of national security.
Most of the new small satellite operators originate in the
United States, which is required by Outer Space Treaty’s article
VI to authorize and continuously oversee remote sensing opera-
tors in accordance with the Outer Space Treaty.72 NOAA is the
U.S. authorizing and supervising agency. It acts in close coordi-
nation with the Department of Defense (DOD) and the USDOS
because of the national security aspects and international treaty
obligations concerning remote sensing.
U.S. policy favors commercial remote sensing over govern-
ment-operated sensing.73 Consequently, the U.S. government,
through the DOD, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
(NGA), and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), is a
major customer of U.S. commercial remote sensing operators.
All small satellite commercial remote sensing operators are re-
quired to obtain operating authorization from NOAA.74 In or-
der to be licensed, they must submit a detailed business plan to
NOAA. Under the statute, the operators must deposit remote
sensing data in the U.S. government data archive. The U.S. gov-
ernment audits each remote sensing operator annually to verify
compliance with government regulations. An amended license
is required if the operator’s business, or a part of it, is acquired
by a foreign person. NOAA also needs to know about an opera-
tor’s contracts to sell remote sensing data to foreigners. The
U.S. government exercises shutter control over its licensed oper-
ators. For example, remote sensing of Israel by U.S. remote sens-
ing operators is prohibited according to U.S. law. Consequently,
much is required of the NOAA’s small staff, which is presently
struggling with the heavy influx of applications from small satel-
lite operators for permission to operate remote sensing small
satellites.
72 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 28, art. VI.
73 51 U.S.C. § 60134; Exec. Off. of the President, U.S. Commercial Remote
Sensing Policy (Apr. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Remote Sensing Policy].
74 Remote Sensing Policy, supra note 73. Note the frustrations of remote sens-
ing operators who are denied government permission to sense and sell very so-
phisticated imagery. See Walter Scott, U.S. Satellite Imaging Regulations Must be
Modernized, SPACE NEWS (Aug. 29, 2016), http://spacenews.com/op-ed-u-s-satel
lite-imaging-regulations-must-be-modernized/ [https://perma.cc/2JJ6-AXK4];
see also Jeff Foust, Not All Regulatory Problems are Equal, SPACE NEWS MAG. (Sept. 12,
2016), https://www.spacenewsmag.com/foust-forward/not-all-regulatory-prob
lems-are-equal/ [https://perma.cc/RP7U-BASJ].
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VI. SMALL SATELITES MUST BE REGISTERED IN THEIR
NATIONAL REGISTRY AND THE U.N. REGISTRY75
The United Nations Registration Convention requires the
purpose and orbital location of all satellites to be individually
registered, for reason of safety, so other operators can avoid col-
liding with new satellites in orbit, new operators can safely plan
to launch their space objects, and when accidents happen, to
determine liability by identifying the involved space objects.
Some of the proposed small satellite systems are located in fairly
close proximity to each other. In order to avoid conflicts, opera-
tors need public information about the orbital slots and fre-
quencies used by other operators. Pursuant to Outer Space
Treaty’s article VI, the state of registry is likely to be the appro-
priate state in which to license each satellite and to conduct con-
tinuing oversight over all its activities in outer space.76
The Registration Convention’s articles I, II, and III require
small satellites to be registered because they are space objects.77
Failure to register or to delay registration of small satellites
tends to defeat the purpose of the treaty.78 Unregistered satel-
lites are a problem. Currently, seven percent of space objects are
not registered.79 Universities and amateur small launch opera-
tors have in the past often neglected to register because they
thought that they were too small and insignificant to be consid-
ered space objects. They remain subject to international law re-
gardless of failure to register because registration of small
satellites can be considered to be customary international law.80
Registration determines which state may exercise jurisdiction
and control over a satellite. It also determines issues relating to
ownership of a satellite. From a safety point of view, a large infu-
sion of new satellites into outer space makes registration even
more urgent. Small space objects are more difficult to track than
75 See generally Registration Convention, supra note 30; LYALL & LARSEN, supra
note *, Chapter 4: Space Objects: Control, Registration, Return and Liability –
The Treaties and the Practice (see section discussing the U.N. Registration
Convention).
76 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 28, art. VI.
77 Registration Convention, supra note 30, arts. I–III.
78 See 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 152 (Hobe et al. eds., 2009).
79 Paul B. Larsen, The Berlin Space Protocol Update, 64 ZEITSCHRIFT FUER LUFT-
UND WELTRAUMRECHT 361, 385 (2015).
80 See COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW, supra note 78, at 164; see also Neta
Palkovitz & Tanja Masson-Zwaan, Orbiting under the Radar: Nano Satellites, Interna-
tional Obligations and National Space Laws, 55 PROC. INT’L INST. SPACE L. 566, 569
(2012).
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large space objects. Satellites are continuously tracked by U.S.
and Russian military authorities, and by the European Space
Agency (ESA), as well as by a handful of other states. However,
tracking is expensive. Most states do not have the resources to
track satellites. Existing tracking systems, being free and govern-
ment-operated, cannot be held liable for negligent tracking.
As the Registration Convention is a treaty, the obligations to
register satellites rests immediately on governments and their
agents. Under the Registration Convention, the launching state
is required to register its space objects in an appropriate na-
tional registry of space, as well as in the United Nations Regis-
try.81 The definition of “launching state” is broad. It is defined as
the state, which launches, procures the launch, or “from whose
territory or facility a space object is launched.”82 Thus, several
states may fit the definition of “launching state” under the Regis-
tration Convention, and the various eligible states must “jointly
determine which one of them shall register” the space object
because only one state may register.83 The national registry is
not required to be publicly available; nevertheless, the U.N. Sec-
retary General is required by the treaty to maintain a public reg-
istry of all the space objects registered in the national
registries.84 The launching state is to update the U.N. registry as
space objects change orbits or are deorbited.
Virtually all states are parties to Outer Space Treaty’s article
VIII, which mandates that it is the state in which a satellite is
registered that has jurisdiction and control over each individual
satellite.85 Thus, owners of a satellite may prefer its national state
to become the registrant in order to protect ownership. Never-
theless, some satellite operators opt for registration by the most
lenient state, the so-called state of convenience. Selection of
state of registry also becomes an issue when an individual satel-
lite, or a fleet of satellites, are sold to a party located in another
state. As described below in the liability section, the state of the
purchaser may be reluctant to accept transfer of registry because
that will result in potential liability.86 A precedent was set when
the Netherlands agreed to register a satellite but declined liabil-
ity. The Netherlands agreed to register the Triton-1 satellite but
81 Registration Convention, art. I, supra note 30, art. II, para. 1.
82 Id. art. I(a).
83 Id. art. II, para. 2.
84 Id. art. IV.
85 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 28, art. VIII.
86 See infra, Section VII, Liability Issues of Small Satellites.
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declined to become a launching state because it did not want to
become liable under the Liability Convention.87 One author
opines that the Netherlands might become liable under the Lia-
bility Convention anyway.88 A similar problem may arise for a
holder of a security interest seeking to foreclose on the security
interest for non-payment.89
VII. LIABILITY ISSUES OF SMALL SATELLITES90
Small satellites are governed both by the liability provisions of
Outer Space Treaty’s article VII and by the Liability Convention,
as well as by customary international liability laws.91 They are
also subject to national laws on liability. The Outer Space Treaty
is adopted by all the states involved in outer space activities, and
it tends to express customary international law. Thus, it also ap-
plies to non-party states. Outer Space Treaty’s article VII pro-
vides that two different kinds of states, the state from whose
territory a satellite is launched or from whose facility a space
object is launched, may be held liable for damage caused to an-
other state by both its governmental and non-governmental
satellites.92
There is no limit on liability. Most planned small satellites are
non-governmental satellites. The consequence of the principle
of state liability established by the Outer Space Treaty is that
responsible states, which may be held liable for the operations
of commercially operated small satellites, are cautious or should
be cautious about licensing small satellite operators to do busi-
ness. On the other hand, flag of convenience states, having few
assets and little or no governmental oversight capacity, may take
the opportunity to authorize non-government operations over
which they have little control or oversight. Considering the mul-
titude of small satellite launches, the liability exposure of states
grows commensurably.
87 SMALL SATELLITES, REGULATORY CHALLENGES AND CHANGES, supra note 1, at
63.
88 Id.
89 Larsen, The Berlin Space Protocol Update, supra note 79, at 382.
90 See Liability Convention, supra note 29; see generally LYALL & LARSEN, supra
note *, Chapter 4: Space Objects: Control, Registration, Return and Liability –
The Treaties and the Practice.
91 Myres S. McDougal, Artificial Satellites: A Modest Proposal, 51 AM. J. INT’L L.
75–77 (1957); see The Corfu Channel Case, Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 1 (Apr. 9);
Trail Smelter Arbitration, 33 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 182 (1939).
92 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 28, art. VII.
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In addition to being party to Outer Space Treaty’s article VII,
many states are also parties to the Liability Convention, which
broadens the liability exposure of small satellite states. Under
the Liability Convention, four different kinds of states are de-
fined as the launching state, and may thus be held severally or
jointly liable for damages caused by small space objects. Those
are the states that launch or procure launches of space object
and states from whose territory or facility space objects are
launched.93 State liability under the Liability Convention is also
unlimited. Liability for surface damage is strict. Liability is based
on proof of fault for damages caused by space objects in outer
space.
Outer Space Treaty’s article VI authorizing process94 is used
by governments to protect themselves against potential govern-
mental liability.95 Thus, in order to obtain a launch license, non-
governmental operators can be and are required to purchase
insurance coverage reimbursing the licensing government for
damages caused. However, many implementing national laws
permit satellite operators to limit the amount of insurance de-
pending on exposure, and on available private insurance. Thus,
governments retain considerable exposure to catastrophic liabil-
ity losses in excess of national liability limits of private operators.
Persons killed, injured, or damaged by a foreign space object
can only recover under either treaty through action brought on
their behalf by a government, usually their own government. No
punitive damages are allowed under these two treaties.
The only example of a recovery relating to the Liability Con-
vention is Canada’s recovery from the then-Soviet Union in the
Cosmos 954 claim, in which a defunct Soviet nuclear satellite
caused damage in northern Canada.96 No lawsuit was brought
by Canada. When presented with the Canadian claims for dam-
ages, the then-Soviet Union declined liability but agreed to pay a
negotiated compensation settlement in the amount of three mil-
lion Canadian dollars, which can be construed as recognition of
93 Liability Convention, supra note 29, arts. I–III. Note that the most recent
treaty obligation prevails. See United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties,
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 289, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (May
23, 1969).
94 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 28, art. VI.
95 Implemented in the United States by the Commercial Space Launch Act,
supra note 44.
96 See Canada—Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Protocol on Settlement of Canada’s
Claims for Damages Caused by “Cosmos 954”, 20 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 689 (1981).
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liability. The small compensation recovered in the Cosmos 954
claim, and the wish of individual claimants to control their own
lawsuits, may cause an individual claimant to prefer to bring pri-
vate claims in national courts against small satellite owners for
loss and damages incurred because that is permitted by the
Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention. Thus, foreign
claimants may bring claims for damages in American courts hav-
ing jurisdiction over small satellite companies under state laws.
Liability may be unlimited depending on the law of particular
U.S. states.
Besides the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention,
claims may also be brought under customary international law
pursuant to case law, such as the Trail Smelter Arbitration and
the Corfu Channel case, both of which concluded that one state
may recover damages from another state for damages caused.97
Domestic claimants cannot invoke treaty liability rights against
small satellite operators of their own nationality for injury and
damage caused. They can only bring claims against domestic op-
erators under domestic liability laws. National liability laws on
small satellite injury and damage caused in outer space would
tend to be based on fault.
Experts point to a greatly increased risk of collisions likely to
be caused by the large influx of small satellites.98 Administra-
tively, the U.S. government is used to processing a few applica-
tions at a time, and one can only speculate about the
government reaction to the request of one operator to author-
ize the launch of 3,800 small satellites.99 Governments will seek
to shift the increased liability exposure over to private insurance
companies. The pool of insurance for outer space activities is
rather small and may not be sufficient to accommodate the ad-
ditional risk. The price of insurance will increase commensurate
with the increased risk. The national laws tend to limit private
liability exposure, leaving excess exposure to the governments.
Thus, the ability of governments to shift the risk exposure over
to private insurance companies is limited. Considerable risk ex-
posure will still rest on the government, thus leaving govern-
ments with the option to restrict the number of licenses to
launch small satellites.
97 See The Corfu Channel Case, Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 1 (Apr. 9); Trail
Smelter Arbitration, supra note 91.
98 Karucaliaglu, supra note 8.
99 See Weeden, supra note 8.
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Yet another consequence of the increased risk of collisions in
outer space will be the reluctance of governments to agree to
register satellites when requested to register titles to satellites be-
ing sold to companies in another country.100 That may result in
reluctance to accept registrations.
Regarding possible liability for personal injury and harm to
the surface of the Earth, national liability laws tend to follow the
example of the Liability Convention and impose absolute liabil-
ity for small satellite harm to persons and property on the sur-
face of the Earth. This accords with the common law rule
established in the 1868 case of Rylands v. Fletcher.101 That would
also conform with the liability regime of the Rome Convention
on aircraft liability for surface damage.102
VIII. SPACE DEBRIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES103
Small satellite operators currently plan to triple the number
of operating satellites in Earth’s orbit.104 While each of the addi-
tional satellites would be small, they would nevertheless each
constitute an additional variable to be taken into account in
maintaining order in outer space. Orbital slots and radio fre-
quencies are now recognized to be scarce resources.105
Non-governmental entities, such as small satellite operators,
are subject to international environmental laws.106 They are sub-
ject to generally applicable international environmental laws
whether established by treaty or by customary international law.
It is also possible that small satellite operators may be subject to
the Precautionary Principle, which requires them to exercise
caution before acting in order to fully understand their environ-
mental duties so that they do not trigger unexpected environ-
mental dangers.107 The Principle is primarily used by decision
100 Larsen, The Berlin Space Protocol Update, supra note 79, at 384–85.
101 Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R.3 H.L. 330 (1868).
102 Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the
Surface, Oct. 7, 1952, 310 U.N.T.S. 181.
103 See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note *, Chapter 10, Environmental Regulation.
104 See Karacalioglu, supra note 8.
105 ITU CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, art. 44, para. 2.
106 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 28, art. III.
107 Note the reference to “precautionary measures” in the preface to the Liabil-
ity Convention, supra note 33. See Paul B. Larsen, Application of Precautionary Prin-
ciple to the Moon, 71 J. AIR L & COM. 295, 297 (2006).
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makers in assessing and managing risk.108 The looming Kessler
Syndrome relates to the Precautionary Principle and the over-
arching worry in launching many small satellites into outer
space. In 1978, Donald Kessler, then a NASA scientist, predicted
a self-sustaining cascade of space debris collisions in LEO.109
The Kessler Syndrome states that space debris will continue to
create more debris as debris cumulatively collide, thus fragment-
ing into endlessly smaller and more pieces. Increasing space
debris will eventually preclude access to outer space and all
space business will stop.
Under Outer Space Treaty’s Article VI, the parties to the
treaty “bear international responsibility” not only for their gov-
ernmental activities in outer space but also for the activities of
their nationals, thus “assuring that national activities are carried
out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present
Treaty.”110 That also places responsibility on the states to ensure
that their non-governmental operators conform to Outer Space
Treaty requirements, for example, by acting in outer space with
“due regard [for] the corresponding interests” of other states
and their non-governmental representatives in using outer
space orbital slots.111 Such slots must be free from interference
by the satellites of other states, and thus not exposed to contami-
nations from and harmful interferences with present and
planned future activities in outer space. The International Court
of Justice conclusively validated the due regard principle in the
case of Iceland v. United Kingdom holding that United Kingdom
fishermen had failed to pay due regard to the legal rights of
Iceland to declare and reserve an exclusive fisheries zone
around Iceland for its fishermen, to the exclusion of United
Kingdom fishermen.112 The principle of due regard was adopted
in the Law of the Sea Convention.113
108 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the
Commission on the Precautionary Principle, at 3, para. 4, COM (2000) 1 final
(Feb. 2, 2000).
109 See Donald J. Kessler & Burton G. Cour-Palais, Collision Frequency of Artificial
Satellites: The Creation of a Debris Belt, 83 J. OF GEOPHYSICAL RES. 2637 (1978). The
Kessler Syndrome predicts a steady increase in debris as old debris constantly
collides with other debris breaking into increasingly smaller fragments, conse-
quently resulting in a drastically rising statistical collision curve.
110 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 28, art. VI.
111 See id. art. IX.
112 Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25).
113 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 87, para. 2, Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 396.
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In a larger sense, it may be argued that a large influx of new
small satellites from one state will reduce the opportunities of
satellite operators of other states to use outer space. In a nar-
rower sense, the many small satellites arguably will prevent the
plans of other countries, in particular the economically less de-
veloped countries, to use specific orbits and frequencies.114 The
Outer Space Treaty’s article IX concern with causing “harmful
interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful
exploration and use of outer space”115 leads to discussion of
space debris and the adverse consequences of the frequent
space debris caused by the short nine to eighteen month dura-
bility of small satellites. For example, renewal of the estimated
fleet of 3,800 small satellites may necessitate replacement of
1,000 small satellites each year. Usually launched in LEO, most
of their debris will deorbit in rather short time. That means that
a lot of space debris will enter the atmosphere. Not all of it may
burn during its descent through the atmosphere; some may rain
down on the surface of the Earth. Either way it will cause
pollution.116
Launch and operation of small satellites will be subject to the
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) space debris guidelines approved by the 2007
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 62/217.117 These
guidelines have become mandatory rules by adoption as na-
tional regulations by the individual national states. Thus, the
launch licenses for small satellites issued by a national state118
114 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 28, art. I (“use of outer space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in
the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
development, and shall be the province of all mankind.”); see also ITU CONSTITU-
TION, supra note 32, art. 44, para. 2 (regarding use of radiofrequencies and orbi-
tal slots “taking into account the special needs of the developing countries and
the geographical situation of particular countries.”).
115 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 28, art. IX.
116 See Search and Rescue Agreement, supra note 31, art. 5, para. 4 (requiring
the launching state, under the direction of the affected state, to eliminate possi-
ble harm to the affected state from space debris.).
117 G.A. Res. 62/217, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/217 (Feb. 1, 2008).
118 See 51 U.S.C.A. § 31501. NASA has the lead in organizing U.S. regulations
on space debris, and NASA has adopted the following rule:
Requirement 4.6-1. Disposal for space structures in or passing through
LEO: A spacecraft or orbital stage with a perigee altitude below
2,000 km shall be disposed of by one of the following three meth-
ods: (Requirement 56557)
a. Atmospheric reentry option: (1) Leave the space structure in an
orbit in which natural forces will lead to atmospheric reentry within
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sets the following rules119 for government authorizations to
launch:
(a) The operator must build each individual satellite so as to
produce as few fragments as possible and to drop launch
debris close to the launch station.120
(b) The operator must minimize the potential for break-ups dur-
ing the operational phases. This requires special design as
well as ability to avoid obstacles in outer space. Application
of this rule depends on whether the small satellite is opera-
tional so as to be steered around other satellites and space
debris.121
(c) The operator must limit the probability of accidental colli-
sions in space. This requires navigability. Small satellites that
cannot be navigated around other space objects in outer
space may thus not be authorized.122
(d) The operator must avoid intentional destruction in outer
space. Whenever destruction is necessary, it should be con-
ducted at low altitude where space debris can deorbit
quickly. This rule requires that there be sufficient fuel on
board to move the satellite, as well as to control
navigation.123
(e) The operator must convincingly prove to the licensing au-
thorities that all energy sources on board the satellite in or-
bit can be depleted or vented before post-mission break-up.
This will avoid explosions and fragments of debris.124
(f) The operator must either remove defunct satellites from or-
bit after mission completion or bring them into proximity to
25 years after the completion of mission but no more than 30 years
after launch; or (2) Maneuver the space structure into a controlled
de-orbit trajectory as soon as practical after completion of mission
b. Storage orbit option: Maneuver the space structure into an orbit
with perigee altitude greater than 2000 km and apogee less than
GEO - 500 km.
c. Direct retrieval: Retrieve the space structure and remove it from
orbit within 10 years after completion of mission.
Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin., STD 8719.14A, Process for Limiting Orbital
Debris (2011), available at https://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/doctree/8719
14.pdf [https://perma.cc/9H8L-2V9K] [hereinafter NASA, STD 8719.14A].
119 INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COMMITTEE, IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guide-
lines, IADC-02-01 (Sept. 2007) (rev. 1) [hereinafter IADC Guidelines]. The
COPUOS work on space debris guidelines was based on preparatory work and
coordination within the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee.
120 Id. at 8.
121 Id. at 8–9.
122 Id. at 10.
123 Id. at 9.
124 Id. at 8.
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Earth (LEO) for de-orbit. The Interagency Space Debris Co-
ordination committee (IADC) recommended that such deb-
ris be removed from LEO within twenty-five years.125 The
United States follows this rule.126
(g) In executing de-orbit, satellite operators should be aware
that de-orbiting space debris may cause damage and may ad-
versely affect the Earth’s environment. Because small satel-
lites are designed to last only nine to eighteen months, and
because they orbit in LEO, the chance of small satellite frag-
ments reaching the surface of the Earth is significant. The
frequency of de-orbits increases chances of environmental
pollution, injury, and property damage. Small satellite opera-
tors should ensure that space debris does “not pose an un-
due risk to people or property” on Earth.127
(h) Satellites located in high GEO orbits, which cannot easily be
de-orbited post-mission, should be placed in graveyard orbits
where they cannot cause interference. Thus, satellite opera-
tors need to leave sufficient fuel onboard to move satellites
out of GEO into yet higher orbit. At this point in time, few
small satellites are planned to be high orbits, so this may not
be a significant problem for small satellites.128
One of the space law treaties, The Agreement on Rescue of
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space, specifically addresses the earthly
environmental problems of de-orbited space debris. Article 5 of
the treaty provides that a state, which finds within its borders
space debris “of a hazardous or deleterious nature may so notify
the launching authority, which shall immediately take effective
steps, under the direction and control of the said Contracting
Party, to eliminate possible danger of harm.”129 The launching
state is responsible for the cost associated with the removal. The
treaty’s definition of the liable “launching state” is narrow. It re-
fers only to the state or international organization responsible
for the launching.130
The estimate that “from 2036 collisions [will] start to occur
regularly” and that there will then be a rapidly increasing num-
ber of collisions and near-collisions with space debris is trouble-
125 Id. at 9–10.
126 See NASA, STD 8719.14A, supra note 118, sec. 4.3.2.1.
127 IADC Guidelines, supra note 119, at 10.
128 Id. at 9.
129 Search and Rescue Agreement, supra note 31, art. 5, para. 4.
130 Id. art. 6. The 1968 Rescue and Return Agreement’s definition of launching
state is more narrow than the much broader definition of launching state in the
1971 Liability Convention, thus its application is smaller.
2017] SMALL SATELLITE LEGAL ISSUES 299
some.131 Space debris remains a major problem for small
satellites because of their multitude and rapid replacements.
This estimate accords with past production of space debris and
is in line with the Kessler Syndrome. Such debris development
would cause governments to hesitate to grant launch authoriza-
tions to a large number of applicants. The applicants will have
to convince the authorizing governments that they will strictly
follow the COPUOS space debris guideline to limit the orbital
life spent in LEO to twenty-five years.132 Nevertheless, one ex-
pert suggests that it will be necessary to reevaluate the adequacy
of the twenty-five year de-orbit rule based on actual experience
and further modeling.133 From the point of view of governmen-
tal regulatory agencies, considering the huge number of small
satellites being planned, the environmental issues may well be
the most serious issue. ESA’s chief space debris expert said that
it would be “totally insane” to allow an increase in the present
level of space debris by adding large numbers of small satellites
to outer space.134
IX. PUBLIC SAFETY EFFECTS OF SMALL SATELLITES135
Outer space lacks basic space traffic management. The ex-
treme speed with which space objects move in outer space
makes navigation extremely hazardous. Constant tracking of all
space objects at all times is important for several reasons.136
Tracking and operators’ self-interest in avoiding accidents are
the major ways of managing traffic in outer space. The U.S. Air
Force tracks all active satellites, as well as large space debris.137
The Air Force currently tracks 21,000 space objects, including
131 Karucalioglu, supra note 8.
132 See Jeff Foust, Smallsat Operators Have Yet to Allay Concerns about Space Junk,
SPACE NEWS (June 24, 2015), http://spacenews.com/smallsat-operators-have-yet-
to-allay-concerns-about-space-junk/ [https://perma.cc/G4C4-43RX].
133 Karucalioglu, supra note 8.
134 2016 IAC Panel Discussion, supra note 25 (remarks by H. Krag, Head of
ESA Space Debris Office); see also Morring, Collision Course, supra note 25. This is
also the author’s personal recollection from the conference.
135 See generally Paul B. Larsen, Outer Space Traffic Standards, PROC. 6TH IAASS




136 See Mike Gruss, Good (Space) Fences Make for Good (Orbital) Neighbors, SPACE
NEWS (Sept. 19, 2016), http://spacenews.com/good-space-fences-make-for-good-
orbital-neighbors/ [https://perma.cc/Q5B7-4D58].
137 Id.
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space debris. A new Space Fence tracking system is being built
and is planned to be operational in 2018.138 It will provide the
Air Force with ten times better accuracy, precision, and
timeliness.
The Air Force is willing to share non-military information with
civilian operators. Small satellite operators depend on the Air
Force for information about possible dangers, and for space sit-
uational awareness. Thus, the public safety relationship with the
Air Force is important. However, military security is the main
focus of the Air Force; a tracking service for the civilian sector is
secondary and incidental. Currently, the Science and Policy In-
stitute is studying various ways to transfer the function of warn-
ing civilian satellites of possible interferences and collisions
based on tracking by the Air Force to the FAA.139
Small satellites orbit mainly in LEO. The International Space
Station (ISS) is located in LEO. Virgin Galactic and Blue Origin
are now planning tourist flights into LEO. This is the space
through which all satellites must ascend and de-orbit after flight
in outer space. Space debris is also concentrated in LEO. So,
LEO constitutes a crowded dangerous mix of traffic where pub-
lic safety is a significant issue.140
The novelty and large number of small satellites to be
launched in outer space raises additional public safety concerns.
Some small satellites are presently not navigable and cannot be
steered around other space objects, including space debris. The
danger of collision is particularly acute when encountering non-
navigable space debris. The 2009 collision in LEO of an Iridium
satellite and a defunct Russian Cosmos satellite, which could not
navigate,141 shocked the world into sharper awareness that outer
space needs better space traffic management. Awareness of the
need for public safety in outer space motivated the 2009 U.S.
138 See id.
139 Both the Air Force and the FAA favor such a transfer. See Jeff Foust, FAA
Pins Price on Taking on Space-Traffic Job, SPACE NEWS MAG. (Nov. 7, 2016), https://
www.spacenewsmag.com/feature/faa-pins-price-on-taking-on-space-traffic-job/
[https://perma.cc/3VLH-ALPG]. Private businesses are also now offering colli-
sion-warning services. See Debra Werner, Congestion Could be Good for Business,
SPACE NEWS MAG., (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.spacenewsmag.com/feature/con
gestion-could-be-good-for-business/ [https://perma.cc/E4GT-JQBW].
140 Note the space debris rules to limit the presence in LEO as much as possi-
ble, supra notes 118 and 119.
141 Frans G. von der Dunk, Too-Close Encounters of the Third Kind: Will the Liability
Convention Stand the Test of the Cosmos 2251-Iridium 33 Collision?, in PROC. INT’L
INST. SPACE L. 2009 199 (2010).
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policy that the United States would begin to “cooperate with in-
teragency, international, and commercial partners to define and
promote safe and responsible space operations.”142
Public safety is an objective of international space law. Outer
Space Treaty article VI makes states responsible for non-govern-
mental satellite operations in outer space.143 The national states
use the authorizing process to compel small satellite operators
to construct and operate satellites safely. Public safety is not only
“in the interest of all countries,”144 it is also part of paying “due
regard”145 to the corresponding interests of all the states to be
safe in the dangerous outer space environment. Outer Space
Treaty’s article III incorporates the U.N. Charter’s national se-
curity provisions and makes public safety provisions of other in-
ternational law applicable for the operation of all satellites.146
Public safety is at the heart of the Search and Rescue Conven-
tion, the objectives of which are rescue and return of lost space
objects and limitation of the impact on the Earth’s surface of
“hazardous and deleterious” debris from space objects.147 Public
safety is also the objective of the Registration Convention, the
purpose of which is to alert all satellite operators to the location
of satellites so as to prevent collisions.148 Early launches of ex-
perimental small satellites were not registered because the
Netherlands and Belgium did not consider themselves as
launching states.149 Non-registration of small satellites has ad-
verse effect on public safety, particularly as the volume of small
satellites increases greatly as planned.150 Failure to register frus-
trates identification of launching states whose satellites have
caused injury and damage.151
ITU has a significant stake in outer space public safety. Satel-
lites, including small satellites, cannot function in outer space
without cleared radiofrequencies and orbital slots. It is the pur-
pose of the ITU legal regime to establish interference-free radi-
ofrequencies that can be used to navigate space objects and to
142 U.S. Dep’t of Def., Directive 3100.10, Space Policy 2 (Oct. 18, 2012).
143 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 28, art. VI.
144 Id. art. I.
145 Id. art. IX.
146 Id. art. III.
147 Search and Rescue Convention, supra note 31, arts. I–V.
148 See Registration Convention, supra note 30, pmbl.
149 Palkovitz & Massoon-Zwaan, supra note 80, at 571–572, 574.
150 See supra Section VI, Small Satellites Must Be Registered In Their National
Registry and the U.N. Registry.
151 Registration Convention, supra note 30, art. VI.
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assign orbits so that satellites will be able to operate safely and
avoid collisions. Safety of space objects is under discussion in the
United Nations Committee for Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.152
It is also discussed in the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion (ICAO) due to its concern with the transit of space objects
through air space.153
X. SMALL SATELLITE NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES
Outer space is the proverbial high ground favoured by the old
Chinese military strategist, Sun Tzu, in The Art of War.154 Use of
the significant kinetic energy derived from the high speed of
space objects is a temptation.155 The three military space pow-
ers—the United States, Russia, and China—are engaged in in-
tense competition for military dominance of outer space.156 In
this competitive environment, small satellites are increasingly
being considered for military uses. Small satellites have military
advantages over large satellites. They can be built very quickly
and cheaply and they can be deployed rapidly as need arises.157
Small satellites are used for military communication.158 They
can be used to probe other satellites in space. The U.S. Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has resolved that
small satellites can be used for military reconnaissance.
DARPA’s SEEME small satellite program is planning a constella-
tion of twenty-four small reconnaissance satellites.159 It is also
thought that small satellites could be useful in countering Inter-
continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).160 Small satellites have
152 Press Release, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Outer
Space Comm. Closes with a Focus on the Future, U.N. Press Release UNIS/OS/
470 (June 21, 2016), available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/press
rels/2016/unisos470.html [https://perma.cc/RSP8-T9RJ].
153 Convention on International Civil Aviation, art. 3, para. (d), art. 10, Dec. 7,
1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (establishing the ICAO, which sets standards for air space
navigation).
154 SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR (Lionel Giles ed., 1994).
155 Technology Quarterly, supra note 8.
156 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note *, at 508–09; see also Paul B. Larsen, Outer Space
Arms Control: Can the USA, Russia and China Make This Happen?, J. CONFLICT SECUR-
ITY L., June 20, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krw026.
157 Terry C. Wallace, The Cubesat Security Edge, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Oct. 10, 2016, at 58.
158 The Iridium Satellite Constellation operates seventy-two small satellites in
LEO. DOD contracts with Iridium for satellite communication services.
159 SMALL SATELLITES, REGULATORY CHALLENGES AND CHANGES, supra note 1, at
292 (describing DARPA’s SEEME Satellite Solution Technical Revolution).
160 Technology Quarterly, supra note 8.
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much in common with missiles in that “ ‘[t]hey share many of
the same kind of seekers and sensors, [and] guidance
computers.’”161
Small satellites may be used in anti-satellite (ASAT) pro-
grams.162 Very small ASAT satellites may not be clearly identifi-
able, and thus not trackable from Earth. A stealthy small satellite
could be used to destroy space objects without being detected.
In this context, an influential U.S. military strategist is report-
edly of the view that aggression in outer space is more advanta-
geous than defense. The Economist magazine reports, “[a]s Doug
Loverro, America’s Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Space Policy, puts it, space is an environment which, at the mo-
ment, [favors] attack over [defense].”163 This strategist states
that because small satellites can be launched quickly to replace
military hardware that has been destroyed or lost in outer space,
sufficient launch capability and satellites should be kept in re-
serve and ready to launch such replenishments.164
Military operations in outer space are becoming increasingly
complex and challenging. There are many space objects, both
large and small satellites, as well as space debris, which require
constant tracking by the U.S. Air Force.165 Tracking and maneu-
verability are required to avoid other space objects and space
debris. Civilian small satellites have military characteristics.
Much remote sensing by civilian small satellites has both military
and civilian value. They are classified as dual use because the
technology of which they are made can be used for both military
and civilian purposes. Therefore, they are subject to both inter-
national and unilateral national import and export restrictions.
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was
adopted in 1987 to restrict the spread of materials that can be
used to deliver weaponry including weapons of mass destruc-
tion.166 Thirty-five states are MTCR members, including both
161 Mike Gruss, Getting a (Robotic) Hand on Smallsats, SPACE NEWS MAG. (Aug. 15,
2016), https://www.spacenewsmag.com/feature/getting-a-robotic-hand-on-small-
sats/ [https://perma.cc/2SAU-YM65] (The U.S. company Raytheon, as part of
its contract with DARPA, builds SEMEE small killer satellites to eliminate inter-
continental ballistic missiles.).
162 Technology Quarterly, supra note 8.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 See Gruss, Good (Space) Fences, supra note 136 (describing the greatly im-
proved Air Force tracking system).
166 See generally LYALL & LARSEN, supra note *, at 461.
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the United States and Russia.167 The MTCR has established two
categories of guidelines.168 Category I is the most restrictive.
Items on this list are so dangerous that denial of export license
is presumed, unless proved otherwise. Category II is less restric-
tive. Permission to export and import items on this list is
granted on a case-by-case examination of the application. For
compliance, the MTCR depends on self-enforcement by the
member states, which adopt domestic laws and regulations en-
forcing the MTCR.169
International trade of small satellites was further restricted in
1995, when a global spread of countries entered into yet an-
other voluntary arrangement to curb the export of arms and
military materials, and to promote non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons.170 The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls
for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies
is a multilateral export control regime. The arrangement has
nine lists of restricted military items. List number nine lists
spacecraft and their payloads.171 Transparency is the main fea-
ture of this arrangement. The Wassenaar states have agreed to
inform each other about any international transactions regard-
ing the 300 items listed.172
Yet another restriction on trade in weaponry is based on Arti-
cle 7 of the U.N. Charter.173 The U.N. Security Council has
adopted universally binding rules requiring states to adopt and
enforce regulations prohibiting the export of weapons of mass
destruction.174 Violations are punishable by criminal sanc-
tions.175 This resolution also restricts trade in dual use small
satellites.176
167 MTCR Partners, MISSILE TECH. CONTROL REGIME, http://mtcr.info/part
ners/ [https://perma.cc/DX8B-PXT5].
168 See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note *, at 461.
169 See, e.g., International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120–130
(2016).
170 About Us, WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT, http://www.wassenaar.org/about-us/
[https://perma.cc/J462-VM7B].
171 List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List, WA-LIST
(16) 148 (2016), http://www.wassenaar.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/WA-
LIST-16-1-2016-List-of-DU-Goods-and-Technologies-and-Munitions-List.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9MHE-MY38].
172 See WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT, supra note 170.
173 U.N. Charter art. 7, ¶ 1.
174 S.C. Res. 1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
175 Id. ¶ 3(d).
176 See id. ¶ 1.
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The European Union (EU) has legal authority to regulate the
trade of all the member countries.177 This authority may be used
to implement and enforce the MTCR and Wassenaar regimes.
The EU Council of Ministers has adopted EU trade restrictions
on all dual use items that may be used to make and deliver weap-
ons of mass destructions. Therefore, the EU, in Council Regula-
tion (EC) No. 428/2009, adopted EU-wide export policy on
dual use items manufactured and produced within the EU and
also dual use items that originate in a non-EU country and are
intended for further export via the EU to other countries. This
EU regulation may also affect transfer of dual use items within
the EU from one member state to another member state. The
EU restricts export authorization for transfer of such dual use
items to any country that is on any U.N. or E.U. arms embargo
list. Thus, small satellites are subject to the EU Council Regula-
tion No 428/2009 adopted in 2009, as subsequently amended.
The U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITARs)
are an example of national regulation of intentional trade in
small satellites.178 The ITARs implement the 1999 U.S. Arms Ex-
port Control Act.179 The effect of the legislation was to prioritize
U.S. national security of U.S. international trade.180 The ITARs
regulate export licenses for all items on the official U.S. Muni-
tions List.181 Many materials used to build space objects are on
that list because they are dual use. Items on the Munitions List
may not be shared with non-U.S. persons, except by special U.S.
government permission.182 The export restrictions include re-
export to third countries. Administrative authority is vested in
the DOS.183 The DOD must approve DOS export licenses with
the U.S. Customs Service responsible for enforcement.184 Under
the 1999 legislation, the President may waive trade restrictions if
that is in the U.S. national interest.185 In consequence of the
1999 US Arms Export Control Act, as implemented by the
ITARs, U.S. trade in global space trade declined drastically from
177 See SMALL SATELLITES, REGULATORY CHALLENGES AND CHANGES, supra note 1,
at 295–304.
178 See 22 C.F.R. §§ 120–30 (2016).
179 Id. § 120.1; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note *, at 463.
180 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note *, at 463.
181 22 C.F.R. § 120.2.
182 See id. § 123.1.
183 Id. § 120.1.
184 Overview of U.S. Export Control System, STATE.GOV, https://www.state.gov/
strategictrade/overview/ [https://perma.cc/3CEF-H8MC].
185 Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778 (West 2017).
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63% to 30%.186 Subsequently, the Obama Administration de-
cided to move most space technology off the restrictive Muni-
tions List.187 Instead, they will be subject to the less restrictive
Department of Commerce Export Administration Regulations
(EARs).188 The revised export regulations entered into force on
December 31, 2016.189 Notably, the new export regulations for
space technology will not lift the trade restrictions on export of
space technology to China.190
XI. CONCLUSION
The energy and enthusiasm for burgeoning small satellite
technology easily leads to demand for immediate conversion to
and unrestricted use of this technology, regardless of existing
international and national laws and regulations. However, an at-
titude of disregard for the Outer Space Treaty, and other inter-
national and national space laws, could adversely affect the
conversion to small satellite technology.191 Small satellites will
have to accommodate to the confines of the outer space envi-
ronment. For example, the multitude of small satellites involves
real danger of increasing the space debris problem, which is reg-
ulated by both the international space debris guidelines and the
national space debris rules with which small satellites are pres-
ently struggling. It would not be in the interest of small satellite
technology to disregard this danger, which the Kessler Syn-
drome predicts could foreclose all satellites from using outer
space.
186 David F. Melcher, Tick Tock, SPACE NEWS MAG. (Oct. 10, 2016), https://
www.spacenewsmag.com/my-take/tick-tock/ [https://perma.cc/M6EA-56XY].
187 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-
239, § 1269 (2013); see Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR): Control of Spacecraft Systems and Related Items the President Deter-
mines No Longer Warrant Control Under the United States Munitions List
(USML), 79 Fed. Reg. 27,418, 27,418–419 (May 13, 2014).
188 Department of Commerce Export Administration Regulations EARs, 15
C.F.R. § 730 et seq. (2016).
189 Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Revisions of
U.S. Munitions List Category XII, 81 Fed. Reg. 70,340, 70,341 (Oct. 12, 2016).
190 Pub. L. 112-239 § 1269; see David M. Ewalt, Obama Drops Satellite Band, Gives
Aerospace Industry a Lift, FORBES (Jan. 4, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/da
videwalt/2013/01/04/obama-drops-satellite-ban-gives-aerospace-industry-a-lift/#
4369eef019aa [https://perma.cc/K3ZA-PF3S].
191 See Jason Andrews, Time for Smallsats to Grow Up and Take Responsibility, SPACE
NEWS MAG. (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.spacenewsmag.com/commentary/time-
for-smallsats-to-grow-up-and-take-responsibility/ [https://perma.cc/88M3-RVA
2].
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Furthermore, there is a recognized scarcity of radiofre-
quencies and orbital slots, particularly in the congested areas
such as LEO and GEO.192 The ITU legal regime exists to keep
order and will ration these scarce resources. The international
regime in turn is administered by member states according to
individual national rules such as the FCC regulations. The inter-
national and national rules cannot be disregarded. Thus, some
patience on the part of the small satellite industry is advisable.193
On the other hand, there is room for the legal regime to ad-
just and be responsive to the booming small satellite activity.
One of the earliest accommodations may well be to expedite the
multitude of applications for small satellites. For example,
NOAA, which issues licenses for remote sensing satellites, is
known to be short of staff to handle the many applications from
small satellite operators. NOAA needs resources to process ap-
plications and to coordinate individual applications with the
DOD and USDOS.194 The FAA also needs resources to process
and coordinate a multitude of applications for launches.
National applications to the FCC for radio frequencies to nav-
igate each individual small satellite, to locate orbital slot loca-
tions, and to process and license small satellites to broadcast to
and from the United States takes considerable staff time, partic-
ularly because that may require further international coordina-
tion with the ITU. Thus, both the FCC and the ITU need more
resources to handle the additional work. Staffing and expedi-
tion of service is a budget issue, which can be resolved by addi-
tional funding of Congressional appropriations.
The Outer Space Treaty’s article VI requires governmental
oversight over satellite activities in outer space.195 The FAA can
authorize launches and reentry but lacks legal authority to regu-
late activities of nongovernmental entities in outer space itself.
The 2015 U.S. Space Launch Competitiveness Act requires study
of U.S. legislation with the object of giving the U.S. government
such regulatory authority in accordance with the standards of
the Outer Space Treaty.196 Speedy adoption of new oversight
192 Ram Jakhu, Legal Issues of Satellite Telecommunications, the Geostationary Orbit,
and Space Debris, 5 ASTROPOLITICS 173, 175 (2007).
193 See Andrews, supra note 191.
194 See supra notes 43, 44.
195 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 28.
196 See U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-
90, § 108 (2015).
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legislation is recommended to implement treaty obligations and
to accommodate and prevent conflicts involving space objects.
New international space treaties are particularly time-consum-
ing to negotiate, and recently states have resorted to use of so-
called “soft law” to regulate new problems. Thus, COPUOS
adopted the space debris guidelines, which are particularly im-
portant to small satellites and which have been adopted by states
as binding regulations. Clearly, COPUOS is going to have to
adopt new international small satellite soft law guidelines on
traffic management in LEO.197 Other international coordina-
tion will be required to accommodate small satellites.198
The multitude of international and national outer space pri-
orities need to be accommodated. Human activities in outer
space must be safe. The ISS is in LEO. Astronauts in the ISS and
in the process of going to and from the ISS must be protected
from collision with debris, as well as with other space objects.
The national security activities in outer space continue to take
precedence over commercial activities. Military outer space
users are increasing. Scientific activities are also increasing.
Global warming restrictions established pursuant to the Paris
Agreement199 must be administered and policed, and remote
sensing satellite resources must be dedicated to disaster relief
under the U.N. Disaster Charter.200
Given that the technological change from a few large satellites
to a multitude of small satellites is coming, the biggest issue will
be how to fit the new technology into the space environment;
control of space debris and safety of satellite traffic are abso-
lutely essential for the success of this change in technology. The
need for space situational awareness, transparency, and traffic
management in LEO are growing. The small satellite industry
maintains that it will comply with the COPUOS space debris
197 The U.S. government favors an international code of safe traffic manage-
ment. See Directive 3100.10, supra note 142; 2016 IAC Panel Discussion, supra
note 25 (remarks by Professor Hobe).
198 See Andrews, supra note 191; Brian Weeden, Time For the U.S. Military to Let
Go of the Civil Space Situational Awareness Mission, SPACE NEWS (Sept. 20, 2016),
http://spacenews.com/time-for-the-u-s-military-to-let-go-of-the-civil-space-situa
tional-awareness-mission/ [https://perma.cc/63V5-H9NE].
199 See Paris Agreement, art. 2, para. 1, Dec. 15, 2015.
200 See Charter on Cooperation to Achieve the Coordinated Use of Space Facili-
ties in the Event of Natural or Technological Disaster, Rev. 3 (Apr. 25, 2000);
Paul B. Larsen, The Oso Landslide: Disaster Management Law in the Space Age, 40 WM.
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY. REV. 335 (2016).
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guidelines, including the twenty-five year de-orbit rule.201 Such
compliance may not be sufficient. The space debris guidelines
may need to be further strengthened in order for the small sat-
ellite revolution to succeed.202
201 2016 IAC Panel Discussion, supra note 25 (statement by M. Lindsay, repre-
senting OneWeb Ltd.).
202 Karucalioglu, supra note 8; see also 2016 IAC Panel Discussion, supra note 25
(statement by H. Krag, Head of ESA Space Debris Office).





The Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entre-
preneurship Act of 2015 (SPACE Act)1 aims to promote wealth
creation by guaranteeing protection of U.S. citizens’ property
rights to celestial resources. But there are serious concerns that
government protection of space property claims are incompati-
ble with international law. This article proposes a purely private
legal system for space commerce as an alternative to govern-
ment-defined and enforced property rights. Economic theory
shows how property rights and rules for adjudicating disputes
can be self-enforcing. Economic history shows that such a system
has worked well for centuries in international trade. A private
legal commercial order for space is thus both feasible and
desirable.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE SPACE ACT was signed into law by President Obama onNovember 25, 2015. Since then, several provisions of the act
have been the subject of controversy in policy and scholarly cir-
cles. Of particular importance is 51 U.S.C. § 51302, which in-
structs the executive branch to “promote the right of U.S.
citizens to engage in commercial exploration for and commer-
* Alexander William Salter is an Assistant Professor of Economics in the Rawls
College of Business at Texas Tech University. He is also the Comparative
Economics Research Fellow at TTU’s Free Market Institute. Dr. Salter received
his Ph.D. from George Mason University in 2014. His research on space-related
topics focuses on legal issues with property rights to celestial resources, as well as
economics of space law more generally. The author thanks Gil Guillory, Peter
Leeson, and Edward Stringham for helpful insights, and James Dean and Glenn
Furton for able research assistance. Any remaining errors belong to the author.
1 Spurring Private Aerospace Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act, Pub.
L. No. 114-19, 129 Stat. 704 (2015) [hereinafter SPACE Act].
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cial recovery of space resources free from harmful interference,
in accordance with the international obligations of the United
States and subject to authorization and continuing supervision
by the Federal Government.”2 While the text appears to guaran-
tee private property rights to celestial resources, it is unclear to
what extent this guarantee is compatible with the international
obligations of the United States, indicated in Article II of the
Outer Space Treaty.3
Under international law, states are sovereign and may define
and enforce property rights within their territories. In outer
space, the situation is different. No state may extend its sover-
eignty to outer space, as enshrined in the Outer Space Treaty,
which has been signed by the United States and all other
spacefaring nations. Article II of this treaty reads, “Outer space,
including the moon and celestial bodies, is not subject to na-
tional appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means.”4 This may also prevent pri-
vate citizens from appealing to their governments to defend
property rights to celestial resources5 As White6 points out, “in
common law countries such as the United States, legal theory
dictates that the government must have sovereignty over terri-
tory before it can confer title on its citizens. Consequently, tradi-
tional real property rights [in outer space] are inconsistent with
this theory.”
More recently, Tronchetti7 echoed White’s8 concerns:
The Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act appears to
collide with numerous provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. Par-
2 51 U.S.C. § 51302 (a)(3).
3 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
4 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, art. 2.
5 Virgiliu Pop, Approriation in Outer Space: The Relationship Between Land Owner-
ship and Sovereignty on the Celestial Bodies, 16 SPACE POLICY 275, 280–81 (2000);
James E. Dustan, Towards a Unified Theory of Space Property Rights: Sometimes the Best
Way to Predict the Weather is to Look Outside, in SPACE: THE FREE MARKET FRONTIER
223, 223–41 (Edward L. Hudgins ed., 2002); Wayne White, The Legal Regime for
Private Activities in Outer Space, in SPACE: THE FREE MARKET FRONTIER 83, 83–111
(E.L. Hudgins ed., 2002); Sarah Coffey, Establishing a Legal Framework for Property
Rights to Natural Resources in Outer Space, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 119, 139–42
(2009).
6 See White, The Legal Regime, supra note 5, at 84.
7 Fabio Tronchetti, The Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act: A Move For-
ward or a Step Back?, 34 SPACE POL’Y 6, 9 (2015).
8 White, The Legal Regime, supra note 5, at 96–97.
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ticularly problematic is its relation with Article II of the Treaty.
Under the Act the United States attributes itself the right to con-
fer property rights over space resources to its private companies.
Importantly, under international law, property rights require a
superior authority, a State, entitled to attribute and enforce
them. This signifies that States need to have property rights first
before being allowed to attribute them to other entities. Seeing
from this perspective the Act could be interpreted as an attempt
by the United States to claim property rights over asteroid re-
sources, a position which would clash with the non-appropriation
clause, not lastly because, as described, there is no consensus on
whether these resources can be appropriated and exploited.
Thus, there is serious question whether the U.S. government’s
understandable desire to create an environment conducive to
flourishing space commerce—something for which a means of
defining and enforcing private property rights is essential9—is
in fact compatible with existing international law, to which the
United States has consented. Recognizing the dilemma,
Tronchetti10 points to two categories of solutions for this prob-
lem. One relies on governance mechanisms at the international
level and the other at the national level. Ultimately, Tronchetti11
seems to prefer a mixture of both:
If the objective of the United States is to support a private aster-
oid mining industry this viewpoint would suggest the United
States to follow an international and domestic path. Internation-
ally, the United States should take the initiative to try to achieve
recognition of the permissibility under existing space law of the
appropriation and utilization of celestial bodies [sic] resources
for purposes other than scientific. Until such a recognition exists
any national initiative addressing this issue would be challenged
and criticized. Domestically, the United States should support
the nascent private space mining sector. However, rather than
rushing the adoption of controversial legislation dealing with ex-
traterrestrial property rights, it should gradually develop a na-
tional regulatory framework to manage (non-governmental)
activities on celestial bodies, including the identification of com-
petent federal agencies, the establishment of technical and safety
standards as well as of licensing procedures.
9 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 504 (1776); LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECO-
NOMICS (1949); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Rights Para-
digm, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 16, 22–25 (1973); Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J.
ECON. PERSP. 97, 97–98 (1991).
10 Tronchetti, supra note 7, at 7–8.
11 Id. at 9.
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Pursuing international and domestic solutions through estab-
lished legal channels is certainly a worthy endeavor. However,
there is a third option not considered by Tronchetti, and consid-
ered little by those exploring the architecture for a future space
legal system. The two options, international and domestic, are
both public law options. There remains the possibility of com-
mercial space governance evolving along the lines of private law.
A private legal order for space commerce would not use existing
national or international institutions of public governance (law
creation, adjudication, enforcement, etc.). Instead, law would
result from specific bargains made among commercial entities,
including whatever dispute resolution procedures agreed to by
the parties themselves.
This article contributes to the literature on legal issues associ-
ated with property rights in space12 by exploring the implica-
12 See Stephen Gorove, Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 37 FORDHAM
L. REV. 349, 349 (1968); Wayne N. White, Jr., Real Property Rights in Outer Space,
SPACE FUTURE (1998), http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/real_ prop-
erty_rights_in_outer_space.shtml [https://perma.cc/3CCY-75CC]; Wayne N.
White, Jr., Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, PROC. FORTY-SECOND COL-
LOQUIUM ON L. OUTER SPACE 174, 179–80 (2003); Ricky J. Lee, Reconciling Interna-
tional Space Law with the Commercial Realities of the Twenty-First Century, 4 SING. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 194, 237 (2000); Lawrence A. Cooper, Encouraging Space Explora-
tion Through a New Application of Space Property Rights, 19 SPACE POLICY 111, 117
(2003); Michael J. Listner, The Ownership and Exploitation of Outer Space: A Look at
Foundational Law and Future Legal Challenges to Current Claims, 1 REGENT J. INT’L L.
75, 94 (2003); Carol R. Buxton, Property in Outer Space: The Common Heritage of
Mankind Principle vs. the “First in Time, First in Right” Rule of Property, 69 J. AIR L. &
COM. 689, 705–07 (2004); Brandon C. Gruner, Comment, A New Hope for Interna-
tional Space Law: Incorporating Nineteenth Century First Possession Principles into the
1967 Space Treaty for the Colonozation of Outer Space in the Twenty-First Century, 35
SETON HALL L. REV. 299, 355–57 (2004); Henry R. Hertzfeld & Frans G. von der
Dunk, Bringing Space Law into the Commercial World: Property Rights Without Sover-
eignty, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 81, 98–99 (2005); Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal
System for Property Rights: From the Earth to the Stars, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 23, 44 (2005);
Jeremy L. Zell, Note, Putting a Mine on the Moon: Creating an International Authority
to Regulate Mining Rights in Outer Space, 15 MINN. J. INT’L L. 489, 518 (2006);
Nikhil D. Cooper, Note, Circumventing Non-Appropriation: Law and Development of
United States Space Commerce, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 457, 482 (2009); Alan
Wasser & Douglas Jobes, Space Settlements, Property Rights, and International Law:
Could a Lunar Settlement Claim the Lunar Real Estate It Needs to Survive?, 73 J. AIR L.
& COM. 37, 78 (2008); Tony Milligan, Property Rights and the Duty to Extend Human
Life, 27 SPACE POL’Y 190, 193 (2011); Rand Simberg, Homesteading the Final Fron-
tier: A Practical Proposal for Securing Property Rights in Space, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE
INST. 1 (2012), http://cei.org/sites/default/files/Rand%20Simberg%20-%20
Homesteading%20the%20Final%20Frontier.pdf; Rand Simberg, Property Rights in
Space, THE NEW ATLANTIS (2012); Brian C. Weeden & Tiffany Chow, Taking a
Common-Pool Resources Approach to Space Sustainability: A Framework and Potential Pol-
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tions of a private legal order for celestial commerce. Similar to
Salter and Leeson,13 this article explores the feasibility of a wide-
spread private legal order for commercial space activities, as well
as the socially beneficial aspects of this kind of ordering. This
argues that a private legal order permits the sophistication and
adaptability required to meet the inevitable wide range of partic-
ular circumstances facing commercial entities, while also provid-
ing the assurance necessary for commercial entities to form
expectations of each other’s future behavior. Since the article
discusses legal order not enforced by the state, it is also a part of
the literature on “analytic anarchism,”14 or how individuals and
social groups are able to govern themselves when they do not
have an irresistible monopoly enforcer. Systems of private law
lack this enforcer and so must devise order by other means.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section
II explores the feasibility of a private commercial legal order in
space. Section III considers the socially desirable aspects of such
a legal order. Section IV concludes by addressing several possi-
ble objections.
icies, 28 SPACE POL’Y 166, 172 (2012); Matthew Feinman, Mining the Final Frontier:
Keeping Earth’s Asteroid Mining Ventures from Becoming the Next Gold Rush, 14 PITT. J.
TECH. L. & POL’Y 202, 234–35 (2014); Lauren E. Shaw, Asteroids, the New Western
Frontier: Applying Principles of the General Mining Law of 1872 to Incentive Asteroid
Mining, 78 J. AIR L. & COM. 121, 168–69 (2013); Thomas R. Irwin, Note, Space
Rocks: A Proposal to Govern the Development of Outer Space and Its Resources, 76 OHIO
ST. L.J. 217, 245–46 (2015); Andrew Lintner, Extraterrestrial Extraction: The Interna-
tional Implications of the Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015, 40
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 139, 153–54 (2016); Alexander William Salter, Space Deb-
ris: A Law and Economics Analaysis of the Orbital Commons, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
221, 237–38 (2016).
13 See Alexander W. Salter & Peter T. Leeson, Celestial Anarchy: A Threat to Outer
Space Commerce?, 34 CATO J. 581, 592–93 (2014).
14 See, e.g., DAVID FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF FREEDOM: GUIDE TO A RADICAL
CAPITALISM xii–xv (3d ed. 2014); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:
HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 1–11 (1991); TERRY L. ANDERSON & PETER J.
HILL, THE NOT SO WILD, WILD WEST: PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE FRONTIER 4–5
(2004); Bryan Caplan & Edward P. Stringham, Privatizing the Adjudication of Dis-
putes, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 504, 599 (2008); Benjamin W. Powell & Ed-
ward P. Stringham, Public Choice and the Economic Analysis of Anarchy: A Survey, 140
PUB. CHOICE 3–4 (2009); Peter Boettke, Anarchism and Austrian Economics, 7 NEW
PERSEPCTIVES ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 1 (2011); Edward P. Stringham & Todd J.
Zywicki, Hayekian Anarchism, 78 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 290, 293 (2011); PETER T.
LEESON, ANARCHY UNBOUND: WHY SELF-GOVERNANCE WORKS BETTER THAN YOU
THINK 1-3, 10 (2014); EDWARD P. STRINGHAM, PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: CREATING OR-
DER IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIFE (2015).
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II. SELF-ENFORCING EXCHANGE: THE FEASIBILITY OF
PRIVATE LAW15
A. THEORY
Many economists and legal theorists believe that widespread
social order, including protection of private property, requires a
strong state to enforce contracts and uphold the rule of law.
While social scientists concede that in some small-scale settings
private ordering is viable, a large and robust commercial net-
work requires some element of public ordering. Today, this role
is filled by the state, which can reasonably be modeled as an
irresistible monopoly enforcer. This explains why many writers
on space commerce assume there must be some form of public
ordering—either national or international—that creates and
enforces property rights to celestial resources. The conventional
wisdom is admirably summarized by Pop: “Appropriation of
land can exist outside the sphere of sovereignty, but its survival
is dependent upon endorsement from a sovereign entity.”16
The standard model employed by social scientists when con-
sidering how individuals act without recourse to a sovereign en-
forcer is the Prisoners’ Dilemma. Two individuals, Alice and
Bob, are considering whether to acknowledge each other’s pri-
vate property rights. Each has two choices: respect the property
claims of the other (cooperate) or prey on the other and take
the other’s property (defect). Assume that Alice and Bob make
their choices simultaneously. If they both choose to cooperate,
they each receive a payoff of A > 0, gained from the enjoyment
of their property. However, if Alice defects while Bob cooper-
ates, Alice can receive a higher payoff C > A, while Bob is left
with B < 0. If both choose to defect, they engage in mutually
costly conflict and are left with a payoff of 0 each. This situation
is represented in the game matrix labeled Figure 1 below.
15 This section is adapted from Salter & Leeson, supra note 13, and is a
condensation of the argument contained therein.
16 Pop, supra note 5, at 281.
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Figure 1—The Prisoners’ Dilemma17
Without a sovereign to uphold Alice’s and Bob’s property
claims, they will both choose to defect. While they could both
earn a higher payoff if they cooperated, each player maximizes
his or her payoff by choosing to defect, regardless of what the
other player does. In other words, defecting is a dominant strat-
egy. We appear to be stuck in the Hobbesian jungle.
However, the above is limited in one important respect: it as-
sumes a one-time interaction between Alice and Bob. This is not
very realistic. When describing the behavior of potential eco-
nomic partners, it makes much more sense to assume they will
interact multiple times over their lives. If we assume Alice and
Bob will face this choice not just once, but indefinitely into the
future as well, the situation looks quite different. Suppose that
Alice and Bob are each willing to give the other a chance to
cooperate, but if either encounters defection, they will refuse to
cooperate (defect) for all subsequent interactions. Further as-
sume that each player discounts future payoffs by a factor of b,
which is between 0 and 1, since future payoffs are worth less
than that same payoff today, all else being equal. The closer b is
to 1, the less a player discounts future payoffs, implying a greater
degree of ‘patience.’ Now, the payoff for cooperation is
Figure 2
The payoff to each player for defecting is still C. But if they
choose to do this, they will receive a payoff of 0 in all future
17 Salter & Leeson, supra note 13, at 585.
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periods. Using the rule for solving an infinite geometric series
and then solving for b, cooperation becomes the preferred strat-
egy for both Alice and Bob so long as
Figure 3
In other words, so long as Alice and Bob are sufficiently pa-
tient—they do not discount future payoffs too steeply—then a
cooperative solution is possible, even without a sovereign en-
forcer. Mutual respect of property rights becomes self-enforc-
ing. Social scientists call this the discipline of continuous dealings:
since the gains from defection are gained only once, but the
gains from cooperating extend into the indefinite future, ra-
tional individuals will be much more likely to cooperate when
they repeatedly interact.18 When applied to property rights in
the context of space commerce, we have good reason to suspect
that the relevant parties will be patient. Engaging in space com-
merce requires large up-front investments before commercial
entities will begin to see positive cash flow. Because of these
large fixed costs, space commerce as an industry will select for
those who are relatively patient, and are thus much more likely
to engage in cooperative ventures, including respecting the
property claims of other commercial entities.
The discipline of continuous dealings shows that, even with-
out an irresistible monopoly enforcer, property rights can exist
and be sustained. This is the foundation of a private commercial
legal order, but it is not a private commercial legal order itself.
More than theory is needed to demonstrate that purely private
law is viable. Fortunately, history supplies us with several such
examples, in such varied situations as medieval Iceland19 and
the 19th century American frontier.20 Probably most relevant to
the problem of private legal ordering for space commerce is in-
18 The above example had only two parties, Alice and Bob, but the logic holds
if there are more than two parties. In fact, as we add additional players, the possi-
bility of reputational effects strengthens the tendency for cooperation. If Alice
wishes to defect in her dealings with Bob, she not only has to worry about losing
future payoffs from cooperating with Bob, but she runs the risk of Bob telling
Charlie about Alice’s antisocial behavior. Thus, Alice loses two future trading
partners instead of just one.
19 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at xii–xv.
20 See ANDERSON & HILL, supra note 14, at 9.
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ternational trade and the institutions that provide the legal
framework that governs it.
B. HISTORY
Internationally, there is no sovereign. The world’s polities ex-
ist in a “state of nature.” Thus, there is no formal organization
that can define and enforce property rights among individuals
from different states who engage in commerce. “In this sense
the property rights situation that parties to international com-
merce confront is similar to the property rights situation that
prospective parties to outer space commerce confront.”21 If con-
ventional wisdom regarding the infeasibility of widespread se-
cure private property rights is accurate, then international
anarchy should render commerce between subjects of different
states extremely difficult and highly uncertain. Instead, we ob-
serve international commercial activity as rich, varied, and lucra-
tive. Parties to international commercial deals have access to a
sophisticated private and voluntary legal system that helps them
adjudicate disputes and accurately form expectations of future
behavior such that the need for dispute resolution in the first
place is low. It would be inaccurate to describe international
commerce as an Eden of laissez-faire, but it is far more orderly
than the conventional wisdom would suggest.
The reasons for this are complex and have deep historical
roots. It is well known that, following the collapse of the Roman
Empire in the West, the volume of international trade shrank
considerably.22 The legal infrastructure provided by the Empire
no longer stood, and the transition away from this order caused
significant commercial disruption. By the ninth and tenth cen-
turies, trade was recovering.23 Across Europe, a professional
merchant class emerged and developed mechanisms to resolve
disputes over property rights and contract enforcement, even
when subjects were from different polities and thus no national
court had jurisdiction.24
The solution was private, merchant-developed law that was en-
forced in private, merchant-developed courts. This medieval law
merchant (lex mercatoria) was a system of self-enforcing property
21 Salter & Leeson, supra note 13, at 588.
22 See Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 3 SOUTH-
ERN ECON. J. 645, 646 (1989).
23 See id.
24 See id. at 646–47.
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rights according to legal rules that emerged out of dispute reso-
lution among interested parties.25 On this basis, international
commerce and commercial law “have developed coterminously,
without the aid . . . of the coercive power of nation-states . . . .”26
The content of these rules initially owed much to the newly-
rediscovered Roman civil law. But the rules evolved as best com-
mercial practices in specific geographic locales became recog-
nized and incorporated into the lex mercatoris, such that they
informed and became a part of standard merchant practice for
those engaged in international trade.27
As for the courts, they developed their own rules of evidence
and protocols for consulting experts, whose services were fre-
quently needed when dealing with the highly specialized issues
that pertained to international commercial contracts. Benson28
and Milgrom et al.29 note that these courts often operated with
significantly less pomp and circumstance than the national
courts of the time and reached decisions much more quickly,
which was a feature highly valued by international traders. As for
enforcing a merchant court’s decision, international traders re-
lied on reputational effects in the context of the discipline of
continuous dealings, as described earlier.30 The courts them-
selves had no formal enforcement power. They could not coer-
cively compel compliance with a decision.31 But most traders
complied with merchant court decisions, even without the
threat of coercive enforcement. Failure to do so would quickly
brand one as a defector, and thus unsafe as a trading partner.32
This would make it extraordinarily difficult to find willing trad-
ing partners, and hence to continue to make profits, in the fu-
ture. Thus, the vast majority of decisions regarding contract
dispute were self-enforcing.
Today, international trade is still overwhelmingly privately
governed. Although modern states have much higher capacity
to create and enforce property rights than medieval polities,
those engaged in international trade choose to make use of pri-
25 Id. at 647.
26 Id. at 645.
27 Id. at 648.
28 Id. at 649–51.
29 See Paul R. Milgrom et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The
Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECONOMICS & POLITICS 1,
5–6 (1990).
30 See id. at 7–14.
31 See Benson, supra note 22, at 650.
32 See Milgrom et al., supra note 29, at 9–10.
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vate arbitration.33 At least ninety percent of international com-
merce contracts contain clauses that state parties will, in the
event of dispute, pursue private arbitration.34 In 2001, the larg-
est provider of private arbitration services, the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), was involved in disputes between
over 1,500 parties from 115 countries. These disputes ranged
from $50 to $1 billion, with over sixty percent for amounts be-
tween $1 million and $1 billion.35 In the same year, the Interna-
tional Center for Dispute Resolution, another private arbitration
organization, was involved in disputes totaling $10 billion with
parties from sixty-three countries.36 As in medieval times, deci-
sions reached by private arbitration are almost always respected
by the commercial parties. The ICC estimates that ninety per-
cent of its decisions are complied with voluntarily,37 due to the
discipline of continuous dealings and reputational effects.38
Theory and history thus show that creation and enforcement
of private property rights, along with a body of law that provides
for dispute adjudication, can exist even without sovereign over-
sight. There is no prima facie reason to think that “celestial an-
archy,” an environment free from the jurisdiction of national
sovereigns due to Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, will be
any different than international anarchy on earth. But this
merely demonstrates that widespread private ordering for space
commerce is viable. It remains to be seen whether such a system
is desirable. The next section considers this latter criterion.
33 Peter T. Leeson, How Important is State Enforcement for Trade?, 10 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 61, 62 (2008).
34 Id. at 64.
35 Salter & Leeson, supra note 13, at 590 (citing 2001 Statistical Report, 13(1)
ICC INT’L CT. ARB. BULL. 5, 6, 8 (2002)).
36 See Salter & Leeson, supra 13, at 593.
37 Leeson, How Important is State Enforcement, supra note 33, at 68.
38 Since 1958, sovereigns have had a partial role in enforcing international
trade contracts. In that year, the first multinational treaty was signed to facilitate
the enforcement of private arbitration decisions in national courts. Signatory na-
tions to the United Nations New York Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention, or NYC) agree
that, if a citizen loses an arbitration judgment to a foreign national, the foreign
national can have this decision coercively enforced by the citizen’s government.
However, this does not invalidate the self-enforcing nature of international com-
merce for two reasons. First, international commerce was substantial prior to
1958. Even if the treaty helped, it was by no means necessary. Second, the treaty is
still an agreement among sovereigns who are in a state of nature with respect to
each other. International anarchy still prevails, since there is no international
sovereign who can compel agreement and compliance. See Leeson, How Important
is State Enforcement, supra note 33, at 83.
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III. ORGANIZATIONS AND ORDERS: THE DESIRABILITY
OF PRIVATE LAW
A. KINDS OF SOCIAL ORDER
Desirability is an inherently normative concept, dealing in
statements not just of “is,” but also of “ought.” To keep the anal-
ysis as broad as possible, when the author argues that a private
legal order for celestial commerce is desirable, he means that it
possesses general features conducive to the satisfaction of
human wants that are near-unanimously judged to be socially
beneficial. These features are the combination of stability and
adaptability: a legal system ought to provide firm ground upon
which parties can form reliable expectations of future behavior
but must also be sensitive to particulars and changeable when
circumstances require.
As a body of rules for coordinating social behavior, a legal
system must possess mechanisms that align the incentives of those
who act within it and provide them the information necessary to
achieve their goals in a way compatible with the similar desire of
others. To understand how this is possible, we need to distin-
guish between two kinds of order, regularity or coordination, in
the social world.39 The most salient kind of order is consciously
brought into being.40 This kind of order is purposively created
by a mind or group of minds.41 An example would be a business
firm or an administrative bureaucracy. These types of social bod-
ies, or organizations, can be reasonably characterized as having a
goal or teleology.42 However, purposely created order is not the
only kind of order in the social world. There is also emergent or
spontaneous order; to paraphrase Adam Ferguson, “the result of
human action, but not the execution of any human design.”43
These orders are not intentionally created by any one mind or
group of minds.44 As social systems, they frequently have tenden-
cies or characteristics, but they are not goal-oriented.45 Hayek
calls this kind of system an “order,” or (felicitously, given this
39 See 1 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 35–54
(1973).
40 See id. at 36.
41 Id.
42 See id. at 37.
43 Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society 1, 205 (1767), http://
oll.libertyfund.org/titles/ferguson-an-essay-on-the-history-of-civil-society [https:/
/perma.cc/5PFK-M6WS].
44 See HAYEK, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 39, at 36–37.
45 Id. at 38.
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article’s subject) a cosmos.46 An order is created by interactions
among various organizations.47 The properties of the order can
be explained with reference to the characteristics of the organi-
zations that interact within it, but these properties are not re-
ducible to the various constituent organizations.48 The whole is
more than the sum of its parts; or, more accurately, the whole
has properties that are exhibited by none of the parts in
particular.49
The organization-order distinction has been most extensively
developed in the theory of markets. Markets are comprised of
organizations (households, firms) but the market itself is an or-
der. Hayek50 explored the properties of markets as orders, not-
ing that in markets, millions of individuals are somehow able to
coordinate their actions and cooperate with each other, in their
capacities as consumers or producers, despite not knowing each
other personally, and despite knowing only an infinitesimal
amount of the total knowledge embedded within markets. Mar-
kets are able to achieve a tremendous degree of coordination
due to the system of prices that continually adjust in response to
changing supply and demand conditions.51 Market prices ex-
press tradeoffs, in the form of real resource scarcities across vari-
ous alternative lines of production. When acting in markets,
households’ and firms’ subjective valuations of goods and ser-
vices confront objective tradeoffs.52 When supply and demand
conditions change, prices change, which provide a crutch for
households and firms in coordinating their production and con-
sumption decisions.
As an example, if an unexpected frost kills a portion of an
orange crop, fewer oranges will be available for exchange on the
market. In the interests of efficiency (directing resources to
their highest-valued uses), the marginal orange should be saved
for only the most valuable, feasible lines of production or con-
sumption, which have been reduced due to the frost. Markets
provide the information and incentives necessary for precisely
this to happen: the reduced supply of oranges will cause the
price of oranges to rise; households that consume oranges, and
46 Id.
47 Id. at 37.
48 Id. at 36.
49 Id. at 42.
50 See F. A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 33–56 (1948).
51 See id. at 41–42.
52 See id. at 44–45.
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firms that purchase oranges to make orange juice, etc. will scale
back their purchase of oranges. This leaves more of the smaller
total quantity of oranges for purchase by those who are willing
to pay the higher price. But, those who are willing to pay the
higher price are those who value the oranges more highly in
consumption, or are those who believe they can use the oranges
as inputs into producing other goods, such as Grand Marnier,
which are more valuable to consumers, and thus justify paying
the higher price. No household or firm needs to know specifics
about the frost nor exactly how the price effects of the frost will
spill over into various markets. Markets help generate this
knowledge due to the mutual adjustments between suppliers
and demanders and provide each an incentive to steward the
scarce resource in the form of a cost (the price) that must be
incurred in order to acquire the resource.53
Thus, the tendency towards efficiency, and thus the mutual co-
ordination of consumers’ and producers’ plans, is a property
not of any household or firm, or group of households or firms,
but the market itself.54 This also suggests why command and
control solutions to economic problems, such as complete so-
cialism, fail. Command and control for an entire market econ-
omy destroys the social intelligence of the marketplace by
replacing it with the much, much more limited intelligence of
the organization in charge of allocating resources. The knowl-
edge necessary to put resources to their highest-valued uses does
not exist in a manner that can be harnessed by any person or
group. The market, in order to deliver the benefits we have
come to expect from commercial exchange, must be an order.
The above summary of the core insight of market theory illus-
trates the importance of orders in promoting social coordina-
tion. Many things are far too complex to be trusted to
consciously crafted organizations. Within the field of law and
economics, many scholars have noted that legal systems, as
sources of social rule creation and enforcement, also fit the or-
ganization-order typology. An example of organization-created
rules would be bureaucratic fiat, whereas an example of order-
created rules would be judicial decisions in a common law sys-
tem. Posner55 famously argued that the common law system had
53 See id. at 50–55.
54 Id.
55 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 249–75 (Vicki Been et
al. eds., 7th ed. 2007).
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strong tendencies to produce efficient legal rules and linked this
tendency to features of the system such as judge-made law, ad-
versarial proceedings, and precedent. For our purposes, what
matters is the emphasis Posner and other scholars placed on the
adjustment mechanisms in legal systems that helped coordinate
the behavior of those who acted within these systems.
B. ORDER AND PRIVATE LAW
In a competitive, discovery-oriented legal system, rules are
analogous to market prices.56 Market prices give parties informa-
tion regarding the terms of exchange; legal rules give to parties
the terms of interaction, providing a “language” of interpersonal
conduct.57 Like market prices, legal rules that coordinate the
actions of those governed by these rules must be discovered,
rather than set in advance.58 A private legal ordering of the kind
discussed in Section II is one in which rules that do a good job
of providing both stability and flexibility are likely to be discov-
ered and maintained, while rules that do a poor job are likely to
be discarded. The medieval and modern law merchant are legal
orders that are private. Its rules emerge from the decentralized
interaction of traders and arbitrators, rather than from any cen-
tralized apparatus of command.59 Admittedly, it is not the only
kind of legal order possible. The common law is also an order,
as the writings of Hayek and Posner show.60 Furthermore, the
role of public courts in common law systems show that a legal
order need not be wholly private. But, such a legal order can be
purely private, as the law merchant demonstrates.
What are the systemic properties of private commercial law
that produce social coordination, by aligning the incentives and
information of those engaged in commerce? There are several
institutional features that, in tandem, achieve this.61 First, the
56 See Todd J. Zywicki & Anthony B. Sanders, Posner, Hayek, and the Economic
Analysis of Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 559, 590 (2008).
57 See id. at 591.
58 See id. at 594–96.
59 Id. at 597.
60 See id. at 602–03.
61 See Benson, supra note 22, 660–61; Bryan Caplan & Edward P. Stringham,
Privatizing the Adjudication of Disputes, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 503, 528
(2008); FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at xii–xv; David Friedman, Private Creation and
Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 410–11 (1979); Carrie
B. Kerekes & Claudia R. Williamson, Discovering Law: Hayekian Competition in Medi-
eval Iceland, 21 GRIFFITH L. REV. 432, 445 (2012); Edward Stringham, Market Cho-
sen Law, 14 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 53, 76–77 (1999); Edward P. Stringham,
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foundational principles of private commercial law, which will
likely be applicable to nascent space commerce as well, are well
established through centuries-long usage. Importantly, this does
not preclude innovations at the margin, as particular circum-
stances arise that extend the application of the basic legal princi-
ples to new particulars, without erasing the principles
themselves:
[T]he primary principles underlying customary business law are
[unlikely] to change. The basic rules of private property and
freedom of contract developed centuries ago . . . the need for
extensions of these basic principles to cover unanticipated cir-
cumstances always arises, however, and customary law adapts,
building on the existing base of substantive principles.62
These foundational principles are the basic material commer-
cial traders use to form expectations about what rules will be
respected in engaging with fellow trading partners, what actions
cause parties to seek adjudication, and how those adjudications
are likely to be resolved. Importantly, the customary body of
merchant law is not codified law, in the sense of a centrally com-
piled set of rules that detail how particular disputes have been
or will be resolved.63 Rather, the law took the form of
written commercial instruments and contracts. In this regard, note
that ‘contract law’ refers to the ‘law’ that parties in exchange bring into
existence by their contractual agreement rather than to the law of or about
contracts. . . . As contractual form came into common usage it
actually became a part of the Law Merchant.64
While the foundational principles are unchanging, their par-
ticular applications frequently do change to meet the needs of
commerce. The principles provide stability, but contractual in-
novations that arise as the needs of trade dictate, and are en-
forced in private commercial courts, provide flexibility.65
Furthermore, these contractual innovations, provided they per-
sistently help traders meet their goals, become generally used in
the course of commerce, and thus become law.66 As Benson
notes:
Extending the Analysis of Spontaneous Market Order to Governance, 42 ATLANTIC ECON.
J. 171, 178 (2014); STRINGHAM, supra note 14, at 4–5.
62 Benson, supra note 22, at 659 (footnotes omitted).
63 See id. at 649.
64 Id. at 649 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
65 See id. at 649–51.
66 See id. at 651–54.
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[i]f a contract is a standard one based on long standing tradition,
it simply reflects existing customary commercial law; if a contract
develops an effective new business practice in the face of a new
situation, it is likely to add to customary law. Since commerce
operates in a dynamic continually changing environment, new
contractual arrangements are always being mediated—new law is
being created.67
This combination of stability and flexibility is what provides
traders and arbitrators the information they need to coordinate
their behavior. The foundational customary principles, which
are widely publicly known, give adjudicators information on how
to deal with basic disputes; traders know this, and take actions to
avoid basic disputes, since disputes are costly to all parties.68 Par-
ticular extensions can be less well known, since in modern com-
mercial arbitration the proceedings and awards of damages are
almost always kept private. However, traders and arbitrators in-
teract within a social network that fosters the transmission of in-
formation. For example, arbitrators may discuss cases by
anonymizing key details. And while there are no case books for
international commercial arbitration, papers and books pre-
pared by arbitrators for conferences and other professional
gatherings provide a way for both traders and arbitrators to get
some insight for how similar conflicts in the future may be re-
solved. Furthermore, while the details of the outcome of an arbi-
tration may be unobserved, the fact that a contract ends up
being arbitrated in the first place is observable. That a particular
contractual form resulted in a dispute is itself useful information
for traders and arbitrators to take into account.
Second, traders and arbitrators have strong incentives to act
in a manner that resolves disputes in as low-cost a manner as
possible. As mentioned above, traders very frequently write arbi-
tration clauses into their contracts.69 If a conflict over contrac-
tual interpretation arises, traders want to resolve this conflict as
quickly and cheaply as possible; the more time and money tied
up in adjudication, the less time available for actually engaging
in profitable commerce.70 Adjudicators are also cost-conscious:
they must be voluntarily selected by all parties, since compulsory
jurisdiction does not exist. The selection of an adjudicator
would depend on traders’ perception of an adjudicator’s exper-
67 Id. at 658 (emphasis added).
68 Id. at 650.
69 See Leeson, supra note 33, at 64.
70 See Benson, supra note 22, 656–57.
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tise, as well as their reputation for impartiality (while selfish
traders may prefer an adjudicator biased in their favor, this is
highly unlikely to be agreed to by the other parties, since selec-
tion of an adjudicator must be voluntary and unanimous).71 Ad-
judicators who were perceived to be biased or inexpert would
find their reputations suffer, losing business as a result.72 And as
already mentioned, traders are very likely to agree voluntarily to
an adjudication decision, even if they believe it was decided in
error in their particular case. Traders who reneged would ac-
quire a reputation of being untrustworthy and would find it dif-
ficult to secure trading partners in the future.73 Except perhaps
in disputes involving extraordinarily large sums of money, with
one of the traders not anticipating being “in the game” for
much longer, defection from previously agreed upon arbitration
procedures is unlikely.
C. SOCIAL BENEFITS
The information-generating and incentive-aligning features of
a private legal commercial order are obviously beneficial for
traders and arbitrators, but they are also beneficial for the rest
of society as well. This is because economizing on costs—using
as few resources to achieve a goal as possible—leaves more re-
sources left over that can be put to other uses. When a firm cuts
costs, it makes higher profits, which benefits the firm. But in
lowering costs, it has also used up less resources, which can now
be used to satisfy other wants. This is good even for those who
do not work for the firm or do business with the firm. For exam-
ple, even those who do not ride trains prefer to live in a world
where railroad businesses use steel rails, rather than platinum or
titanium. These latter metals have much higher valued uses,
such as in communications satellites. In a world where railroads
are built using platinum or titanium, all society gets is expensive
rail travel. But in a world where railroads are built using steel,
and platinum and titanium are saved for making communica-
tions satellites, society gets cheap rails as well as telecommunica-
tion services. Society is wealthier by the amount of resources
saved by economizing on costs.
The information generated by a private commercial order
helps traders avoid conflict. Conflict is costly for traders; adjudi-
71 See id. at 649.
72 See id.
73 See Milgrom et al., supra note 28, at 9–10.
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cating conflict uses up real resources.74 Avoiding conflict in the
first place makes both traders and society as a whole wealthier.
But some amount of conflict due to honest disagreement over
contractual terms is unavoidable. In this situation, the incentives
of traders and arbitrators is to settle the dispute as quickly as
possible, subject to some decision procedure which is voluntarily
agreed upon, and thus decided by all parties to be beneficial ex
ante.75 Specific practices of merchant courts, such as simple rules
of evidence and forbidding appeals, result in minimal resources
devoted to conflict resolution, which again reflects the interests
of both traders and arbitrators, as well as society at large in the
form of economized costs.76
The incentives of traders and arbitrators are aligned through
reputational effects and the discipline of continuous dealings.
Traders bear the costs of arbitration and will only engage in ar-
bitration when they find such procedures to be mutually benefi-
cial. Arbitrators will preside over cases in exchange for
compensation, the future prospects of which incentivize them to
reach speedy and unbiased decisions. Because the costs of dis-
pute resolution are borne primarily by the parties to these dis-
putes, a private commercial legal order gives parties the
incentive to act in socially beneficial ways—or, to put it differ-
ently, the incentives within the system align what is personally
beneficial with what is socially beneficial.
Finally, it is worth contrasting this private legal commercial
order with the likely characteristics of a legal order that would
arise out of national or international governing bodies attempt-
ing to impose a set of rules.77 This would transform the legal
system from an order into an organization. Whereas a competi-
tive private legal order is capable of generating and conveying to
actors a greater amount of knowledge than any one of them can
acquire on their own, an organization cannot benefit from this
social intelligence mechanism.78 Rather than taking advantage
of the competitive discovery procedures embedded in a private
74 See HAYEK, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 39, at 41–45, 50–55.
75 See Benson, supra note 22, at 649.
76 Id. at 650.
77 Neither a national nor an international governing body, in the abstract,
must be a bureaucratic or regulatory organization. But given the constraints
posed by the Outer Space Treaty, the most likely course of public action in the
pursuit of celestial governance would be this kind of organization or organiza-
tions. Of course, there is nothing precluding sovereigns from amending interna-
tional law to avoid this situation. See infra Part IV.
78 LUDWIG VON MISES, BUREAUCRACY 48–56 (1944).
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legal commercial order, the overseeing organization would, by
necessity, be taking a top-down approach.79 Bureaucrats and
regulators in this scenario would not be able to do as well in
implementing socially beneficial rules because there is no feed-
back mechanism informing them which rules best serve the in-
terests of commercial parties.80 Furthermore, bureaucrats and
regulators would face much weaker incentives to find effective
rules.81 Since they are making decisions the costs and benefits of
which primarily are borne by others, bureaucrats and regulators
would not personally confront costs and benefits in the same
way as under a private legal commercial order.82 In fact, the eco-
nomic literature on bureaucracy strongly suggests that bureau-
crats engage in cost-maximizing behavior, rather than cost-
minimizing behavior,83 because of a lack of competitive pressure
and personal cost bearing. Because of these incentive and infor-
mation problems, a private legal order for space commerce is
more consistent with desirable social consequences, such as cost-
minimization, than typical public organizational solutions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The SPACE Act attempts to create an environment conducive
to space commerce by promoting U.S. citizens’ property rights
to celestial resources. This is controversial because it seems to
run afoul of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.84 The
problems posed by Article II can be overcome by a private law
regime for space commerce. A private law regime for space com-
merce is feasible: property claims to celestial resources, along
with rules for adjudicating conflicts over these claims, can be
self-enforcing. Thus, property rights and rules do not require
protection or enforcement by sovereign states. A private law re-
gime for space commerce is also desirable: as a spontaneous or-
der, it is stable enough to ground commercial actors’
expectations and flexible enough to meet the particulars of new
contractual arrangements. The legal regime renders the pursuit
of self-interest by commercial parties both information- and in-
centive-compatible with social wellbeing.
79 See id. at 48–53.
80 Id. at 40–56
81 See id. at 51–52.
82 See id. at 53–55.
83 See GORDON TULLOCK, BUREAUCRACY (1965), reprinted in 6 THE SELECTED
WORKS OF GORDON TULLOCK 210–23 (Charles K. Rowley ed., 2005).
84 See Tronchetti, supra note 7, at 8.
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There are several anticipated objections to this article. First, as
Tronchetti argues, both national and international law can be
modified to create a foundation for space commerce.85 This is
true; national and international efforts certainly should be made
to clarify certain points of international space law. However,
since significant amendment to the legal regime will have to
take place internationally in order to make clear the relation-
ship between territorial sovereignty and sovereign property
rights enforcement—or, in the extreme case, repealing Article
II—it must result from consensual agreement among sovereign
states. Securing this consent will likely be incredibly costly.
Given the feasibility and desirability of private commercial law in
space, a strong argument will have to be made for the superior-
ity of some form of public law in this case for the benefits of
international treaty amendment to be worth the costs.
Second, critics may charge that this approach is a de facto
concession of all authority by national space regulatory bodies.
This is not true. Instead, embracing a private commercial legal
order for space requires reorientation of these agencies. Existing
agencies can perform other roles that do not violate Article II.
For example, federal agencies can oversee launches by private
companies in the United States, to ensure safety standards are
met and that commercial space entities do not inadvertently
damage citizens’ lives or livelihoods. Agencies can also mitigate
the problem of space debris in desirable orbits, especially the
low earth orbits, by enforcing rules for deorbiting useless mate-
rial. In fact, many agencies are currently performing these or
similar roles, and there is nothing in my argument that compels
them to stop.86 The feasibility and desirability of private legal
commercial order in space still leaves ample room for national
agencies to keep space both safe and accessible for citizens, with-
out amounting to a de facto extension of territorial sovereignty,
as Tronchetti87 shows.
Third, critics might embrace a narrower definition of desira-
bility than currently discussed, one that a private legal commer-
cial order for space may not meet. While this objection is
obviously too broad to respond to sui generis, the one that merits
attention concerns wealth distribution. It may be conceded that
85 Id. at 7–8.
86 See, e.g., Brian Dunbar, NASA Invests in Private Sector Space Flight with
SpaceX, Rocketplane-Kistler (2006), https://www.nasa.gov/exploration/news/
COTS_selection.html [https://perma.cc/VJ53-T9BA].
87 See Tronchetti, supra note 7, at 9.
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a private legal commercial order for space is desirable in that it
would create massive amounts of new wealth. But the distribu-
tion of this wealth might be sufficiently objectionable that it out-
weighs the creation of the wealth itself. This claim is incredible,
but a satisfactory reply is to allow the private commercial order
in space, thereby allowing massive new wealth creation, and
then using domestic policy to affect a more desired distribution.
If a U.S. company creates wealth in space, the U.S. government
might not be able to enforce that company’s rights without vio-
lating Article II, but there is no reason why it cannot tax the
company’s earnings.88 These tax dollars can then be allocated
publicly in line with distributional goals. Ultimately, wealth must
be created before it can be distributed. Compared to the ex-
treme scenario of not allowing new wealth creation in the first
place, allowing the wealth creation and then redistributing some
of it makes many people better off, and nobody worse off.
We cannot know in advance how the existing body of private
commercial law will apply to space commerce. While we know
that some self-enforcing property and legal regime will emerge
out of contracting among commercial space entities, we cannot
say what the mixture of existing and new rules and institutions
will ultimately govern celestial commerce.89 This means scholar-
ship on space governance will be most useful if it answers which
space governance problems can be performed by national agen-
cies without violating international treaty, as well as which
problems, although they fall within the scope of a public
agency’s mandate, are best left to private initiative. The tools of
law and economics will be invaluable in understanding these
governance problems in theory and suggesting solutions to
them in practice. Importantly, we must avoid the “pretense of
knowledge”90 by not trying to write down a set of rules for space
governance that do not reflect, and cannot adapt to, the particu-
lar circumstances that commercial space entities will face.
88 The tax itself will prevent some potential wealth from being created. The
dissatisfaction due to the destroyed wealth must be compared to the satisfaction
due to achieving a more pleasing distribution of wealth to ascertain whether re-
distribution is worthwhile.
89 See Salter & Leeson, supra note 12, at 593.
90 Friedrich von Hayek, The Pretense of Knowledge, Nobel Memorial Lecture
(Dec. 11, 1974), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/
laureates/1974/hayek-lecture.html [https://perma.cc/P4ZQ-3YLU].
DE FACTO AMENDMENT OF A FAA REGULATION BY
NON-REGULATORY INTERPRETATION: UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF FAA SUGGESTIONS ON HOW
TO COMPLY WITH THE FLIGHT REVIEW
REQUIREMENT
MICHAEL L. SHAKMAN*
THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA) regu-lates civil aviation in the United States primarily by issuing
regulations.1 Before becoming effective, FAA regulations (FARs)
must be published in the Federal Register, a period must be al-
lowed for public comment, and those comments must be re-
viewed and considered by the FAA.2 The process can be lengthy
but serves the important purpose of allowing interested parties
to comment.3 It also affords the FAA an opportunity to consider
the ramifications of proposed regulations that the agency may
have overlooked in the drafting process.4
In contrast, the FAA can issue Advisory Circulars that need
not be published in the Federal Register and are provided with
* Partner, Miller Shakman & Beem, LLP, Chicago. Pilot and flight instructor
with more than 4,000 hours in airplanes and gliders.
1 49 U.S.C. § 106(f)(3) (2012).
2 U.S. Dep’t of Transp., FAA, Advisory Circular 11-2A ¶ 1-4 (July 26, 1984).
The FAA describes its regulatory process as follows:
When an amendment to a FAR is proposed in a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) it is published in the Federal Register. This
NPRM not only announces the proposal but it also invites the pub-
lic to participate in the rulemaking process by submitting written
data, views, or arguments prior to a specific date. Each response
contributes to the evaluation of the proposal and is considered in
the development of the amendment to the FAR which is also pub-
lished in the Federal Register. . . . In order to develop FAR’s that
are responsive to the needs and desires of the public and that con-
form with the regulatory responsibilities of FAA, it is essential that
the public participate in the rulemaking process to the fullest prac-
ticable extent.
3 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 11.25, 11.39.
4 U.S. Dep’t of Transp., FAA, Advisory Circular 11-2A ¶ 1-4 (July 26, 1984).
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limited or no advance public circulation.5 Advisory Circulars are
nonbinding discussions of important aviation topics that inform
pilots and others of safety or technical matters or assist in inter-
pretation of regulations.6 They generally serve that purpose well.
This article discusses what can happen when, with apparently
good intentions, the FAA issues an Advisory Circular that pur-
ports to explain how to comply with an important regulation in
ways that go far beyond the language and intent of the regula-
tion. The result is a de facto amendment without the accompa-
nying safeguards of public comment or consideration of
unforeseen but significant consequences for the effected avia-
tion community participants.
The regulation in question is Section 61.56 of the FARs, which
governs pilot flight reviews.7 The relevant Advisory Circular, des-
ignated AC 61-98C, was issued in late 2015 as the fourth amend-
ment to a long-standing Advisory Circular.8 If applied as written,
AC 61-98C would change the flight review regulation in impor-
tant respects, facilitate claims for liability of flight instructors
and others, and discourage use of the flight review process.
I. THE FLIGHT REVIEW REGULATION
Section 61.56 is a FAR with which all pilots are familiar. It
affects most pilots by requiring that they undergo a flight review
every two years conducted by a certified flight instructor (CFI)
in order to continue to exercise pilot privileges.9 The Section
states, in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (f) of this section,
a flight review consists of a minimum of 1 hour of flight
training and 1 hour of ground training. The review must
include:
(1) A review of the current general operating and flight
rules of part 91 of this chapter; and
(2) A review of those maneuvers and procedures that, at the
discretion of the person giving the review, are necessary
5 U.S. Dep’t of Transp., FAA, Order 1320.46D FAA Advisory Circular System
¶¶ 4-1, 4-2 (2015), https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/FAA_
Order_1320.46D.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM2J-Q3RF].
6 See id.
7 See Flight Review, 14 C.F.R. § 61.56 (2016).
8 U.S. Dep’t of Transp., FAA, Advisory Circular 61-98C (Nov. 20, 2015).
9 See 14 C.F.R. § 61.56(c).
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for the pilot to demonstrate the safe exercise of the priv-
ileges of the pilot certificate.10
Unless one of several exceptions apply, a pilot who does not
meet the flight review requirement loses the right to exercise his
or her pilot privileges:
(c) Except as provided in paragraphs (d), (e), and (g) of this
section, no person may act as pilot in command of an aircraft
unless, since the beginning of the 24th calendar month
before the month in which that pilot acts as pilot in com-
mand, that person has—
(1) Accomplished a flight review given in an aircraft for
which that pilot is rated by an authorized instructor and
(2) A logbook endorsed from an authorized instructor who
gave the review certifying that the person has satisfacto-
rily completed the review.11
Section 61.56 permits a single flight review in any aircraft for
which a pilot is licensed to satisfy the flight review requirement
for all aircraft for which the pilot is licensed.12 When the regula-
tion was first discussed in 1973, the FAA had proposed to re-
quire a separate flight review for each category and class of
aircraft for which a pilot was licensed.13 Although that sugges-
tion generated considerable public opposition and was dropped
by the FAA,14 it has reemerged in revised AC 61-98C.15
10 14 C.F.R. § 61.56(a).
11 14 C.F.R. § 61.56(c), (d), (g); 14 C.F.R. § 121.441 (2016). The principal ex-
ceptions are stated in § 61.56(d):
A person who has, within the period specified in paragraph (c) of
this section, passed a pilot proficiency check conducted by an ex-
aminer, an approved pilot check airman, or a U.S. Armed Force,
for a pilot certificate, rating, or operating privilege need not ac-
complish the flight review required by this section . . . .
Student pilots are expressly exempted from the flight review requirements by
§ 61.56(g), if holding a current solo endorsement from a CFI. Airline pilots gen-
erally are exempted by meeting the pilot proficiency check conducted by their
employer.
12 Id.
13 See U.S. Dep’t of Transp., FAA, Advisory Circular 61-98A ¶ 6-1 (Mar. 26,
1991). Examples of a category are “airplane,” “rotorcraft,” and “glider.” See Gen-
eral Definitions, 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2016). Some of these categories are broken
down into classes of aircraft, examples being “single-engine land,” “single-engine
sea,” “helicopter,” “gyroplane,” etc. See id.
14 See U.S. Dep’t of Transp., FAA, Advisory Circular 61-98A ¶ 6-2 (Mar. 26,
1991). (“During public hearings conducted in the initial phases of the regulatory
review, comments submitted were generally unfavorable with respect to the cate-
gory and class requirement proposed for the flight review.”).
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Section 61.56 grants broad discretion to the CFI to determine
both the flight maneuvers to be executed by the pilot and the
nature of “the current general operating and flight rules of [14
C.F.R.] [P]art 91” to be reviewed as part of the non-flying com-
ponent of the flight review.16 No specific procedures are set
forth defining how the instructor should determine if the pilot
has demonstrated the necessary knowledge of Part 91 or the
ability to safely exercise the pilot’s privileges.
II. THE ADVISORY CIRCULAR
AC 61-98C focuses on flight reviews and, separately, on instru-
ment proficiency checks for pilots holding instrument ratings.17
It provides sound safety advice when, for example, it urges pilots
to “design a currency program tailored to their individual oper-
ating environments and needs.”18 It correctly states that “[i]n
most cases, pilots should consider the need for currency beyond
that specified by the 14 CFR.”19 It suggests that pilots consider
participating in the FAA WINGS Program and “read aviation pe-
riodicals on a regular basis.”20 The analysis in this article is not
intended as criticism of safety advice. It focuses, instead, on po-
tential liability consequences for flight instructors and flight
schools based on statements made in the Advisory Circular and
on other consequences of the Advisory Circular.
The Advisory Circular provides “suggestions” and analyses
that are contrary to the requirements of Section 61.56, or that
go well beyond the requirements of that regulation. The Advi-
sory Circular appears to be a non-regulatory effort to revisit the
FAA’s 1973 effort to require a separate flight review for each
category and class rating held by a pilot. The FAA’s statements
in the Advisory Circular may, as discussed below, form the basis
for asserting liability against instructors who comply with the
regulation but not with all aspects of the suggestions in the Advi-
15 See U.S. Dep’t of Transp., FAA, Advisory Circular 61-98C ¶ 3-1 (Nov. 20,
2015).
16 Flight Review, 14 C.F.R. § 61.56(a) (2016).
17 U.S. Dep’t of Transp., FAA, Advisory Circular 61-98C (Nov. 20, 2015). This
article focuses on the flight review components of AC 61-98C. Normally instru-
ment proficiency check flights are conducted separately from flight reviews, as
many pilots do not have instrument ratings or, if they do, elect to maintain instru-
ment currency by actual instrument flight activity or by practice instrument flight.
See Recent Flight Experience: Pilot in Command, 14 C.F.R. § 61.57(c) (2016).
18 U.S. Dep’t of Transp., FAA, Advisory Circular 61-98C ¶ 1-7 (Nov. 20, 2015).
19 Id.
20 Id.
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sory Circular. It thereby discourages use of flight reviews
generally.
For example, the Advisory Circular notes that pilots who add a
rating can treat the check ride for the new rating as satisfying
the flight review requirement, but recommends against it:
However, the FAA recommends that pilots consider also accom-
plishing a review under some of the following circumstances. For
example, a pilot with an Airplane Single-Engine Land (ASEL)
rating may have recently obtained a glider rating, but may still
wish to consider obtaining a flight review in a single-engine air-
plane if the appropriate 24-month period has nearly expired.
When approached by pilots seeking advice on such matters, CFIs
should consider the factors described in the following
paragraphs.21
The paragraphs that follow make a series of recommendations
directed at CFIs before undertaking to provide a flight review.22
Among these recommendations is the statement that when a
pilot holds multiple ratings, “the pilot may take a flight review in
any one of the aircraft for which he or she holds a rating or
operating privilege and they will have met the regulatory re-
quirement for all aircraft for which they [sic] hold a certificate
and or rating.”23 But the Advisory Circular recommends that
CFIs resist such action by pilots rated in more than one type of
aircraft:
The CFI may also wish to recommend that the pilot take a review
in more than one category/class of aircraft under certain circum-
stances. For example, a pilot with ASEL and glider ratings may
have flown only gliders in the last 2 years but is also contemplat-
ing flying single-engine airplanes in the near future. If a pilot
who requests a review only in the glider approaches a CFI, the
CFI may wish to recommend an additional review by a qualified
person in a single-engine airplane before the pilot acts as PIC of
a single-engine airplane.24
Section 61.56(a)(2) states that the maneuvers to be executed
in a flight review are those determined by the CFI.25 They are
determined to be those that “at the discretion of the person giv-
ing the review, are necessary for the pilot to demonstrate the
21 Id. ¶ 4-1.
22 Id. ¶ 4-2.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Flight Review, 14 C.F.R. § 61.56(a)(2) (2016).
338 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
safe exercise of the privileges of the pilot certificate.”26 Unlike
the Advisory Circular, the regulation does not suggest that the
CFI should require the pilot to demonstrate proficiency in each
category and class of aircraft for which the pilot is rated.27
The Advisory Circular also addresses another issue beyond the
scope of Section 61.56—the possibility that the nature of the
pilot’s future flight operations may change:
The CFI should consider the need for an in-depth review of cer-
tain subjects or procedures if the type of flight operations is likely
to change, or if other extenuating circumstances exist. For exam-
ple, a pilot who normally conducts only local flight operations
may plan to begin flying to a location with Class B airspace. An-
other pilot may only operate a two-seat aircraft without radio but
will operate in close proximity to Class B airspace. In both cases,
the CFI should include Class B airspace operating requirements
and procedures in the flight review. This review should also in-
clude pertinent revisions to operational regulations to ensure
that the pilot has full knowledge of these changes.28
Section 61.56, in contrast, does not suggest that the CFI
should conduct a forward-looking review of possible changes in
the pilot’s typical operations.29 A forward-looking review may be
a good idea to promote aviation safety and enhance pilot skills,
but it is not part of the regulation.
The Advisory Circular is similarly expansive when it comes to
the so-called ground portion of the flight review, when the CFI
reviews the pilot’s knowledge of the operating rules of 14 C.F.R.
Part 91:
The CFI should tailor the review of general operating and flight
rules to the needs of the pilot under review. The objective is to
ensure that the pilot can comply with all regulatory requirements
and operate safely in various types of airspace under an appropri-
ate range of weather conditions. As a result, the CFI should con-
duct a review that is broad enough to meet this objective, yet
provide a more comprehensive review in those areas in which the
pilot’s knowledge is weaker. In the latter instance, the CFI may
wish to employ a variety of references/sources, such as the Aero-
26 Id.
27 See 14 C.F.R. § 61.56(c).
28 U.S. Dep’t of Transp., FAA, Advisory Circular 61-98C ¶ 4-2 (Nov. 20, 2015).
“Class B Airspace” refers to controlled airspace around major metropolitan air-
ports, such as Chicago’s O’Hare Field or Los Angeles International. U.S. Dep’t of
Transp., FAA, Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge FAA-H-8083-25B ¶
15-2 (2016).
29 See 14 C.F.R. § 61.56(a)(2).
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nautical Information Manual (AIM), to ensure that the pilot’s
knowledge meets current standards.30
The Advisory Circular’s objective, “to ensure that the pilot can
comply with all regulatory requirements and operate safely in
various types of airspace[,]”31 is considerably more expansive
than the Section 61.56(a)(1) requirement of a “review of the
current general operating and flight rules of [P]art 91 of this
chapter.”32 The regulation does not use the term “ensure” or
suggest that the CFI has a duty to ensure anything, only to con-
duct “a review of the current general operating and flight rules
of [P]art 91 . . . .”33 The difference is plainly significant.
The Advisory Circular’s advice to the CFI on how to prepare
for the flight review also warrants note:
After reaching an agreement on how the CFI will conduct the
review, he or she should prepare an action plan for completing
the review. The action plan should include a list of regulatory
subjects that the CFI will cover, the maneuvers and procedures
that the pilot will need to accomplish, the anticipated sequence
in which the segments will occur, and the location where the CFI
will perform the review. . . . Although not required by § 61.189,
the CFI may wish to retain this action plan for an appropriate
time period as a record of the scope and content of the review.34
In summary, the Advisory Circular goes well beyond the regu-
lation in the major respects noted above: (a) it recommends a
separate flight review for each category and class of aircraft for
which the pilot is licensed;35 (b) it recommends a forward-look-
ing analysis of possible changes in the pilot’s typical operations
and expands the flight review to include such potential activi-
ties;36 (c) it asks the CFI to “ensure that the pilot can comply
with all regulatory requirements and operate safely in various
types of airspace under an appropriate range of weather condi-
tions”;37 and (d) it suggests generating and keeping records that
include a “list of regulatory subjects” covered and maneuvers
and procedures to be accomplished.38 The FAA has conflated
30 U.S. Dep’t of Transp., FAA, Advisory Circular 61-98C ¶ 4-3 (Nov. 20, 2015).
31 Id.
32 Flight Review, 14 C.F.R. § 61.56(a)(1) (2016).
33 Id.
34 U.S. Dep’t of Transp., FAA, Advisory Circular 61-98C ¶ 4-3 (Nov. 20, 2015).
35 Id. ¶ 4-2.
36 Id.
37 Id. ¶ 4-3.
38 Id.
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two related but distinct subjects: the way to improve aviation
safety, and the level of competence and knowledge a pilot must
demonstrate to renew his flying privileges every two years. These
topics are related but not the same. Conflating the two and ad-
ding requirements not found in the regulation can have poten-
tially serious liability ramifications.
III. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Aircraft accident litigation often involves claims against every-
one who had any connection with the accident pilot, including
flight instructors.39 While CFIs are not often sued for negli-
gence, it does occur.40 The Advisory Circular states expansive
performance standards for CFIs, which are summarized above.41
It is reasonable to anticipate that those standards will be applied
to measure the conduct of CFIs who provide flight reviews for
pilots subsequently involved in aircraft accidents. If, following
an aircraft accident, a CFI were found to be negligent because
he or she did not follow one of the expanded standards (or
lacked records to show what was covered in the flight review),
liability could also be imputed to the CFI’s employer, who may
be a flight school or other recurrent training provider.42
A CFI planning to conduct a flight review for a pilot with
more than one aircraft rating, or even a pilot with a single rating
whose flying might change in nature, would have to think twice
about whether to provide the review at all. In the case of a pilot
with more than one rating, the CFI must consider whether to
insist as a condition of the review that the pilot agree to obtain a
second flight review for the other category or class of aircraft for
which the pilot is licensed. The CFI will need to consider asking
the pilot whether it is possible that he may change his flying
practices from, for example, local daytime VFR (visual flight
rules) flights to long-distance night flights in instrument condi-
tions, or some variant thereof. If the pilot indicates that he
might change his flying practices, according to the Advisory Cir-
39 See, e.g., Garland v. Sybaris Club Int’l, Inc., 21 N.E.3d 24, 27–30 (Ill. App. Ct.
2014) (describing the many types of claims that can be asserted against parties
having any relationship to a significant aircraft accident, including claims against
flight instructors and recurrency training providers who had trained or reviewed
the accident pilot, the firm whose business used the accident aircraft on the day
of the accident, and the owner who entrusted the aircraft to the accident pilot.).
40 See id. at 27, 43 ¶ 49.
41 See supra Part II.
42 See Garland, 21 N.E.3d at 44 ¶ 53.
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cular, the CFI would need to expand the scope of the flight re-
view substantially.43 The CFI would also have to think about the
nature and breadth of the review of Part 91 regulations, of the
weather conditions to be discussed, and about keeping detailed
records.44 These are realistic concerns for any CFI who reads the
Advisory Circular.
If a pilot were involved in a significant accident, the most
likely claim against a CFI who administered a flight review to the
pilot after the date of issuance of AC 61-98C would be that the
CFI did not do all of the things the Advisory Circular recom-
mended and that, therefore, he failed to comply with Section
61.56, with resulting injury; the plaintiff would have to allege
and prove that the failure caused the accident or proximately
contributed to it, depending on the standard for liability under
the applicable state law.45
Violation of a FAR can be the basis for generating a rebutta-
ble presumption of negligence.46 If a plaintiff presents plausible
expert evidence (and perhaps even if he or she does not) that in
the case of the accident pilot Section 61.56 required the CFI to
take additional steps described in the Advisory Circular, a court
might conclude that the departure from the Advisory Circular is
sufficient to generate an issue of fact for a jury to decide. With-
out an allegation that the flight review was inadequate, it is not
likely that a plaintiff could successfully advance a negligent in-
struction claim premised solely on the assertion that the flight
review constituted instruction.47 Case law dealing with instructor
43 U.S. Dep’t of Transp., FAA, Advisory Circular 61-98C ¶ 4-2 (Nov. 20, 2015).
44 Id. ¶ 4-3.
45 See Garland, 21 N.E.3d at 44–45 ¶ 54.
46 See, e.g., Steering Comm. v. United States, 6 F.3d 572, 576 (9th Cir. 1993)
(discussing the effect of a federal regulatory violation under California law and
applying a rebuttable presumption of negligence from the violation if it caused
the injury and “the statute, ordinance, or regulation was intended to protect the
class of person or property injured.”); accord Avemco Ins. Co. v. Elliott Aviation
Serv., 86 F. Supp. 2d 824, 829 (C.D. Ill. 2000) (applying Illinois law that “violation
of a statute or ordinance designed for the protection of human life or property is
prima facie evidence of negligence” and citing French v. City of Springfield, 357
N.E.2d 438, 440 (Ill. 1976)).
47 See Waugh v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 966 N.E.2d 540, 551–554 (Ill. App. Ct.
2012) (discussing the case law in other jurisdictions that reject such claims, and
following that case law in Illinois). Courts generally hold that negligent instruc-
tion claims against flight instructors do not state a viable cause of action. See id.
Claims of actual negligence in the course of providing a flight review or other
instructional flight have been found to state claims. See Avemco Ins. Co., 86 F.
Supp. 2d at 827, 831 (finding that the flight review constituted instruction and
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liability is, therefore, also not likely to be relevant to a claim
based on an allegedly inadequate flight review.48
IV. WHAT OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE CFI?
When a flight review applicant has multiple ratings or flies in
a variety of flight conditions (or may do so), what options does
the CFI have to limit his or her potential liability in the event of
a subsequent accident involving the pilot?
One option is only to participate in flight reviews for pilots
known to the instructor to be engaged in one specific type of
flying and who have only a single rating. For such a pilot, the
CFI may conduct and document the flight review by addressing
all of the many possible aspects of that pilot’s flight activities.49
While that approach provides no assurance of avoiding claims
and potential liability, it does reduce the risk.
Not participating in flight reviews may be an acceptable solu-
tion in many cases. Indeed, the Advisory Circular recommends
that pilots consider the FAA’s WINGS program, which provides
a substitute for a flight review without an instructor sign-off as
such.50 Instead, a pilot who has successfully completed three
FAA-approved flight activities with a CFI and participated on his
or her own in three web-based or live knowledge programs in a
twelve-month period is issued a certificate that substitutes for
the flight review.51
The required flight activities are defined by the FAA and con-
sist of discrete, limited tasks from the practical test standards for
a rating held by the pilot.52 For a pilot holding an airplane, sin-
gle-engine land rating, for example, required tasks could in-
clude demonstrating proficiency in short-field takeoffs and
maximum performance climbs, which are specific, focused tasks
holding a flight instructor liable for damages resulting from an off-airport land-
ing following a simulated engine failure in the course of a flight review).
48 See Lunsford v. Tucson Aviation Corp., 240 P.2d 545, 546–47 (Ariz. 1952)
(where the Arizona Supreme Court stated that the “general rules governing tort
liability and negligence are applicable to airplane accident cases” but applied,
instead, a common carrier’s duty because the defendant conceded that was the
relevant standard).
49 See U.S. Dep’t of Transp., FAA, Advisory Circular 61-98C ¶ 4-3 (Nov. 20,
2015).
50 Id. ¶¶ 1-7, 4-1.
51 See FAA, WINGS PILOT PROFICIENCY PROGRAM USER’S GUIDE TC 11-0007 ¶¶
4.3, 4.7, 5, https://www.faasafety.gov/documents/Wings_Manual.pdf [https://
perma.cc/J23M-WEFC].
52 Id. ¶¶ 1.1, 9.6, 9.8.
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with defined standards for successful completion.53 Thus, a CFI
can limit his activity to approval of three specific sets of flight
activities undertaken by an applicant without assuming any duty
to determine performance on other maneuvers or to inquire
about all the potential types of flying the pilot might do, where
he might go, or whether he may fly in different or challenging
conditions.54 The CFI’s signoff in the WINGS Program is limited
to the specified tasks undertaken, without any crystal ball obliga-
tions or duty to inquire.55 Moreover, the CFI has no responsibil-
ity to determine that the pilot is familiar with the regulations of
Part 91 in any respect.56 That requirement is satisfied by the pi-
lot taking and passing three knowledge activities, which include
FAA-approved regulatory and other content.57
One can argue that the revised Advisory Circular makes the
CFI’s flight review tasks so potentially onerous as a means to dis-
courage flight reviews and, instead, to encourage participation
in the WINGS Program, which is modeled expressly on the re-
current training approach used by the airlines. The Advisory
Circular’s approach to the flight review is essentially open-ended
in terms of maneuvers and regulations on which the CFI is
urged to examine the pilot.58 The WINGS Program may go too
far in the opposite direction. Its approach limits maneuvers to
only those selected by the pilot from the menu provided by the
FAA and divorces the CFI entirely from the pilot’s review of the
operating regulations of Part 91.59
For those CFIs who do not refer most of their flight review
applicants to the WINGS Program, and who provide flight re-
views for any but the most standard and relatively simple pilot
profiles, the Advisory Circular provides a road map for a plain-
tiff to later attempt to shift responsibility to the CFI if the pilot is
involved in an accident arguably attributable to some aspect of
his flying that might have been covered in the flight review, but
53 Id. ¶ 4.8.
54 See id. ¶¶ 4.8, 9.4.
55 See id.
56 See id. ¶ 1.3.
57 See id. ¶ 5.
58 See U.S. Dep’t of Transp., FAA, Advisory Circular 61-98C ¶¶ 4-2, 4-3 (Nov.
20, 2015).
59 See FAA, WINGS PILOT PROFICIENCY PROGRAM USER’S GUIDE TC 11-0007 ¶¶
1.3, 4.8, 9.4, https://www.faasafety.gov/documents/Wings_Manual.pdf [https://
perma.cc/J23M-WEFC].
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which was not.60 Other than a very extensive (and expensive),
thoroughly documented flight review that focuses on all areas in
which the pilot may operate and all regulations that may apply
to those operations, the CFI may have a difficult time rebutting
an argument that something important was missed in the flight
review that allegedly accounted for a subsequent accident.
60 See U.S. Dep’t of Transp., FAA, Advisory Circular 61-98C ¶ 4-2 (Nov. 20,
2015).
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ABSTRACT
Subsidy allegations against the three major Middle-Eastern
carriers—Emirates Airlines, Etihad Airways, and Qatar Air-
ways—have been brought by the three major U.S. carriers—
American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and United Airlines. The lat-
ter claim that the Gulf trio receive letters of credit and subsidies
from their governments. They claim also that their rivals take
passengers and revenues from U.S. carriers and force them to
reduce, terminate, or forego services on international routes.
This article rationalizes the ongoing debate without arguing
whether the subsidy allegations are founded or not. It seeks to
understand the basic rationale behind any findings and conclu-
sions drawn by the different stakeholders that are involved or
concerned by the subject. It is important to shed light on the
conflicts of interests that might harm air transport development
as a whole, and hence the fundamental right of the people: free-
dom of movement and, more specifically, the needs of the peo-
ple for “efficient and economical air transport” prescribed by
Article 44 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation.1
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1 Int’l Civ. Aviation Org. [ICAO], Convention on International Civil Aviation,
art. 44, ICAO Doc. 7300/8, (8th ed. 2000) [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
The Convention came into force Apr. 4, 1947. Id. at 1, n.1.
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The focus is on the North American region. The air transport
policies and competitive issues are addressed from different na-
tional and international perspectives, specifically, the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Trade
Organization (WTO), national civil aviation authorities, and for-
profit organizations. The analysis is based mainly on scientific
data and legal and regulatory aspects, which are discussed
through a case study of the United States and Canada on the
one hand and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the other.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE POLICIES AND regulations which have governed theair transport industry for several decades have various moti-
vations to each country. However, unnecessarily restrictive regu-
lations may have led to significant losses of economic efficiency,
and thereby a failure to safeguard an efficient and viable air
transportation to the largest possible proportion of the popula-
tion. In other words, a failure to “[m]eet the needs of the peo-
ples of the world for . . . efficient and economical air
transport.”2
Economic and social benefits have been pointed out as the
very essence of air transport liberalization, which has been an
engine and a catalytic tool of socioeconomic development
within the aviation industry.3 Connectivity has been identified as
a social benefit and considered a secondary effect of
liberalization.4
What is considered by some stakeholders as a benefit occur-
ring from liberalization might be perceived by others as a threat.
Not everyone is convinced of the effects or side effects of com-
petition in air transport, which is the driving force of
liberalization.
One of the fundamental rules of air transport regulation is to
make sure that international air transport services are estab-
lished “on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated
soundly and economically.”5 More specifically, every contracting
State should have “a fair opportunity to operate international air-
2 Id. at 20.
3 Air Transp. Res. Soc’y, Air Transportation Liberalization & the Economic
Development of the Countries 3 (ICAO, Working Paper No. 189, 2016), http://
www.icao.int/Meetings/a39/Documents/WP/wp_189_en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Y7YC-C5Z2].
4 Id. at 4.
5 Chicago Convention, supra note 1, at 1.
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lines.”6 Article 44 of the Chicago Convention explains the objec-
tives of ICAO, built upon the message of peace and harmony
among nations mentioned in the preamble.7
According to ICAO,
The liberalization of international air transport regulation con-
tinued to evolve at various levels since the 1980s. It is estimated
that, in 2012, this involved about 35 [percent] of country-pairs
with non-stop scheduled passenger air services and about 58
[percent] of the frequencies offered, through either bilateral
“open skies” air services agreements (ASAs) or regional/pluri-
lateral liberalized agreements and arrangements.8
In order to assist Member States in liberalizing their air ser-
vices, ICAO has set up a Template Air Services Agreement
(TASA) as a comprehensive framework for optional use by
States.9 TASA provides proposals of provisions for bilateral and
regional/plurilateral ASAs based on the model clauses devel-
oped by ICAO and the practice of States in their agreements.10
The template provides explicit explanations of many clauses
throughout its Articles. Likewise, similarities and differences be-
tween various wordings are pointed out depending on the de-
sired degree of liberalization (i.e. traditional, transitional, or full
liberalization).11
Every ten years, ICAO holds a worldwide air transport confer-
ence (ATConf) to examine the key issues and related regulatory
framework governing the development of air transport. In 2003,
the fifth such event (ATConf/5) “gave widespread support for
the concept and contents of the TASA, its optional use by States
in their air services relationships and its further development
6 Id. at 20.
7 Id. at 1, 20. These objectives include: (1) encouraging the arts of aircraft
design and operation for peaceful purposes; (2) meeting the needs of the people
of the world through the development of safe, regular, efficient, and economical
air transport; and (3) ensuring that the rights of contracting States are respected,
and avoiding discrimination between States.
8 ICAO SECRETARIAT, REGULATORY & INDUSTRY OVERVIEW 1 (2013), http://
www.icao.int/Meetings/a38/Documents/REGULATORY%20AND%20INDUS
TRY%20OVERVIEW.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3FB-CBN2].
9 ICAO SECRETARIAT, WORLDWIDE AIR TRANSPORTATON CONFERENCE: CHAL-
LENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF LIBERALIZATION 2 (2003), http://www.icao.int/
Meetings/ATConf5/Documents/atconf5_wp017_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/78D
G-9GRS].
10 ICAO, ICAO TEMPLATE AIR SERVICES AGREEMENTS 1 (2009), http://www.ic
ao.int/Meetings/AMC/MA/ICAN2009/templateairservicesagreements.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X6SW-JKJ8].
11 Id. at 1–2.
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over time by ICAO as ‘living documents.’”12 One decade later,
1,000 delegates and observers from 131 Member States and
thirty-nine international organizations attended the most recent
conference (ATConf/6) held in Montreal from March 18–22,
2013. Among other things, this conference decided that ICAO
should continue to update TASA to keep pace with regulatory
evolution.13
The main outcomes of ATConf/6 are summarized on the ba-
sis of four important points: (1) highlighting air transport policy
as an integral element of a sustainable civil aviation system; (2)
reaffirming the objective of enhanced liberalization and ICAO’s
leadership role in developing related policies and tools; (3)
opening up new perspectives for the modernization of the
global regulatory framework; and (4) providing a basis for con-
crete actions by ICAO.14
In 2014, experts from twenty-seven Member States and eigh-
teen observer States and international organizations partici-
pated in the twelfth meeting of the Air Transport Regulation
Panel (ATRP/12) in order to assist ICAO Secretariat in the AT-
Conf/6 follow-up work.15 It was noted that the work of the ATRP
will take into consideration the interests of all stakeholders, in-
cluding an effective and sustained participation of States in in-
ternational air transport and the ICAO Strategic Objectives for
2014-2016. In that regard, the ATRP has committed to under-
take several actions and measures, including further develop-
ment of ICAO’s policy and guidance material on international
air transport regulation and liberalization. Accordingly, ATRP/
12 considered strategic issues relating to air transport liberaliza-
tion, which include: (1) a long-term vision for international air
transport liberalization; (2) an international agreement for
Members States to liberalize market access and air carrier own-
ership and control; (3) regulatory approaches for fair competi-
tion; and (4) a set of core principles on consumer protection.16
12 Id. at 1.
13 Council of ICAO, Outcome of the Sixth Worldwide Air Transportation Con-
ference 2, 11 (ICAO, Working Paper No. 56, 2013), http://www.icao.int/Meet
ings/a38/Documents/WP/wp056_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3V9-P29L].
14 Id. at 4.
15 ICAO, REPORT OF THE TWELFTH MEETING OF THE AIR TRANSPORT REGULA-
TORY PANEL (ATRP/12), ii-1, A1–A4 (June 19, 2014), http://www.icao.int/Sus
tainability/Compendium/Documents/ReferenceDocuments/ATRP12_Report_
en.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5SQ-P4EA].
16 See id. at ii-1–ii-2.
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The International Air Transport Association (IATA)17 advo-
cates that, as a global industry, aviation liberalization “can pro-
vide greater benefits for passengers and allow airlines to operate
on a fully commercial basis.”18 According to IATA, modern,
commercial, and global rules are required to achieve further—
and fuller—liberalization of the global airline industry.19 IATA
believes that the liberalization of operational (i.e. product mar-
ket) and ownership (i.e. capital market) restrictions can be a
very beneficial process despite the difficulty inherent in such
process. In that regard, IATA has analyzed the impact of opera-
tional and ownership liberalization in four other industries—re-
tail banking, energy, telecoms, and media—which share close
parallels with the air transport industry; all are strategically im-
portant, network oriented, and customer-focused. The results
showed that further liberalization will have positive impact for
both consumers and producers.20
IATA points out the existing restrictive bilateral ASAs as an
impediment to the sustainable growth of air transport industry
including air traffic services and airline ownership and control
by foreign nationals.21 IATA notes that the airline industry is
“safer, more accessible and more efficient than ever before”
thanks to airlines.22 IATA urges governments to bring policy in
line with these achievements: “The future success of our indus-
try rests on greater commercial freedom to serve markets where
they exist and to merge and consolidate where it makes business
sense.”23
17 “was founded in Havana, Cuba, in April 1945 . . . . At its founding, IATA had
57 members from 31 nations, mostly in Europe and North America. Today it has
some 265 members from 117 nations in every part of the globe.” The Founding of
IATA, IATA, http://www.iata.org/about/Pages/history.aspx [https://perma.cc/
L5FM-2EHC]. IATA is the trade association for the world’s airlines, representing
83% of total air traffic. It supports airline activity and helps formulate industry
policy and standards. About Us, IATA, http://www.iata.org/about/Pages/in-
dex.aspx [https://perma.cc/CMG3-S8AA]. It is headquartered in Montreal, Ca-
nada with Executive Offices in Geneva, Switzerland. IATA Office Addresses, IATA,
http://www.iata.org/about/Pages/offices.aspx [https://perma.cc/6A9Z-NRW2].
18 MARK SMYTH & BRIAN PEARCE, IATA, IATA ECONOMIC BRIEFING NO. 7: AIR-
LINE LIBERALISATION 6 (2007).
19 Id. at 4, 14.
20 Id. at 3–4.
21 Id. at 7.
22 Id. at 3.
23 Id.
350 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
Air transport services, which are governed by the WTO,24 are
defined in the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), the WTO’s multilateral agreement on trade in ser-
vices.25 These services are set out in the annex of the GATS on
air transport services, which excludes from the scope of the
GATS: (1) traffic rights, however granted; or (2) services related
to the exercise of traffic rights, except aircraft repair and main-
tenance services, selling and marketing of air transport services,
and computer reservation system services.26
However, these services are subject to a regular review by the
Council of Trade in Services, with a view to considering the pos-
sible further application of the GATS to the sector.27 In that re-
gard, a first review took place from 2000 to 2003, and the second
one is ongoing.28 The WTO works in coordination with the
ICAO and other stakeholders on various aspects, specifically
those related to liberalization of air transport. On that note, the
WTO has developed, in preparation for the second review, the
Quantitative Air Services Agreements Review (QUASAR)
database and methodology, which aims to assess the degree of
liberalization of the air transport.29 Moreover, a study was con-
ducted by the ICAO and the WTO in 2005 to develop the Essen-
tial Service and Tourism Development Route Scheme (ESTDR),
and hence institutional mechanisms to support airlines willing
24 The WTO is a global international organization that deals with the rules of
trade between its 159 member states. See What is the WTO?, WTO, https://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm [https://perma.cc/YS
7U-FMGZ]. The WTO acts as conductor of negotiations of trade agreements, a
tribunal for dispute settlement, a monitor of trade policies, and a trainer to build
trade capacity. See The Four Roles of the WTO, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/
news_e/infocenter_e/brief_roles_e.doc [https://perma.cc/PB5Q-LT75].
The WTO acts as a global police. Between 1995 and 2013, the organization
received more than 400 trade disputes between member states. 75% of these
cases have been resolved by informal consultations between the plaintiffs and
defendants. Countries concerned have generally adopted the recommendations
of the WTO. See CHARLES W. L. HILL ET AL., GLOBAL BUSINESS TODAY 211 (9th ed.
2016).
25 Air Transport Services, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/
transport_e/transport_air_e.htm [https://perma.cc/TL8X-RSX6].
26 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1B: Annex on Air Transport Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinaf-
ter Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 1B].
27 Id.
28 Air Transport Services, supra note 25.
29 Id.
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to provide certain services of a public service nature.30 The
QUASAR methodology and the role of the WTO in regard to
competition issues and commercial disputes are discussed later
in this Article.
Unlike the international organizations, the objectives and
principles of the air transport liberalization from the perspec-
tives of national authorities and airlines, considered separately,
might vary drastically at large, depending upon the interests of
each stakeholder. What is considered by one as a great benefit
might be perceived by another as a threat. This is more evident
when conflicts occur between parties, which can be either na-
tional authorities (e.g. political disputes, conflicts with other de-
partments within the same State) or airlines (e.g. disputes on
competition). Neither ICAO nor IATA have authority over the
national civil aviation authorities and airlines when it is a matter
of the level of market access.
II. AIR TRANSPORT LANDSCAPE IN THE UNITED
STATES, CANADA, AND THE UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES
A. UNITED STATES
The United States is one of the best examples of market liber-
alization. It has high quality statistics on air travel because of its
size and the relatively lengthy period since it deregulated its do-
mestic market in the late 1970s. Moreover, its “airports have
been most active in pursuing new services, and in evaluating the
economic impacts of aviation.”31
Over the past decade, the United States has been a nexus for
economic growth and air transport development. Between 1996
and 2010, “[U.S.] gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
[grew] by approximately 27% [and] [U.S.] air passenger-miles
for international and domestic travels . . . increased by 52% and
32%, respectively.”32 According to the World Economic Forum
30 ICAO, A Study of an Essential Service and Tourism Development Route Scheme 2
(2005), http://www.icao.int/sustainability/EssentialServicesStudy/EssentialSer
vicesStudy_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MP3-PANG].
31 INTERVISTAS CONSULTING, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AIR SERVICE LIBERALIZA-
TION 10 (2006), http://www.intervistas.com/downloads/Economic_Impact_of_
Air_Service_Liberalization_Final_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/YG6B-6623].
32 Junwook Chi & Jungho Baek, Dynamic Relationship Between Air Transport De-
mand and Economic Growth in the United States: A New Look, 29 TRANSPORT POL’Y
257, 257 (2013).
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(WEF), “economic growth plays a crucial role in the expansion
of both air passenger and freight services.”33
In 2014, the U.S. aviation industry generated a total of 5.7
million jobs, of which 2.2 million were direct.34 It also had an
impact of $561.7 billion on GDP, of which $118 billion were in
the tourism industry.35 Moreover, according to the U.S. Travel
Association, domestic and international travelers spent $927.9
billion directly and spurred an additional $1.2 trillion in other
industries.36
Open Skies agreements have vastly expanded international
passenger and cargo flights to and from the United States. Ac-
cording to the Department of Transportation, Open Skies
agreements with over 100 partners have been achieved from
every region of the world and at every level of economic devel-
opment: “America’s Open Skies policy has gone hand-in-hand
with U.S. airline globalization. By allowing U.S. air carriers un-
limited market access to our partners’ markets and the right to
fly to all intermediate and beyond points, Open Skies agree-
ments provide maximum operational flexibility for airline
alliances.”37
However, with the rise of the Middle Eastern carriers and
other foreign carriers (e.g. Norwegian Air Shuttle), Open Skies
agreements “are under attack from an unlikely alliance of do-
mestic airlines and unions.”38 Legacy airlines, “which have tradi-
tionally backed open-skies policies to expand their markets,” are
now claiming the re-evaluation of the objectives of these agree-
ments because of alleged unfair competition from some major
foreign carriers.39
33 Id. at 260.




36 U.S. TRAVEL ASS’N, U.S. Travel Answer Sheet—Facts About a Leading American
Industry That’s More Than Just Fun (2014), https://www.ustravel.org/sites/default
/files/Media%20Root/Document/US_Travel_AnswerSheet_DEC2015_final%20
(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/YD2F-N7RD].
37 Open Skies Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tra/
ata/ [https://perma.cc/H4NF-VVJN].
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Operation of airports by municipal and quasi-municipal gov-
ernments is unique to the United States. The airport workers
are government employees and the airport’s budget is subject to
city or municipal approval.40 Generally speaking, airports are
subject to a heavy regulatory framework dating back to the
Nixon era.41 Also, U.S. airports have traditionally been heavily
“influenced by competitive private interests, particularly by air-
lines that have had the power . . . to shape virtually all the major
aspects of airport development and management.”42
Long-haul travel experienced a 40% growth from 2000 to
2010, while the domestic market showed just a 2% growth dur-
ing the same period.43 In 2014, the United States held the top
rank regarding the number of operating airlines, which was 223.
It ranked second in overall air transport infrastructure, and
ninth in terms of quality. However, it ranked 128th out of 141
countries in price competitiveness related to ticket taxes and air-
port charges, being among the highest in the world.44
Even though U.S. airports are essential for the country’s de-
velopment, they suffer from heavy government controls and
frameworks and lack of revenues. This is due to the Federal Avi-
ation Administration (FAA) regulated fares. According to the
WEF Report, this has caused the United States to fall to the
thirty-first position in airport development.45 The United States
restricts foreign ownership of domestic and international air-
lines to 25%, though it “has allowed up to 49% foreign owner-
ship on a case-by-case basis.”46
40 MIKE TRETHAWAY, AIRPORT OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT & PRICE REGULATION
4–6 (2001), http://www.intervistas.com/downloads/Airport_Ownership_Man
agement_and_Price_Regulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/KCZ4-5L3L].
41 See generally THERESA L. KRAUS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 1903–2008 25–44 (2008), https://
www.faa.gov/about/history/historical_perspective/media/historical_perspective
_ch4.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YDA-VK9P].
42 RICHARD DE NEUFVILLE, AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION ISSUES FOR THE UNITED
STATES 5 (1999).
43 Kate Rice, U.S. Travel Associations Dow Details Impact of 9/11 on Travel Business,
TRAVEL PULSE, Aug. 24, 2011, http://www.travelpulse.com/news/features/us-tra
vel-associations-dow-details-impact-of-911-on-travel-business.html [https://perma.
cc/ZB2T-D8VS].
44 WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE TRAVEL & TOURISM COMPETITIVENESS REPORT
2015 339 (Roberto Crotti & Tiffany Misrahi, eds., 2015), http://www3.weforum.
org/docs/TT15/WEF_Global_Travel&Tourism_Report_2015.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/S9UR-QJWQ].
45 Id. at 43.
46 DAVID GILLEN, COMPETITION POLICY REVIEW PANEL, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP RE-
STRICTIONS IN THE CANADIAN AVIATION INDUSTRY: A REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT 2
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During the period between 2011 and 2015, as the economy
was returning from the 2008 economic crisis, the financial re-
sults of U.S. airlines continued to show improvement as the in-
dustry was being restructured. In 2015, the industry recorded
one of the strongest profitability reports; “the top 10 U.S. sched-
uled passenger airlines, based on operating revenue, reported
an after-tax net profit of $24.2 billion . . . up from a profit of
$7.3 billion in 2014.”47 These airlines included American Air-
lines, Delta, United, Southwest, JetBlue, Alaska, Hawaiian,
Spirit, SkyWest, and Frontier.48 They “carried 81.9 percent of
U.S. airlines’ scheduled service passengers in 2015 and ac-
counted for 94.6 percent of the scheduled passenger airline af-
ter-tax net profit.”49
It is expected that in the next twenty years, due to a long-term
nationwide economic recovery, passenger and cargo traffic will
experience annual growths of 2.7% and 3.8%, respectively.50 On
the other hand, some of the major issues looming include (1)
allegations by U.S. airlines that the three major Middle Eastern
carriers are violating competition rules; and (2) labor claims by
workers at Southwest and Delta that demand better pay and re-
ject recent labor contracts.51
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code describes
the requirements and process of reorganization of the business
affairs and assets of debtors, in this case financially troubled cor-
porations. In that sense, a reorganization plan is set to assess the
debtor’s fulfillment of its obligations. Chapter 11 presents an
opportunity for the company to avoid bankruptcy and allows the
(2008), https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cprp-gepmc.nsf/vwapj/David_Gillen.pdf/
$FILE/David_Gillen.pdf (“In May 2003, the [U.S.] government proposed raising
the allowable percentage of total foreign voting stock ownership to 49%, but this
is still being debated.”) [https://perma.cc/3VUW-N6FE].
47 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS (BTS), BTS RELEASES
2015 AIRLINE FINANCIAL DATA 2 (2016), http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/press_re
leases/bts026_16 [https://perma.cc/3TEY-L8B9].
48 Id. at 6.
49 Id. at 2.
50 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, OFFICE OF TRAVEL AND TOURISM INDUS., National
Travel & Tourism Strategy Task Force on Travel & Competitiveness (2012), http://
travel.trade.gov/pdf/national-travel-and-tourism-strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/
24MX-KLWA]; FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA Aerospace Forecast: Fiscal Years
2016–2036, at 9, 19 (2016) https://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aero
space_forecasts/media/FY2016-36_FAA_Aerospace_Forecast.pdf.
51 Susan Carey, Three Big U.S. Airlines Allege Additional State Subsidies to Qatar
Airways, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2016; Susan Carey, Dark Clouds Loom for Airlines Even
as Their Profits Take Off, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2015, at A1.
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creditors to receive some form of payment for amounts owed to
them by the debtors.52 However, it is worth noting that debtors
need not be “insolvent” to file a voluntary Chapter 11 petition.53
It is deemed to be in debtor-company’s interest to file early
for Chapter 11 because it provides it with “wide-ranging and val-
uable powers.”54 These include the right to “disclaim, adopt or
assign contracts,” and most importantly, “the ability to sell assets
and borrow money.”55 In fact, the directors of these debtor-com-
panies remain responsible to all constituents; they “may act to
maximize the values for all, including negotiating on behalf of
existing equity-holders.”56 Therefore, the debtor is enabled to
“address its business and operational issues, including its rela-
tionship with unions and its pensions.”57 In contrast, in the
United Kingdom for instance, debtors do not have such powers
under its administration procedure.58 On top of that, it is ar-
gued in large Chapter 11 cases that existing management have
benefited from generous compensation and severance incen-
tives in order to remain with the company during the reorgani-
zation process. In another vein, it is claimed that debtors could
use Chapter 11 as a delaying tactic when dealing with creditors
and opponents in litigation.59 Perhaps that is the reason why the
Bankruptcy Code was amended in 2005 to “include an 18 month
‘drop-dead date’ for exclusivity in Chapter 11 cases,” and “re-
strict significantly the circumstances under which incentives can
be granted.”60
According to the United States Government Accountability
Office (GAO), airline bankruptcies’ overall duration averages
52 Ch. 11 – Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-
forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics [https://
perma.cc/E6XP-JE4Z].
53 JONES DAY, COMPARISON OF CH. 11 OF THE U. S. BANKRUPTCY CODE WITH THE
SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION IN THE U. K., THE RESCUE PROCEDURE IN FRANCE, IN-
SOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS IN GERMANY, AND THE EXTRAORDINARY ADMINISTRATION
FOR LARGE INSOLVENT COMPANIES IN ITALY 8 (2007), http://goo.gl/In4tb9
[https://perma.cc/5FMA-VXBX] [hereinafter COMPARISON OF CH. 11].
54 Id. at 14.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 13.
57 Id. at 14.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 10.
60 Id. at 10, 13.
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714 days. This duration is higher than the average of all indus-
tries, which was 518 days.61
The longest and costliest bankruptcy in aviation history was
United Airlines, which reemerged in 2006 after 1,150 days in
bankruptcy.62 The airline was able to slash costs by $7 billion per
year and cut out $8 billion of its debt, but it still had to deal with
$17 billion of the remaining debt. Furthermore, a new manage-
ment incentive plan was adopted following the period of reor-
ganization despite the “angry” opposition of the union; the
disputed plan “reward[ed] 400 executives with a total of 10 mil-
lion stock shares, 8% of the reorganized company.”63
B. CANADA
“Historically, Transport Canada approached the issue of bilat-
eral air service negotiations on an ad hoc basis that featured in-
cremental negotiations.”64 In November 2006, Canada adopted
a new approach to international air access named Blue Sky by
Transport Canada.65 The criteria to be considered in determin-
ing Canada’s negotiating priorities include the following factors:
61 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-945, COMMERCIAL AVIATION:
BANKRUPTCY AND PENSION PROBLEMS ARE SYMPTOMS OF UNDERLYING STRUCTURAL
ISSUES 23–24 (2005).
62 PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, AIRLINE BANKRUPTCY: THE POST-DEREGULATION EPI-
DEMIC 33 (2012), https://www.mcgill.ca/iasl/files/iasl/aspl613_paul_dempsey_
airlinebankruptcies2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4WM-G8Q4].
63 Marilyn Adams, Has United Changed Enough?, USA TODAY, Jan. 23, 2006,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/biztravel/2006-01-22-united-cover-usat
_x.htm [https://perma.cc/BD5D-WQZ2].
64 LIBERALIZATION IN AVIATION: COMPETITION, COOPERATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
446 (PETER FORSYTH ET AL. eds., 2013).
65 Id. Blue Sky policy has the following objectives:
“[p]rovide a framework that encourages competition and the devel-
opment of new and expanded international air services to benefit
travellers, shippers, and the tourism and business sectors[;]
[p]rovide opportunities for Canadian airlines to grow and compete
successfully in a more liberalized global environment[;] [e]nable
airports to market themselves in a manner that is unhindered by
bilateral constraints to the greatest extent possible[;] [s]upport and
facilitate Canada’s international trade objectives[;] [s]upport a
safe, secure, efficient, economically healthy and viable Canadian air
transportation industry.”
The following principles guide the approach of the Blue Sky pol-
icy: “[r]ecognize that air transportation is a direct contributor to a
dynamic economy and is a leading trade and tourism facilitator[;]
[m]arket forces should determine the price, quality, frequency and
range of air services options[;] Canadian carriers should have the
opportunity to compete in international markets on a reasonably
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Canadian airline and airport priorities and interests; [l]ikelihood
and extent of new Canadian and foreign carrier services, giving
preference where early start-up of air services is planned; [s]ize
and maturity of the air transportation markets and potential for
future growth; [f]oreign government requests; Canada’s interna-
tional trade objectives; [s]afety and security issues; [f]oreign rela-
tions; and [b]ilateral irritants and disputes.66
The Blue Sky policy emphasizes that “[a]s a primary objective,
Canada will seek to negotiate reciprocal ‘Open Skies’-type agree-
ments, similar to the one negotiated with the [United States] in
November 2005, where it is deemed to be in Canada’s overall
interest.”67
“Until the early 1990s [Canadian] airports were managed by
the federal government.”68 Since then, Canadian airports have
been corporatized. The government still maintains ownership of
the airports through emphyteutic leases however, which “set out
the governance and consultation mechanisms under which the
airports are run” by not-for-profit entities.69 Thus, these entities
bare the operating and funding responsibilities under the long-
term leases.70
According to Daniel-Robert Gooch, president of the Cana-
dian Airports Council (CAC): “Canada essentially has a ‘user pay
PLUS’ system for aviation in which users pay for airport infra-
structure, security screening and air traffic control, plus a little
extra to the federal government.”71
Gooch noted that over $19 billion have been invested in air-
port improvements under this system since 1992.72  As a result,
the WEF in 2015 ranked Canada’s overall air transport infra-
structures first worldwide ahead of the United States and the
level playing field[;] [a]ir liberalization initiatives will continue to
be guided by safety and security considerations.”
See TRANSP. CAN., BLUE SKY: CANADA’S NEW INTERNATIONAL POLICY 2 (2006),
https://www.tc.gc.ca/media/documents/policy/bluesky.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Y74U-Q9CL].
66 Id. at 3.
67 Id.
68 Daniel-Robert Gooch, Why Canada’s Airport Model is Working for Taxpayers,
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UAE, respectively.73 Canadian airports ranked sixteenth in
terms of quality.74 However, the same report ranked Canada
130th out of 141 countries, among the highest in the world, in
terms of price competitiveness related to ticket taxes and airport
charges.75
“Canada limits foreign ownership of Canadian air carriers to
25%.”76 In the current aviation market, Air Canada, Air Transat,
WestJet, and Porter Airlines, which operate scheduled and char-
ter services domestically and abroad, represent the main air car-
riers in Canada.77 “Air Canada is extending its global reach
through its membership in Star Alliance and through its partici-
pation in a transatlantic revenue sharing joint venture with
United Airlines and Deutsche Lufthansa AG, referred to as
A++.”78 Furthermore, the flag carrier often considers code-shar-
ing as a “preliminary step to either achieve more comprehensive
Joint Ventures . . . or in some cases, to introducing [its] own
aircraft on a new route.”79 It is worthy to note that in 2003, the
biggest issue looming was the financial difficulties faced by Air
Canada.80 At that time, the national carrier managed to keep its
membership in Star Alliance thanks to its partner United Air-
lines, though airlines are required to meet certain financial obli-
gations to maintain their membership.
Similar to Chapter 11 in the United States, the Companies’
Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) allows financially troubled
Canadian corporations to restructure their financial affairs
73 THE TRAVEL & TOURISM COMPETITVENESS REPORT 2015, supra note 44, at 113,
335, 339.
74 Id. at 113.
75 Id.
76 GILLEN, supra note 46, at 1.
77 Brian Spiegel, List of Canadian Airlines, USA TODAY, http://traveltips.usato
day.com/list-canadian-airlines-63316.html [https://perma.cc/7DU4-RE46].
78 AIR CANADA, 2013 MANAGEMENT’S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS OF
OPERATIONS AND FINANCIAL CONDITION 4 (2014), https://www.aircanada.com/
content/dam/aircanada/portal/documents/PDF/en/quarterly-result/2013/20
13_MDA_q4.pdf [https://perma.cc/HS8K-HG5J].
79 Calin Rovinescu, CEO, Air Canada, Remarks to the Vancouver Board of
Trade 12 (Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.aircanada.com/content/dam/aircanada
/portal/documents/PDF/speeches-presentations/en/vancouverBoard_2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K4TH-AFEK].
80 Keith McArthur, How Creditors Saved Air Canada, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (May
3, 2004), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/how-creditors-
saved-air-canada/article1137095/ [https://perma.cc/WRU6-EFVS].
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through a formal Plan of Arrangement.81 In contrast with Chap-
ter 11, among other things, a Canadian debtor must be “insol-
vent” and “have in excess of C$5-million in liabilities” to be able
to make a voluntary application for relief under the CCAA.82
Canadian “[c]orporations that do not reach this $5 million
threshold can utilize the Division I Proposal under the Bank-
ruptcy and Insolvency Act.”83 Moreover, “the stay of proceedings
is not automatic” in Canada.84 Nevertheless, “a broad initial stay
up to a maximum of 30 days” can be issued by courts, typically
exercising their discretion.85 In addition, while there is no time
limit on the stay under Chapter 11, an extension of the initial
stay can be granted upon application to the Court under the
CCAA. The “debtor must demonstrate that it is acting in good
faith and with due diligence.”86 Another point concerns the le-
gal bankruptcy estate, which is created upon the filing of a
Chapter 11 petition, but is not under the CCAA.87
“Air Canada entered bankruptcy in April 2003, emerging in
September 2004.”88 Among the benefits gained from CCAA Pro-
tection, the carrier was able to cut its costs by $2 billion, which
included “$1 billion labour and benefits; $0.6 billion in aircraft
lease rentals (49% cut in cash rent from 2003 to 2009); and $0.4
billion in supplier contracts and other.”89
C. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE)
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), UAE’s
non-oil GDP was expected to grow at 4.4% in 2015,90 and it grew
81 What is CCAA?, PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS CANADA, http://www.pwc.com/
ca/en/services/insolvency-assignments/what-is-ccaa.html [https://perma.cc/
3ND2-FS2C].
82 BLAKE, CASSELS & GRAYDON LLP, CHAPTER 11 AND CCAA: A CROSS-BORDER
COMPARISON 1 (2013), http://www.blakesfiles.com/Guides/Blakes_Restructuring
_and_Insolvency_Canada.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8DG-9Z23] [hereinafter Ch.
11 & CCAA].
83 What is CCAA?, supra note 81.
84 CHAPTER 11 AND CCAA, supra note 82, at 2.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 3.
88 DEMPSEY, supra note 62, at 20.
89 Aircraft Commerce, Air Canada’s Post-Bankruptcy Re-Organisation, 38 AIRCRAFT
ANALYSIS & FLEET PLANNING 24 (December 2004/January 2005).
90 Waheed Abbas, UAE’s Non-Oil GDP to Grow at 4.4% in 2015: IMF, EMIRATES
24/7 (May 5, 2015), http://www.emirates247.com/business/economy-finance/
uae-s-non-oil-gdp-to-grow-at-4-4-in-2015-imf-2015-05-05-1.589693 [https://
perma.cc/C9HU-ZPD9].
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by 2.5% in 2016.91 Transport and tourism are fundamental sec-
tors driving the UAE economy in that perspective. Aviation has
established itself as a vital contributor to the UAE’s economy
contributing more than AED 145 billion ($39.47 billion) or
14.7% of the national GDP.92 It is expected to contribute 32% to
Dubai’s GDP by 2020, according to government estimates.93
Carla Slim, the Middle East and North Africa economist at Stan-
dard Chartered bank, explained: “This announcement reflects
the success of Dubai’s economic strategy. . . . It cements Dubai’s
position as a major tourist destination in the region but also as a
gateway for trade, logistics and regional services.”94
“The UAE has signed more than 160 [bilateral] . . . ASAs, of
which [the] majority are Open Skies arrangements.”95 Despite
this liberal approach, the UAE still has some restrictive ASAs
with “limits on capacity, designated airports and, in some cases,
approved airlines and pricing.”96 According to a study con-
ducted by InterVISTAS Consulting, “it is possible that restric-
tions within an ASA are not due to the policies of the UAE
government but due to the policies of the opposite [signatory]
country.”97 Generally, governments require reciprocity when ne-
gotiating the terms of a bilateral Air Service Agreement.98
91 Solid Profitability Seen for Top UAE Banks, TRADEARABIA (Feb. 14, 2017), http:/
/www.tradearabia.com/news/BANK_320726.html [https://perma.cc/PB9Q-
UNG3].
92 OXFORD ECON., ECONOMIC BENEFITS FROM AIR TRANSPORT IN THE UAE 4, 14
(2011), https://www.iata.org/policy/Documents/Benefits-of-Aviation-UAE-
2011.pdf
93 UAE Economy, UAE EMBASSY, http://www.uae-embassy.org/about-uae/uae-
economy [https://perma.cc/ZBE8-GS8D].
94 Mahmoud Kassem, Aviation Expansion to Give Some Lift to UAE Economic
Growth, THE NATIONAL (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.thenational.ae/business/avia
tion/aviation-expansion-to-give-some-lift-to-uae-economic-growth [https://per
ma.cc/32AG-KXU3].
95 Press Release, Reed Exhibitions, Open Skies Remains in the Frontline of
UAE’s Winning Aviation Strategy (May 14, 2014), http://www.reedexpo.com/fr/
Press-Releases/2014-Press-Releases/Open-Skies-remains-in-the-frontline-of-UAEs-
winning-aviation-strategy/ [https://perma.cc/E6EU-499C] [hereinafter Open
Skies Remains in the Frontline].
96 INTERVISTAS-EU CONSULTING, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE
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Dubai is a long-term supporter of Open Skies with over 100
international airlines flying to its international airport.99 In fact,
the government of Dubai considers the Open Skies policy as a
“key component of its economic and trade policy.”100 According
to Mohammed Ahli, Director General of Dubai Civil Aviation
Authority:
Dubai is one of the true pioneers of aviation liberalisation having
adopted an open skies policy as one of the cornerstones of its
economy ever since late Sheikh Saeed bin Maktoum Al Maktoum
O.B.E signed the Dubai Commercial Air Agreement with His
Majesty’s Government in July 1937, long before Emirates was es-
tablished in 1985. Access to Dubai, one of the world’s largest and
fastest-growing hubs, allows carriers of the world to grow their
services and also boost exports and trade to their own markets.
For Dubai it gives consumers more choice, stimulates traffic
growth and is good for business. Considering that ICAO predicts
there will be 6 billion people travelling by air in 2030 compared
to 3 billion today. Dubai is well-placed to capitalise on this
growth. I am confident that Dubai’s steadfast commitment to
Open Skies is a source of inspiration for other countries.101
As a result of the government policy, it is “estimated that $82
billion have been invested in aviation infrastructure develop-
ment in the Emirate of Dubai alone since the formation of the
UAE in 1971.”102 The country has six international airports.103
Since 2014, Dubai International Airport has “become the
world’s busiest in terms of international passenger traffic ahead
of London-Heathrow.”104 With almost 70 million international
99 International and Government Affairs: Connectivity, Competition and Consumer
Choice, EMIRATES, http://www.emirates.com/english/about/int-and-gov-affairs/
international-and-government-affairs-new.aspx [https://perma.cc/8KZ6-WURZ].




102 Open Skies Remains in the Frontline of UAE’s Winning Aviation Strategy,
supra note 95.
103 Planning a Trip, EMBASSY OF THE U.A.E. IN WASHINGTON, D.C., http://www.
uae-embassy.org/about-uae/travel-culture/planning-trip [https://perma.cc/
VL4U-89VF].
104 Press Release, Airport Council International, ACI World Releases Prelimi-
nary World Airport Traffic and Rankings for 2014 - DXB Becomes Busiest Airport
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passengers in 2014, Dubai International Airport was ranked the
“sixth busiest airport in the world in overall passenger traffic.”105
The overall air transport infrastructures in the UAE were
ranked third worldwide by the WEF, and second in terms of
quality.106 In addition, the UAE ranked twenty-fifth out of 141
countries, among the highest in the world in terms of the price
competitiveness related to ticket taxes and airport charges.107
This is attributed mostly to its world-class international hubs for
global air travel.108
“Foreign ownership and control of airlines in the UAE is re-
stricted to a 49% equity stake.”109 Four of the UAE’s five na-
tional airlines are 100% state-owned: Emirates Airlines, Etihad
Airways, Air Arabia, and Fly Dubai.110 Rotana Jet is owned jointly
by Amiri Flight (50%) and Abu Dhabi Aviation (50%).111 Emir-
ates, followed by Etihad, are by and large the biggest national
carriers and two of the major players in the international air-
lines industry.112 Besides, it is worth noting that the two airlines
have different strategic approaches: while Emirates’ strategy is
based on the liberalized bilateral ASAs, Etihad favors equity mi-
nority interests. Unlike Qatar Airways, Emirates does not belong
to an alliance. The airline emphasizes its concerns about the
anti-competitiveness of some traditional alliance arrange-
ments.113 Emirates instead prefers codeshare agreements with
potential partners to “reinforce Dubai’s standing as a global
hub.”114
105 Id.
106 THE TRAVEL & TOURISM COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2015, supra note 44, at
335.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 18.
109 THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE ON LIBERALIZATION OF THE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE), supra note 96, at iii.
110 Id.; Company History, FLYDUBAI, https://www.flydubai.com/en/information
/about-flydubai/company-history [https://perma.cc/J55C-BQ4J].
111 Your Abu Dhabi Guide, UAE AIRLINES, http://www.yourabudhabiguide.com/
uae-airlines.html (last visited Jun. 19, 2017); About Us, ROTANA JET, http://www.
rotanajet.com/About-us (last visited Jun. 19, 2017).
112 THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE ON LIBERALIZATION OF THE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE), supra note 96, at 13.
113 Ben Flanagan, Etihad and Emirates Show Airline Alliances are Outdated, THE
NATIONAL, Sept. 1, 2015, http://www.thenational.ae/business/aviation/etihad-
and-emirates-show-airline-alliances-are-outdated [https://perma.cc/YF8R-W678].
114 International and Government Affairs: Connectivity, Competition, and Consumer
Choice, supra note 99.
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D. ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE MAJOR MIDDLE-EASTERN
CARRIERS IN THE UNITED STATES
The three major U.S. carriers—American Airlines, Delta Air
Lines, and United Airlines—claim that their rivals from the Mid-
dle East—Qatar Airways, Emirates Airlines, and Etihad Air-
ways—receive letters of credit and subsidies from their
governments (in the form of assumption of fuel hedging
losses).115 They also claim that the Middle Eastern carriers take
passengers and revenues from U.S. carriers, and force them to
reduce, terminate, or forego services on international routes.116
Therefore, a fifty-five-page white paper was addressed to the U.S.
government by the three U.S. major airlines in January 2015.117
William S. Swelbar, a researcher at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) and a member of the OneJet Advisory Team,
studied in a position paper the impacts of the alleged subsidies
at different levels. His analysis was based on the fifty-five-page
white paper. According to Swelbar, the first results expected in-
clude: (1) the reduction of the U.S. network carriers’ [and their
alliance partners’] share in key markets (notably, the Middle
East and Indian subcontinent); and (2) the shifting of connect-
ing passengers to the Middle–East–traffic diversion.118
Swelbar explained that the Middle Eastern carriers’ services
threaten the viability of nonstop flights with greater economic
impact than connecting flights at the three major airports—
Dubai, Abu Dhabi, or Doha. He added: “routes with strong local
markets need to rely less on connecting passengers to reach
route profitability, enhancing the economic benefits of such ser-
vice to both communities.”119 Another argument is that small-
and medium-sized airports in the United States are negatively
impacted by the Middle Eastern carriers, which operate in
115 PARTNERSHIP FOR FAIR AND OPEN SKIES, RESTORING OPEN SKIES: THE NEED TO
ADDRESS SUBSIDIZED COMPETITION FROM STATE-OWNED AIRLINES IN QATAR AND THE
UAE 1, 27, 28 (2015), http://www.openandfairskies.com/wp-content/themes/
custom/media/White.Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7MT-3JVV] [hereinafter
RESTORING OPEN SKIES].
116 Id. at 46.
117 See generally id.
118 WILLIAM SWELBAR, VIOLATIONS OF “FAIR AND EQUAL” OPEN SKIES AGREE-
MENTS THREATEN LARGE AND SMALL AMERICAN COMMUNITIES AND THEIR ACCESS TO
THE GLOBAL AIR TRANSPORTATION NETWORK 2 (2015), http://www.openandfair
skies.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Open-Skies-Violations-Threaten-Ameri
can-Communities.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7LW-6Y3Z].
119 Id. at 6.
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nearby hubs and therefore “threaten[ ] the viability of existing
domestic flights.”120
Swelbar’s analysis is based on data that certainly show the
strong growing position of the Middle Eastern carriers in the
U.S. market, yet the alleged subsidies were rather considered as
an upheld hypothesis of the study. To the contrary, the veracity
of these allegations should have been questioned. In fact, the
same reasoning would apply and the same conclusions would be
drawn if other competitors of the U.S. airlines were considered
as being subsidized. For instance, Ethiopian Airlines, Cathay Pa-
cific, Singapore Airlines, and Kuwait Airways121 operate fifth
freedom routes from some U.S. airports, but so does Emirates,
since 2013, by flying from New York to Milan and continuing on
to Dubai.
Therefore, Swelbar’s approach is misleading the reader by as-
suming the allegations against the Middle Eastern carriers are
true on the basis of the white paper drawn by the complainants.
In fact, Swelbar advocates for the Partnership for Open & Fair
Skies, which is a coalition composed of American Airlines, Delta
Air Lines, and United Airlines, along with some associations of
pilots and flight attendants.122
On the other hand, the fifty-five-page white paper pointed out
some alleged anti-competitive financial advantages and irregu-
larities contained in the released financial statements of the
Middle Eastern carriers.123 Moreover, the focus was laid on some
120 Id. at 10.
121 Kuwait Airways dropped its New York City-to-London route in December
2015 after a discrimination complaint was filed by the U.S. Department of Trans-
portation, which threatened legal action over the carrier’s refusal to sell tickets to
Israelis. However, the carrier has since started operating the same route again.
Ben Schlappig, Kuwait Airlines’ Controversial London to N.Y. Flight is Still Operating
(Sort Of), ONE MILE AT A TIME (Mar. 21, 2016), http://onemileatatime.boarding
area.com/2016/03/21/kuwait-airways-jfk/ [https://perma.cc/3BYA-9KSC].
122 New Report: Violations of Open Skies Threaten Small and Large Communities Across
the Nation, PARTNERSHIP FOR FAIR & OPEN SKIES (July 23, 2015), http://www.open
andfairskies.com/press-releases/violations-of-open-skies-threaten-small-and-large-
communities/ [https://perma.cc/2HXC-GA2L]. The associations of pilots and
flight attendants include the Air Line Pilots Association International, the Allied
Pilots Association, the Airline Division of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, the Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, the Association of Profes-
sional Flight Attendants, the Communications Workers of America, and the
Southwest Airlines Pilots’ Association. Who We Are, PARTNERSHIP FOR OPEN & FAIR
SKIES, http://www.openandfairskies.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/U4S7-
LS9C].
123 RESTORING OPEN SKIES, supra note 115, at 12.
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local regulation advantages that benefit the Gulf trio. These in-
clude, for instance, the labour rights management.124 According
to this paper, John O’Connell, Senior Lecturer at Cranfield Uni-
versity, has observed that: “Emirates has the advantage that la-
bour laws in the UAE forbid strikes and there are no trade
unions, thus ensuring smooth flight operations and continuous
services.”125
However, it should be noted that Swelbar did not consider the
complexity and multidimensionality of global regulatory
frameworks. It is true that the three major U.S. carriers are un-
ionized, yet their ability to reconsider the terms of their employ-
ees’ contracts is more flexible than that of their competitors in
Europe (e.g. Air France, Lufthansa). The latter are, in fact,
bound by strict regional and national (read: social) regulations.
For instance, in October 2015, Air France executives faced rabid
reactions from furious striking staff after the airline cut 2,900
jobs.126 Subsequently, this number was reduced to 1,000 jobs by
2016.127 Though such a reaction would not be conceivable in
the U.S. context, Delta Air Lines, perhaps coincidently, an-
nounced at the same time its plan to cut an unspecified number
of jobs from its administrative workforce.128
Another argument has been raised by Delta Air Lines, which
is leading a U.S./EU fight for action against the Middle Eastern
carriers’ “alleged predatory pricing and capacity dumping prac-
tices.”129 However, Kevin Mitchell, the Founder and President of
the Business Travel Coalition, claimed that dumping is “a prac-
124 Id. at 36.
125 John F. O’Connell, The Rise of the Arabian Gulf Carriers: An Insight into the
Business Model of Emirates Airline, 17 J. OF AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 339, 344 (2011).
126 Kim Willsher, Air France Workers Rip Shirts From Executives After Airline Cuts
2,900 Jobs, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 6, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2015/oct/05/air-france-workers-storm-meeting-protest-executives-job-losses-paris
[https://perma.cc/JH56-EJKK].




128 Michael Sasso, Delta Air Plans Cuts in Office Workforce to Boost Productivity,
BLOOMBERG, Oct. 2, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-02
/delta-air-plans-cuts-in-office-workforce-to-boost-productivity [https://perma.cc/
686R-838L].
129 Kevin Mitchell, Why Are The BIG 3 Silent On Consumer Harm From Gulf Carri-
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tice used and perfected by U.S. major network airlines over de-
cades in their domestic market against low-cost new entrant
airlines.”130 For instance, on November 10, 2015, the Depart-
ment of Justice sued “to block a proposed deal between United
and Delta airlines to swap access between their New York City-
area hubs, in an effort to preserve competition at Newark Lib-
erty International Airport.”131 On the whole, the aforemen-
tioned white paper raises arguments or hypotheses on alleged
subsidies, which require a technical and global analysis based on
internal data from the alleged Middle Eastern carriers. This pro-
cess makes the verification of any information somewhat impos-
sible to fulfill from one side.
In that sense, Emirates has clarified that its accounts are au-
dited by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) in compliance with in-
ternational standards and are publicly available.132 Emirates
denies receiving State subsidies other than the start-up seed cap-
ital in 1985 and claims, rather, that it provides financing to the
government of Dubai through dividend payments:
In 1985 Emirates received US$10 million from the Government
of Dubai in start-up seed capital and US$88 million invested in
infrastructure, which included two Boeing 727 aircraft and the
Emirates Training College building. This has been more than re-
paid by dividend payments to the Government of Dubai, which
have totalled US$2.3 billion to date. The Dubai Government and
the management of Emirates have consistently made it clear that
Emirates is required to be self-sustainable and profitable.133
Unlike Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways do not release de-
tailed financial reports, which makes it difficult to establish any
finding and, more importantly, to determine the exact size of
eventual subsidies.134 Yet this cannot be considered in any way as
an illegal matter since it is entirely within the right of [non-pub-
130 Id.
131 Bart Jansen, DOJ Seeks to Block United and Delta Deal for Newark Access, USA
TODAY, Nov. 10, 2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/2015/11/
10/doj-seeks-block-united-and-delta-deal-newark-access/75511350/ [https://
perma.cc/BE59-QH9N].
132 EMIRATES AIRLINES, AIRLINES AND SUBSIDY: OUR POSITION 10 (2012), http://
content.emirates.com/downloads/ek/pdfs/int_gov_affairs/airlines_and_subsidy
_our_position.pdf [https://perma.cc/8243-8V3Z].
133 Id. at 8.
134 Ted Reed, Etihad and Qatar Airways Report Earnings, So to Speak—But Are They
for Real?, FORBES, June 20, 2015, https://www.forbes.com/sites/tedreed/2015/
06/20/etihad-and-qatar-airways-report-earnings-so-to-speak-but-are-they-for-real/
#50a3d3e376a1 [https://perma.cc/9W3S-K2XE].
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lically traded] companies to publish or not their financial
reports.135
On an academic level, a recent paper from the University of
Maryland examined direct and secondary impacts of Middle
Eastern carriers’ competition on U.S. airlines’ international traf-
fic and fare levels. The analysis concluded that this competition
is associated with (1) direct impacts: significant growth in
U.S.–Middle East traffic volumes; and (2) secondary effect: small
but statistically significant traffic losses and fare reductions for
U.S. carriers in route markets connecting the United States with
Africa, Asia, Australia, and Europe.136
According to this study, relatively few academic papers have
examined the impacts of the Middle Eastern carriers on the air
travel market. Nevertheless, Jay Squalli’s work is considered as a
notable exception in that regard.137 Squalli studied the relation-
ship between the performance of Emirates and the air transport
liberalization. He analyzed 155 route markets originating in
Dubai and concluded that: “further liberalization of the UAE
market (and, by extension, other Gulf carriers’ markets) leads
to greater passenger volumes, lower fares and, ultimately, wel-
fare gains.”138
So far, the analysis of the aforesaid studies shows that there is
a conflict of interest between different stakeholders in the
United States. Two main groups have been identified in regard
to the ongoing debate on fair competition and the allegedly sub-
sidized Middle Eastern carriers: (1) the three major U.S. airlines
and more than six associations representing together the group
Partnership for Open & Fair Skies;139 and (2) the Business
Travel Coalition (BTC), a U.S. advocacy organization,whose ob-
135 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD),
International Transport Forum: Interview with Alain Lumbroso (Mar. 2016); Private
Company Research, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/rr/business/com
pany/private.html [https://perma.cc/3PS9-76JA].
136 Martin Dresner et al., The Impact of Gulf Carrier Competition on U.S. Airlines,
79 TRANSP. RES. PART A: POL’Y AND PRAC. 2–3 (2015), http://www.business
travelcoalition.com/documents/theimpactofgulfcarriercompe.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7LT5-854T].
137 Id. at 3.
138 Id.; see also Jay Squalli, Airline Passenger Traffic Openness and the Performance of
Emirates Airline, 54 QUARTERLY REV. OF ECON. & FIN. 138 (2014).
139 See Who We Are, supra note 122.
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jective is to “bring transparency to industry and government pol-
icies and practices.”140
From a trade and global development perspective, the U.S.-
UAE commercial-aviation relationship generated in 2012 more
than $16 billion in benefit to the United States (direct spending
and spinoffs), more than 100,000 jobs, and over $1.6 billion in
tax revenue, according to the U.S.-UAE Business Council.141
Based in Washington, D.C., the U.S.-UAE Business Council
promotes and advocates trade and commercial opportunities
between the two countries. It counts almost 100 members, rang-
ing from public and private corporations, which represent the
interests of both countries. In that regard, Emirates, Etihad,
Boeing, and Lockheed Martin count among thirty-four found-
ing members. Additionally, FedEx is a corporate member, and
the American Business Council of Dubai and the Northern
Emirates is an honorary member.142
From a manufacturer perspective, Boeing (and Airbus as well)
is benefiting hugely from the continuing growth of the Middle
Eastern carriers at spectacular rates (i.e. expansion of the
fleets). For instance, Emirates is currently the world’s largest op-
erator of the 777 and the only airline that operates all the vari-
ants of this aircraft. During the Dubai Air Show, in 2013,
Emirates announced an order for one-hundred fifty 777Xs,
which is considered a record for the single largest airplane or-
der ever in the world.143
From a consumer perspective, the Middle Eastern carriers
stimulate demand, offer passengers more choice, and pressure
the U.S. airlines to improve their product and service offerings.
As a matter of fact, the Middle Eastern carriers have adopted a
competitive strategy based on an aggressive head-to-head com-
petition with their rivals worldwide. In response to the alleged
subsidies, Emirates clarified that it “filled a gap in the market by
taking travelers to new destinations not served by [others], and
140 About, BUS. TRAVEL COAL., http://www.businesstravelcoalition.com/about/
untitled.html [https://perma.cc/R2TH-M6LP].
141 ROB BRITTON, U.S.-U.A.E. COMMERCIAL AVIATION: TAKING FLIGHT – THE
WORLD’S FASTEST GROWING BILATERAL AVIATION RELATIONSHIP 1 (2013), http://
usuaebusiness.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/US-UAE-aviation-report_Pub
lished.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RXX-GKUW].
142 Membership, U.S.-U.A.E. BUS. COUNCIL, http://usuaebusiness.org/member-
ship/ [https://perma.cc/M4ZG-WHXY].
143 Emirates’ $76 Billion Boeing Aircraft Order a Boost to US Aviation Industry, EMIR-
ATES (Nov. 18, 2013) http://www.emirates.com/us/english/about/news/order-
boeing.aspx?intcid=carousel-637518-1443005 [https://perma.cc/Z43Y-ZDC2].
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helped contribute to [U.S.] economies, trade, and tourism.”144
Also, Emirates emphasized that it “provides a much-needed
competitive alternative to the three airline alliances with anti-
trust immunity permitting them to keep fares artificially
high.”145
The latter point ties in with a similar conclusion of Timothy
John Hazledine, Professor at University of Auckland, who stud-
ied the impacts of Emirates’ service in Trans-Tasman air mar-
kets. Indeed, Hazledine concluded that “Emirates offered
significantly lower fares but did not exert much pricing pressure
on incumbent carriers Air New Zealand and Qantas.”146
That being said, in 2016, Qatar Airways, Emirates, and Etihad
were respectively ranked second, first, and sixth out of the 100
best airlines by Skytrax.147 The rankings are based on the votes
from millions of travelers from around the world. Skytrax World
Airline Awards are “coveted Quality accolades for the world air-
line industry.”148
E. CANADA/UAE RESTRICTIVE BILATERAL ASA
David Gillen, Director of the Centre for Transportation Stud-
ies at the University of British Columbia, underlined different
metrics to be considered for assessment of the Canadian Blue
Sky policy. These include the number and type of treaties, who
the treaties are with, and the impact on passengers, cargo, and
the economy. With this regard, Gillen highlighted in his analysis
important facts vis-a`-vis:
•The institutional framework and process: the number of negoti-
ating teams which has not been adjusted (increased) since the
adoption of the Blue Sky policy.
•The number of signed ASAs: prior to the Blue Sky policy, be-
tween 1949 and 2004, fifty ASAs were signed (over a period of
fifty-six years). From 2005 to 2009, fifteen ASAs were signed a
144 American Consumers and Regional State Economies the Ultimate Victims of US Car-





146 Dresner et al., supra note 136, at 3; see also Tim Hazledine, Pricing, Competi-
tion and Policy in Australasian Air Travel Markets, 44 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 37
(2010).
147 The World’s Top 100 Airlines in 2016, SKYTRAX, http://www.worldairlinea
wards.com/awards/world_airline_rating.html [https://perma.cc/CW3T-M5EZ].
148 Id.
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rate three times that prior to 2005 which may be considered as a
huge success; these include the Open Skies Agreements with
the European Union (EU) and the United States.149
Gillen pointed out other metrics as necessary to assess the im-
pact of the Blue Sky policy in terms of its initiation and facilita-
tion of the negotiation process. However, the lack of available
data would not allow him to proceed in that purpose, which is
due, according to him, to the secrecy characterizing this process
within the institutional framework.150
Gillen estimated a mathematical model of total international
passengers against numbers of ASAs. Besides the negative effect
of the distance on the total number of passengers with an elas-
ticity of -0.67, the impact of the degree of liberalization on total
number of passengers was the main result of the study. In fact,
countries with an Open Sky agreement with Canada have signifi-
cantly more passenger flows, followed by liberal ASAs, which
also have higher passenger flows. Ultimately, it was noted that:
(1) the impact of Open Skies agreements is nearly four times
larger than a less liberal ASA; and (2) “the Blue Sky policy intro-
duced in 2005 has had no statistically significant impact on total
passenger flows between Canada and its top 50 international
passenger destinations.”151
Under the UAE-Canada ASA, designated airlines from both
parties—Etihad, Emirates, and Air Canada—are permitted to
operate three weekly flights between Toronto and Dubai.152
Emirates began flying the Dubai-Toronto route in October
2007. These flights have been consistently operated at capac-
ity—even after the A380 was put on the route in 2009.153 Since
then, the UAE has been “pushing” for a more liberalized ASA.
Nevertheless, the negotiations between the two countries, which
lasted several years, resulted in little to no progress.154 In No-
149 Forsyth et al., supra note 64, at 447–48.
150 Id. at 448.
151 Id. at 454.
152 Alexander Cornwell, Air Canada: We Will Oppose More Flights for Emirates,
Etihad, GULF NEWS (Nov. 5, 2015), http://gulfnews.com/business/aviation/air-
canada-we-will-oppose-more-fligths-for-emirates-etihad-1.1614329 [https://per
ma.cc/PVY7-QSD2].
153 EMIRATES, EMIRATES & CANADA 1 (2016), https://cdn.ek.aero/downloads/
ek/pdfs/int_gov_affairs/Emirates_and_Canada_June_2016.pdf [https://perma.
cc/33HU-G9D3].
154 The Canadian Press, Emirates Pushing Canada on Air Travel, CBC NEWS, Oct.
10, 2010, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/emirates-pushing-canada-on-air-
travel-1.925223 [https://perma.cc/63NZ-HUU7].
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vember 2010, it was reported that Canada was prepared to offer
more landing slots at the Calgary and Vancouver airports de-
spite Air Canada’s objection to any increased service for UAE
carriers. Air Canada argued that such an expansion of landing
rights would harm Air Canada because few passengers fly from
the UAE to Canada and that UAE carriers are carrying passen-
gers beyond their hubs (sixth freedom),155 which will harm Air
Canada.
The UAE was not satisfied with anything less than more flights
to Toronto.156 In fact, it was reported that Canada’s offers in-
cluded a capacity cut instead of a capacity increase, meaning
that the offers were of little value to the UAE, and so the UAE
negotiators were accordingly offended.157 The dispute over com-
mercial airline landing rights soured relations between the two
countries and led to the Canadian Forces getting evicted from a
key military transit base near Dubai.158 Moreover, the UAE de-
cided to pursue visa reciprocity towards Canada, among other
countries, by the end of 2010.159
Surprisingly, in 2012, some reports indicated that Air Canada
had proposed a joint venture with Emirates in 2006 “in which
the two airlines would share equally in profits from increased
flights between the [UAE and Canada].”160 Yet Yves Dufresne,
Vice President of Alliances and Regulatory Affairs at Air Canada,
minimized the relevance of this information.161 According to
Dufresne, this was somehow propaganda circulated as a result of
Transport Canada’s refusal to increase landing rights for Emir-
ates and Etihad in 2012.
In 2014, Emirates submitted a paper to the Canada Transpor-
tation Act Review 2014, in which it considered the UAE-Canada
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160 Air Canada Proposed Emirates Deal in 2006: Documents, THE GLOBE AND MAIL
(Aug. 24 2012), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/air-canada-
proposed-emirates-deal-in-2006-documents/article561788/ [https://perma.cc/T
7ZL-KQQ7].
161 Yves Dufresne, Guest Lecturer in CIAM520 – Air Transport Finance & Econom-
ics, MCGILL UNIVERSITY/SCHOOL OF CONTINUING STUDIES (Mar. 11, 2015).
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ASA as one of the most restrictive agreements. As shown in Ta-
ble 1, Emirates explained that Canada is the only country that
allows just three weekly flights, among eighty countries to which
Emirates operates passenger services.162
Table 1: Canada’s stance on airline competition from an
Emirates perspective compared with other G7
members
G7 Member Emirates entitlement Frequencies/week 
UK Open Sky 112
US Open Sky 77





Source: Emirates Airlines (2014)
The paper emphasized that Emirates is a fully commercial air-
line operating a transparent and non-subsidized business model,
and as mentioned earlier, its accounts are audited by PwC in
compliance with international standards, and are publicly
available.163
In his address to the Standing Committee on International
Trade at the House of Commons of Canada, Ian Smith, Presi-
dent of the Air Canada Pilots Association (ACPA), declared in
2015:
I mention this to address two fronts that are concerning our asso-
ciation at this time. One is the continued attempt by Emirates
Airline to expand its foothold into Canada . . . . When applying
the blue sky policy, it is essential to understand that Emirates Air-
line operates under a completely different business model and
completely different rules. Unlike Air Canada, Emirates Airline is
an extension of Dubai’s government, whose economic develop-
ment strategy is to expand its airline market share at other coun-
tries’ expense. Emirates Airline is a subsidiary of the Emirates
162 EMIRATES, EMIRATES SUBMISSION TO THE CANADA TRANSPORTATION ACT RE-
VIEW, 3–4 (2014), INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND ENVIRONMENT AFFAIRS,
https://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/ctareview2014/pdf/Emirates%20Submission.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R9Z3-GHCL].
163 Id. at 1.
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Group of companies, which integrates the airline into its airport
operations in Dubai. With near limitless state capital funding, a
tax-free environment, foreign low-cost labour to build infrastruc-
ture, and a state-owned airline, Dubai has been transformed into
a major collection point, commonly called a hub.164
Smith believed that Emirates’ move will damage the sus-
tainability of the Canadian aviation sector and, consequently,
harm national interests. He noted that the domestic aviation
market is presently at its upper saturation limit—with a popula-
tion of almost 36 million.165
Overall, these statements appear to be akin to the allegations
of the major U.S. carriers against the Middle Eastern carriers at
large.166 However, unlike the situation in the United States, it is
important to note that some stakeholders are not involved in
the current debate in Canada. This includes the tourism indus-
try and most importantly the end users—passengers.
In 2013, the Tourism Association Industry of Canada (TAIC)
published a paper addressing its position on Open Skies policy
in Canada. This paper analyzed the potential impacts and inter-
actions of the Canadian air policy with the tourism industry.167 It
outlined three interrelated perspectives that should be consid-
ered in any improvements in air access to Canada: (1) “Cost
Structure: [e]ven with a liberal air access agreement, Canada’s
prohibitively expensive aviation cost structure will continue to
dissuade foreign carriers from doing business with Canada”; (2)
“Facilitation: Canada must be able to meet the anticipated in-
creased demand” from a more liberalized ASA by rectifying out-
standing immigration issues such as Transit Without Visas,
Canada Border Services Agency staffing capacity; and (3) ASAs:
“Open Skies policies alone will not increase international visita-
tion. However, with the right aviation policies in place ([points]
1 and 2) Canadian tourism may benefit from more liberalized
ASAs in specific cases.”168
164 Air Canada Pilots Association, House of Commons, Standing Comm. on
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With regard to the passengers, it seems that the policymakers
and airlines do not bother to mention how high air fares are in
both the domestic and international markets. Admittedly, Cana-
dian airports have been run by not-for-profit entities since they
were corporatized in the 1990s, yet the end users—passengers—
have to bear the cost of the investments on airport facilities by
paying high fees to ensure a return-on-investment of the airport
facilities (“user pay PLUS” system, as explained earlier in this
article).169 Ticket taxes and airport charges are pointed out as
real issues facing air transport development in Canada.170 In
2012, 23% of the total Origin/Destination (O/D) transborder
passengers used neighboring U.S. airports. This represents a
leakage of traffic of 6.4 million passengers, 5 million of which
are Canadian residents.171 Mary-Jane Bennett concluded, in her
study, that leakage of passenger traffic in Canada is due mainly
to the lack of competition as a result of the exorbitant costs
(base fare and charges) leading to increasingly high fares in the
aviation market in Canada.172
On the other hand, a recent article by Centre Asia Pacific Avi-
ation (CAPA) examined the recent withdrawal of Delta Air
Lines from its Dubai route (announced on October 28, 2015)
due to competition with Emirates.173 The article noted the coin-
cidence of this move with the new service launched by Air Ca-
nada to Dubai (on November 3, 2015) and Delhi (on November
1, 2015). The article considered Canada as overtly protectionist
and concluded that from a passenger perspective, “open skies in
the [U.S.] has delivered extensive benefits while protectionism
in Canada is limiting travel options and the economy.”174
169 Gooch, supra note 68.
170 INTERVISTAS CONSULTING, THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT POLICY IN THE COST
COMPETITIVENESS OF CANADIAN AVIATION: IMPACTS ON AIRPORTS AND AIRLINES 3, 56
(2008), http://www.intervistas.com/downloads/Aviation_Competitiveness_Re
port_16Jan2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/D93T-56ZS].
171 CANADIAN AIRPORTS COUNCIL, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE AIR TRANSPOR-
TATION INDUSTRY IN CANADA 10 (2013), http://www.cacairports.ca/sites/default/
files/Docs_2013/CAC_Economic-Impact-Study_FINAL_April-2013.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VK29-62MG].
172 Mary-Jane Bennett, A New Policy is Required for Air Transportation, 104 BACK-
GROUNDER (FRONTIER CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY) 1, 4 (2013), https://www.fcpp.org/
files/1/FB104_AirTransport_JA06F5.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX5C-7WXA].
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III. APPLICATION OF CASE STUDIES TO PRINCIPLES OF
COMPETITION IN AIR TRANSPORT
The definition of a level playing field in the international
trade is often a source of confusion. In fact, a conflict of interest
is most likely to occur when various stakeholders are involved in
complex processes within different environments, and hence,
different conditions of operation (e.g. labor standards, taxes).
An equilibrium is not easy to achieve when potential benefits for
a party are more of threats for others. In that regard, Appelman
et al. explained:
Pleas for a level playing field, for instance in international trade,
are often not well-founded. This is because it is not exactly clear
what a “level playing field” means. But even if it would be clear
what the plea would imply, a level playing field is not always desir-
able from an economic perspective.175
Appelman et al. defined the concept of “level playing field”
according to two approaches: First, “a rules-based level playing
field, which suggests that all players in a market are treated the
same in equal circumstances” regarding various criteria such as
labour standards, taxes, and subsidies.176 In other words, all
firms compete under symmetric rules in an international mar-
ket.177 Second, “an outcome-based level playing field, which
means that all firms in a market have the same expected profit,”
therefore, disadvantaged firms are compensated by the govern-
ment.178 In that case, asymmetric rules are adopted to level the
playing field; that is, corrective measures are designed to ad-
dress the distortions caused by unfair advantages.179 Appelman
et al. pointed out two fundamental points with regard to the
applicability of both approaches: (1) “a rules-based level playing
field is desirable, although there are reasons to deviate from this
assumption”; and (2) “it is never desirable to pursue a fully out-
come-based level playing field, but that it may be desirable to
175 MARJA APPELMAN ET AL., CPB NETHERLANDS BUREAU FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
ANALYSIS, EQUAL RULES OR EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES? DEMYSTIFYING LEVEL PLAYING
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level the playing field to a certain extent in the case of market
failure.”180
Based on the above, the definition of the level playing field
and the applicability of the concept rely on the appreciation of
the mechanisms governing international markets. That is to say,
interpretations from different perspectives hence different in-
terests depending on the specifics and complexity of each
industry.
In that sense, the definition will be even more complex for
the aviation system, which is based by definition on the interna-
tional market mechanisms from regulatory, legal, and opera-
tional perspectives. For instance, as mentioned earlier, ICAO
developed, conjointly with WTO, the Essential Service and Tour-
ism Development Route Scheme (ESTDR), which was “a mecha-
nism whereby a support, in the form of a financial subsidy and/
or an exclusive concession, can be provided to airlines for the
provision of certain services of a public service nature.”181 The
experience of route support schemes has raised many questions
regarding the appropriate manner by which the process of sub-
sidy allocation should be set so that any distortion of market and
unfair competition are avoided, i.e., the playing field has to be
leveled.182
Jaap G. de Wit, Professor of Transport Economics at Univer-
sity of Amsterdam, clarified that even with equal rules for inter-
national trade and identical economic and institutional policies
(i.e. rules-based level playing field), trading partners may still
benefit from comparative advantages. As a result, the playing
field is unlevel, yet De Wit noted that this “cannot be qualified
as unfair competition.”183
180 Id. at 89.
181 A Study of an Essential Service and Tourism Development Route Scheme, supra note
30, at 1.
182 Jon Woolf, Dir. & Principal Consultant at ASM, Address to the ICAO Glob.
Symposium on Air Transp. Liberalization: Air Service Development for Develop-
ing Countries 23 (Sept. 18–19, 2006), http://www.icao.int/Meetings/Liberaliza
tionSymposium/Documents/2006-Symposium-Dubai/Woolf.pdf [https://perma
.cc/CF89-BVNX].
183 Jaap G. de Wit, Unlevel Playing Field? Ah Yes, You Mean Protectionism, 41 J. OF
AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 22, 24 (2014); see also Ian Fletcher, Time to Quit Pining for a
“Level Playing Field” in International Trade, GLOB. GEOPOLITICS & POLITICAL ECON.
(Mar. 18, 2011), http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2011/03/18/time-to-
quit-pining-for-a-level-playing-field-in-international-trade/ [https://perma.cc/
6TVS-H8BR]; Samuel Bostaph, The Myth of the Level Playing Field, LEWROCK
WELL.COM (May 12, 2005), https://www.lewrockwell.com/2005/05/samuel-bost
aph/the-myth-of-the-level-playing-field/ [https://perma.cc/V9YQ-QVVU].
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The theory of comparative advantage suggests that free trade
stimulates economic growth within a country. That is based on
the trading of goods that can be produced most efficiently in
such a way as to offset the disadvantages in areas where goods
are produced less efficiently compared to other countries. As a
whole, trade is a positive-sum game, according to the theory of
comparative advantage.184
Theoretically, comparative advantages and disadvantages are
supposed to be assessed by the negotiating parties on an individ-
ual basis throughout the negotiation process. The outcome of
such assessment permits each party to compare the consistency
of its own endogenous and exogenous parameters (e.g. eco-
nomic measures; institutional policies vs. geographic location)
to that of the other parties. This process allows, at the same
time, parties to determine the Best Alternatives to a Negotiated
Agreement (BATNA), which is the most valuable alternative
course of action to be considered if negotiations fail and an
agreement cannot be reached.185
As for aviation, the comparative advantage/disadvantage ap-
proach is more difficult to achieve given “that aviation has been
separated from general trade negotiations.”186 As a result, “the
issue of the level playing field plays an inordinately larger role in
aviation than in other sectors.”187Nevertheless, many aspects in
aviation remain consistent with this perspective. For instance, as
explained earlier in this article, Dubai considers the Open Skies
policy “a key component of its economic and trade policy.”188
Overall, the national institutional policies play in favor of the
aviation system as a whole in the UAE and Qatar.189 In addition,
the geographic location is pointed out as a major advantage for
the Middle Eastern carriers; that is, international hubs enable
carriers to benefit from operations between the United States
and Asia Pacific, as well as Europe and South Asia/East Africa.190
On the other hand, Boeing and Airbus benefit in return from
184 de Wit, supra note 183, at 24.
185 ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN 51–52 (1992).
186 MIKE TRETHEWAY & ROBERT ANDRIULAITIS, INTERVISTAS CONSULTING, WHAT
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the rapid growth of the Middle Eastern carriers as discussed ear-
lier in this article; this is due to the comparative advantage of
the United States and Europe in high tech manufacturing and
skilled labor for the production of the largest aircraft tailored to
the Gulf trio, i.e. the A380 and B777.191 Besides, the U.S. ap-
proach in air transport liberalization has been advocating for
competition rules by reducing the burden of regulation that is
to ensure equality of opportunity for the different players.192 In
fact, the United States was the first country to start pursuing
Open Skies agreements following the “International Air Trans-
portation Negotiations Statement of U.S. Policy for the Conduct
of the Negotiations,” which was issued by President Carter in
1978.193 According to this statement:
The guiding principle of U.S. aviation negotiation policy will be
to trade competitive opportunities, rather than restrictions, with
our negotiating partners. We will aggressively pursue our inter-
ests in expanded air transportation and reduced prices rather
than accept the self-defeating accommodation of protectionism.
Our concessions in negotiations will be given in return for pro-
gress toward competitive objectives, and these concessions them-
selves will be of a liberalizing character.194
One of the fundamental rules of air transport regulation is to
make sure that international air transport services are estab-
lished “on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated
soundly and economically.”195 Hence as discussed earlier, the
objective of ICAO is to “[i]nsure that the rights of contracting
States are fully respected and that every contracting State has a
fair opportunity to operate international airlines.”196
On another note, Annex 1B of the GATS does not cover the
“largest part of air transport services: traffic rights and services
directly related to traffic.”197 However, it is worthy to note that
“traffic rights” include, by definition, “tariffs to be charged and
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Adam L. Schless, Open Skies: Loosening the Protectionist Grip on International
Civil Aviation, 8 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 435, 435, 441–42 (1994).
194 Jimmy Carter, International Air Transportation Negotiations Statement of U.S.
Policy for the Conduct of the Negotiations, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 21,1978),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=31218 [https://perma.cc/LSP3-
ML7M].
195 Chicago Convention, supra note 1, at 1.
196 Id. at 20.
197 Air Transport Services, supra note 25.
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their conditions.”198 Likewise, commercial disputes related to
the subject of paragraph 3 of the Annex are not covered by the
GATS (i.e., aircraft repair and maintenance services, the selling
and marketing of air transport services, and Computer Reserva-
tion System (CRS) services).199
Therefore, the GATS’ procedures of dispute settlement can
be applied to air transport services other than the above issues
such as unfair competition caused by “unlawful” subsidies. Even
though these procedures can only be invoked when certain con-
ditions are met and as a last resort to be relied upon only after
other alternatives (i.e. clauses of bilateral ASAs). In fact, para-
graph 4 of the GATS’ Annex on air transport services, specifies
that “[t]he dispute settlement procedures of the Agreement
may be invoked only where obligations or specific commitments
have been assumed by the concerned Members and where dis-
pute settlement procedures in bilateral and other multilateral
agreements or arrangements have been exhausted.”200
From a regulatory perspective, it should be noted that there is
almost no comprehensive descriptive clause referring to anti-
competition or unlawful subsidies in the existing bilateral ASAs.
For instance, the Open Sky agreement between the United
States and the UAE has a very vague referral to competition is-
sues. Article 11 of this agreement states that “[e]ach Party shall
allow a fair and equal opportunity for the designated airlines of
both Parties to compete in providing the international air trans-
portation governed by this Agreement.”201
Moreover, it is specified on the first page of the agreement
that, among other things, both countries “[d]esire to promote
an international aviation system based on competition among
airlines in the marketplace with minimum government interfer-
ence and regulation.”202 The word “minimum” is vague and sub-
jective, which opens the door to different interpretations of how
a “minimum government interference and regulation” should
or shall be defined.203
198 Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 1B, supra note 26, at 307.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Air Transport Agreement between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the United Arab Emirates U.A.E.-U.S., 8, Mar.
11, 2002, T.I.A.S. No. 02-1211, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
125743.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9Q6-DQNZ] [hereinafter US-UAE Agreement].
202 Id. at 1.
203 Id.
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On the other hand, settlement of disputes is discussed under
Article 14 of this agreement, which includes disputes on compe-
tition issues.204 Likewise, Article 14 explains the process of for-
mal consultations and arbitration by a tribunal of three
arbitrators.205 A comparison of Article 14 of the U.S.-UAE agree-
ment with Article 34 of the ICAO TASA206 mainly shows the
following:
• Article 14 of the US-UAE Open sky agreement is somehow
based on the second arbitration approach defined by ICAO.
• The wording of paragraph 7 of Article 14 complies with the
first option of the paragraph 8 of Article 34, which limits the
enforcement of the decision or award of the arbitral tribunal:
“[e]ach Party shall, to the degree consistent with its national
law, give full effect to any decision or award of the arbitral
tribunal.”
• The use of commas instead of square brackets in the ICAO
proposal may modify the meaning or the scope of the forego-
ing paragraph.207
It should be noted that under the provision of the second op-
tion of paragraph 8 in Article 34, “the decision of the tribunal
shall be binding on the Parties.”208
Consequently, the U.S.-UAE Open Sky agreement does not
provide explicit information or examples that answer the follow-
ing questions: How should an accepted level of government in-
terference and regulation be defined? How should the playing
field be leveled so that any distortions of market and unfair com-
petition are avoided? And, more importantly, how shall the con-
tracting parties proceed when commercial disputes occur?
As for the United States’ allegations of capacity dumping, tar-
iffs to be charged and their conditions, or any other matter re-
204 Id. at 10.
205 Id.
206 ICAO TEMPLATE AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT, supra note 10, at 75–83. Article
34 on settlement of disputes provides an explicit description of the dispute reso-
lution process, which depends on whether the ASA is traditional or fully liberal-
ized. Id. Article 34 may exclude disputes on competition issues if the contracting
parties decide to include a separate consultation process under Article 15 on fair
competition. See id. at 75.
207 Compare ICAO TEMPLATE AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT, supra note 10, at 80–82,
with US-UAE Agreement, supra note 201, at 10. “Parenthetic expressions may be
set off by parentheses or dashes instead of commas, depending on the degree of
emphasis or pause desired, or the length of the expression.” Punctuation, BUREAU
DE LA TRADUCTION (2017), http://www.btb.termiumplus.gc.ca/tcdnstyl-chap?
lang=eng&lettr=chapsect7&info0=7 [https://perma.cc/H54F-E53C].
208 ICAO TEMPLATE AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT, supra note 10, at 80.
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lated to traffic rights, the plaintiff should invoke Article 14
(Settlement of Disputes) and Article 12 (Pricing) in the current
US-UAE Open Sky agreement.209 Given that commercial dis-
putes cannot be resolved based on the vague provisions of Arti-
cle 14, parties cannot take any legal actions, per allegations of
financial subsidies, under the current bilateral ASA. Thus, un-
less airlines involved in that issue foresee their future growth
through partnerships when possible instead of exchanging use-
less allegations, the only recourse should be a specialized juris-
diction based on views of experts in the subject matter of the
dispute. In that sense, the WTO is the international body em-
powered to examine questions that bear on commercial dis-
putes (as explained previously in the GATS’ Annex on Air
Transport Services).
Consequently, based on foregoing analysis, and given the
ASAs’ limited scope, plaintiffs should request the intervention of
the WTO in cases of commercial disputes related more specifi-
cally to alleged financial subsidies, which may distort the mar-
ket. Even though there is no mention to the WTO in the overall
existing bilateral ASAs in case of a dispute relating to unfair
competition, perhaps it is the will of civil aviation regulators to
maintain the status quo by resolving possible disputes under the
bilateral ASAs without any referral to an organization outside
the aviation sphere or diplomatic channels of both parties—in
the worst scenario.
IV. CONNECTIVITY AND DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION IN
AIR TRANSPORT
Air transport connectivity is defined in line with the Chicago
Convention as inter alia Preamble and paragraph D of Article
44: “[m]eet[ing] the needs of the peoples of the world for . . .
efficient and economical air transport.”210 Accordingly, connec-
tivity in air transport is defined by ICAO as the “[m]ovement of
passengers, mail and cargo involving the minimum of transit
points, which: makes the trip as short as possible, with optimal
user satisfaction; [and] at the minimum price possible.”211
In 2015, a commentator said:
209 See US-UAE Agreement, supra note 201, at 9–10.
210 Chicago Convention, supra note 1, at 20.
211 A. Sainarayan, Chief, Aviation Data & Analysis Sec., ATB, Workshop at the
ICAO’s 39th Assembly: Air Connectivity and Competition (Sept. 27, 2016), http:/
/www.icao.int/Meetings/a39/workshops/Documents/Air%20Connectivity%20
and%20Competition.pdf [https://perma.cc/2L9F-4JPG].
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“Connectivity” which is the most compelling need in aviation,
and embodied in the Chicago Convention as inter alia “meeting
the needs of the people of the world for efficient and economical
air transport” is stultified by interests of commercial and national
policy . . . . The [U.S. position]212 makes one wonder whether
the fate of air transport lies in internal job creation and not in
connecting the world which is the main intent and purpose of
the Chicago Convention.213
In 2012, the numbers of cities served from twenty-four major
hub airports across the globe were ranked according to three
different measures with different outcomes. In terms of domes-
tic and international flights (i.e., total cities served and total in-
ternational destinations), Frankfurt—FRA with 313 cities served,
is the largest, followed by Paris—CDG with 268. For the United
States, Atlanta—ATL ranked third (228) and Chicago O’Hare—
ORD ranked fifth (210). In Canada, Toronto—YYZ ranked
eighth (183) in a tie with New York—JFK (183) and London—
LHR. Finally, Dubai—DXB ranked fifth with 313 cities served.214
In the context of international flights only, the geographical
location of the hub airports must be considered when “examin-
ing how airport rate as international hubs on connectivity.”215 In
that regard, European hubs rate well since they have “a majority
of their service within Europe that is included as interna-
tional.”216 For similar reasons, Dubai Airport also scores well in
terms of the number of international destinations served, com-
ing in third behind Paris—CDG and Frankfurt—FRA.217
As for outside the region, an alternative measure considers
the “number[ ] of cities served outside the hub airport’s local
region.”218 “Dubai[—DXB] is the largest international hub air-
port on this measure, followed by Frankfurt—FRA, Paris—CDG
and New York—JFK.219 Toronto—YYZ and Montre´al—YUL also
fare well on this measure; Toronto ranked sixth just behind New
212 The author refers to the recent allegations of the three major U.S. airlines
against the Gulf carriers.
213 Ruwantissa Abeyratne, What in the World is Happening to Air Transport?, SRI
LANKA GUARDIAN, May 5, 2015, http://www.slguardian.org/2015/05/what-in-the-
world-is-happening-to-air-transport/ [https://perma.cc/Z9PV-7VYQ].
214 THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE AIR TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY IN CANADA,
supra note 171, at 16–17.
215 Id. at 16.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 17.
218 Id. at 16.
219 Id. at 16–17.
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York—JFK and London—LHR, and Montre´al ranked tenth.”220
“The Asian hub airports don’t rate highly on this measure as
much of their service is to airports within the region.”221 “Cana-
dian hub airports are relatively small compared to major world
hub airports considering total passenger traffic, but in terms of
connectivity they fare better.”222
According to Clayton M. Christensen, professor at Harvard
Business School and pioneer of the disruptive innovation the-
ory, “disruptive innovation . . . [is] a process by which a product
or service takes root initially in simple applications at the bot-
tom of a market and then relentlessly moves up market, eventu-
ally displacing established competitors.”223 As a result of that
process, disrupted products or services become more accessible
and affordable to a large population instead of a specific seg-
ment willing to pay higher prices.224
In a recent article of Harvard Business Review, Christensen et
al. explained the concept and basic tenets of disruptive innova-
tion theory. The process of disruption describes how a disrupter
enters a market or creates a new one and how it evolves from a
business oriented toward new customers or low-end to high-end
customers, while passing through the mainstream customers.225
Christensen et al. pointed out the confusion surrounding the
application of the concept of disruptive innovation when it is
used by many researchers, writers, and consultants. In that re-
gard, “disruptive innovation” is different from “sustaining inno-
vations,” which focuses on improving the products or services
offered to an incumbent’s existing customers—notably, the
most profitable ones.226 By contrast:
Disruptive innovations . . . are initially considered inferior by
most of an incumbent’s customers. Typically, customers are not
willing to switch to the new offering merely because it is less ex-
pensive. Instead, they wait until its quality rises enough to satisfy
220 Id.
221 Id. at 16.
222 Id.
223 What is Disruptive Health Technology?, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., DISRUPTIVE
HEALTH TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE, http://www.dhti.cmu.edu/dhti/definition.asp
[https://perma.cc/LLT4-FN4N].
224 Id.
225 Clayton M. Christensen et al., “What is Disruptive Innovation?”, 93 HARV. BUS.
REV. 44, 46 (2015).
226 Id. at 46–47.
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them. Once that’s happened, they adopt the new product and
happily accept its lower price.227
Christensen et al. explained that “[d]isruptive innovations origi-
nate in low-end or new-market footholds.”228 New-market dis-
ruption occurs where a new market is created where none
previously existed, hence a new segment of customers is
targeted by a disrupter. Second, low-end disruption refers to the
situation where low-end and less-demanding customers of an es-
tablished business (incumbent) are attracted by progressive en-
hanced product/service offerings of a new entrant (disrupter).
The disrupter will later adapt its business strategy to the evolu-
tion of the market, whereas the incumbents will focus rather on
the most profitable and demanding customers by providing
them with “ever-improving products and services.”229
Based on the above reasoning, it appears that the business
model of the low-cost carriers (LCCs) fits overall into the new-
market disruption. This resulted in the emergence of a new seg-
ment of passengers who could not afford traveling by air before,
due to exorbitant airfares.230 Yet it is also true that the low-end
and mainstream passengers are attracted by the affordable
prices and improving service offerings of the low cost model
(i.e. low-end disruption).231 This dynamic of disruption and the
evolution of performance over time is continuously changing at
different paces, depending on the business models of the dis-
rupters and the incumbents, but also on the evolution of the
cyclic airline industry as a whole (i.e. Ultra LCCs, LCCs, hybrid
carriers, and legacy carriers).
227 Id. at 48.
228 Id. at 47.
229 Id.
230 See John F. O’Connell & George Williams, Passengers’ Perceptions of Low Cost
Airlines and Full Service Carriers – A Case Study Involving Ryanair, Aer Lingus, Air Asia
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Another point worth mentioning is that a process of action
and reaction emerges from the dynamic of disruptive innova-
tion given that this concept can profoundly affect the function-
ing of established companies.232 This leads to what Christensen
called the “innovator’s dilemma,” which refers to the mindset of
an established company when it has to decide whether it should
maintain its products or services with the current high-value of-
ferings or create a new product or service similar to the one
offered by a disrupter.233 That said, the new product or service
must be designed with basic or less sophisticated attributes to be
able to compete with the new entrant, which targets mainstream
customers (e.g., Legacy carriers versus LCCs, Ford versus
Toyota).
The traditional airlines have been facing two types of disrup-
tions concurrently, which is “unusual in the story of disruption,”
according to Christensen.234 Thus, unlike incumbents in other
industries, traditional carriers cannot move to more profitable
upmarket tiers to maintain a certain competitive advantage over
the new entrants. Christensen explained that incumbents in
other industries have more options when disrupted, whereas
“[t]he high fixed-cost structure of hub-and-spoke airlines means
they can’t run away from the volume in the lower tiers of the
market.”235 In fact, with the growing competition from LCCs on
short-haul routes, traditional carriers in the United States and
Europe have been trying to focus on flowing passengers through
their hubs on longer routes.236 However, they are no longer in a
position of supremacy due to the fierce competition from the
Middle Eastern carriers on long-haul.237 Basically, the margins of
the traditional U.S. and European airlines are getting squeezed
on both sides—short- and long-haul.
232 Disruptive Innovation-Policy Implications, VISIONARY ANALYTICS (Jan. 2016),
http://www.visionary.lt/disruptive-innovation-policy-implications [https://per
ma.cc/97Q3-7GHH].
233 A.W., What Disruptive Innovation Means, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 25, 2015,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/01/economist-ex
plains-15 [https://perma.cc/EM24-5E8V].
234 Jeremy Dann, Disruption: Flying the Not-So-Friendly Skies, HARV. BUS. SCHOOL
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Nevertheless, contrary to LCCs, the major Middle Eastern car-
riers operate through a different business model that does not
necessarily target, at the very beginning, their operations, the
mainstream passengers, or a new-market segment. In fact, an-
other aspect that distinguishes the airline industry from other
industries is its dependency on different components of the
global air transport system; these include airport infrastructures,
geographic location, and national institutional policies. These
components combined would facilitate the process of disruption
when acting in an international market with different compara-
tive advantages. That said, favorable conditions, to a certain ex-
tent, might create an uneven playing field without being illegal,
as discussed earlier.
Within that perspective, many major airlines have benefited
from favorable conditions, which cannot be ignored in their de-
velopment history. Perhaps the time frame of these advantages
and the cyclic characteristic of the airline industry are the main
parameters that make it challenging to conduct a reasonable
comparison between the beneficiaries. For instance, as men-
tioned earlier, Emirates reported that it benefited from the gov-
ernment investment in infrastructure, plus start-up seed capital
in 1985.238 Other airlines have been rescued, either directly
through subsidies, or indirectly by application of bankruptcy
laws (e.g. United Airlines in 2006).239
Airlines adopt an aggressive strategy to leverage the compara-
tive advantages of a global disparate air transport system. How-
ever, the success of a new carrier relies above all on its ability to
seize new opportunities and meet an eventual pent-up demand
through a solid product offering in terms of quality and pric-
ing.240 In a similar approach, Abeyratne briefly explained his
definition of disruptive innovation in the airline industry based
on the constraints raised by Christensen:
Disruptive innovation in the air transport industry is based on
two strategies: service strategy and pricing strategy. These two
combined justify the three basic features of a successful business
strategy which displaces an existing market: availability of goods
and services; good price and quality; and value for money. When
238 AIRLINES AND SUBSIDY: OUR POSITION, supra note 132, at 8.
239 Adams, supra note 63.
240 See LCCs Playing Important Role in Driving Onboard Passenger Experience Im-
provements, FUTURE TRAVEL EXPERIENCE (June 2014), http://www.futuretravelex
perience.com/2014/06/lccs-playing-important-role-driving-onboard-passenger-
experience-improvements/ [https://perma.cc/5QWK-7RHT].
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these practices are applied to the airline industry, one finds that
an established carrier is much more vulnerable to disruptive in-
novation than most other industries.241
Abeyratne explained a common misconception that considers
a decrease in innovation as an adverse effect of increased com-
petition. He clarified that, contrary to this erroneous assump-
tion, “[c]ompetition and innovation are mutually
endogenous.”242 Aghion et al. further described the
relationship:
First, an increase in competition leads to a significant increase in
R&D investments by neck-and-neck firms. Second, an increase in
competition decreases R&D investments by laggard firms. Moreo-
ver, this Schumpeterian effect243 is significantly stronger the
shorter the time horizon. Third, increased competition affects
industry composition by reducing the fraction of neck-and-neck
sectors, and overall, competition increases aggregate
innovation.244
Edwards and Day identified innovation as a crucial indicator
that enables a company to build an emotional brand connection
with its customers. They identified lack of real innovation as one
of the five symptoms of malaise of consumer-led brands.245
These are: (1) an increased similarity between brands; (2) an
inconsistent brand image and offer; (3) a lack of real innovation
and surprise; (4) an increasing gulf between brand offer and
brand capability; and (5) something hollow at the heart of the
brand.246 In that sense, Edwards and Day described Emirates as a
company with a record of successful brand innovation; that is,
“an example of rapid-fire innovation” offering many on-board
241 RUWANTISSA ABEYRATNE, COMPETITION AND INVESTMENT IN AIR TRANSPORT—
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 108 (2016).
242 Id. at 107.
243 “The Schumpeter effect is associated with the notion of creative destruction
put forward in the 1930s by the celebrated economist Joseph Schumpeter, which
introduced the process by which new innovations replace older technologies.
Start-up airlines have to be mindful of being overrun by more established air-
lines, making creative destruction a common phenomenon in air transport.” Id.
at n.84.
244 Philippe Agnion et al., The Causal Effects of Competition on Innovation: Experi-
mental Evidence 4 (Harvard University, Working Paper, 2014), http://scholar.
harvard.edu/files/aghion/files/causal_effects_of_competition.pdf?m=1393
886457 [https://perma.cc/8E4Q-ZWYA].
245 HELEN EDWARDS & DEREK DAY, CREATING PASSION BRANDS: HOW TO BUILD
EMOTIONAL BRAND CONNECTION WITH CUSTOMERS 23–24, 31 (2005).
246 Id. at 24, 28, 31, 34, 37.
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options and innovative technologies to the passengers.247 Be-
sides, it was highlighted that the airline had not tested the intro-
duced innovations before the implementation stage. Tim Clark,
Emirates CEO, explained: “We know what consumers want, and
we use the experience of our own people to assess new ideas. If
we tested innovation every time with a posse of consumers, we
would lose the initiative. We prefer to back our judgement.”248
From a customer perspective, Emirates, Qatar Airways, and
Etihad Airways provide high levels of service, especially for pre-
mium passengers. As mentioned earlier, in 2016 these carriers
ranked first, second, and sixth, respectively, out of the 100 best
airlines by Skytrax World Airline Awards.249 On the other hand,
Delta ranked thirty-fifth, United ranked sixty-eighth, and Ameri-
can ranked seventy-seventh, according to the same Skytrax.250
That is, the three major U.S. airlines lagged behind the most
recognized carriers in terms of customer service, including leg-
acy and low-cost carriers based mostly in Asia (e.g. Singapore
Airlines (third), AirAsia (twenty-third)) and Europe (e.g. Luf-
thansa (tenth), Air France (fourteenth)). Per Canadian carriers,
Air Canada ranked thirty-first, ahead of WestJet (fiftieth), Porter
Airlines (forty-seventh), and Air Transat (eighty-eighth).251
Emirates has been successful in providing high quality service
to its passengers flying either economy, business, or first class.
According to Fortune magazine, the overall quality offered by
Emirates outstrips that of its rivals in Europe
>at both the top and bottom ends of the market. Customers in
Emirates’ economy class usually pay less compared with compet-
ing flights, while still receiving a superior level of service. Upper
class customers, meanwhile, usually pay more, but receive greater
exclusivity and comfort compared to upper class cabins on Euro-
pean airlines, especially in First Class . . . .252
Increasingly, many airlines have replaced first-class accommo-
dations with business-class seats. Some planes are reconfigured
to offer more capacity in competitive markets with potential ex-
isting and pent-up demand. However, for most airlines, the com-
247 Id. at 32.
248 Id. at 32–33.
249 The World’s Top 100 Airlines in 2016, supra note 147.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Cyrus Sanati, Get Ready for Middle-East Airline Domination, FORTUNE (Nov. 22,
2013), http://fortune.com/2013/11/22/get-ready-for-middle-east-airline-domi
nation/ [https://perma.cc/Q7RS-27BQ].
2017] COMPETITION AND SUBSIDIES 389
fort differences between business class and first class are
shrinking, whereas the huge difference in price has not changed
accordingly.253
Emirates, the world’s largest A380 and Boeing 777 operator,
uses Dubai as both a hinterland hub for routes to other cities in
the Middle East and an hourglass hub for long-haul traffic.254
That is, they service global destinations by operating the sixth
freedom while connecting Europe to Australia and the United
States to Asia in addition to the fifth freedom route from New
York City to Milan continuing on to Dubai.255 According to de
Wit, the long-haul hourglass model and fleet composition (new
and fuel-efficient aircraft) allows Emirates to significantly lower
its cost per available seat-kilometer (CASK) more than its com-
petitors in Europe.256 In addition to all of the foregoing, Emir-
ates does not compete with the low-cost carriers, which operate
rather in short and medium haul, hence its ability to generate
high revenue per available seat-kilometer/mile (RASK/
RASM).257
With the regard to market share, the Gulf trio achieved 11%
of the international air market in 2012, as measured by available
seat miles.258 That is way beyond the 2% recorded in 2002. By
contrast, the market share of the U.S. airlines has decreased
from 14% to 11% during the same period.259 This upward trend
is expected to continue “growing by 12 to 15% annually this dec-
ade, according to IATA figures.”260
The advancement of Emirates Airlines, Etihad Airways, Qatar
Airways, and Turkish Airlines—as “super-connectors” world-
wide—has turned the evolution of the airline industry upside
down. From 2003 to 2013, these airlines have achieved tremen-
253 Joan Voight, Emirates is the World’s Most Glamorous Airline, ADWEEK (Oct. 12,
2014), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/emirates-worlds-
most-glamorous-airline-160714 [https://perma.cc/8XQH-H3YJ].
254 GUILLAUME BURGHOUWT, AIRLINE NETWORK DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR AIRPORT PLANNING 16 (2007).
255 Id.
256 de Wit, supra note 183, at 24–26.
257 Id. at 24.
258 Sanati, supra note 252.
259 Id.
260 Gwyn Topham, Gulf Airlines’ Success Prompts Hostility from US and European
Carriers, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/business/
2015/apr/20/gulf-airlines-emirates-etihad-qatar-success-hostility-us-european-car
riers [https://perma.cc/4GRQ-TKGU]; see also Dresner et al., supra note 136, at
2.
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dous performance in terms of revenue passenger kilometer
(RPK).261 The Middle Eastern carriers are expanding their net-
works, taking advantage of their strategic location between Eu-
rope, Asia, Africa, and America.262 This constitutes a highly
competitive advantage that allows these carriers to operate the
fifth and sixth freedoms using their state-of-the-art hubs. By do-
ing so, it is not a surprise that fares seem to be low on some
routes “because of the efficiency of their long-haul-to-long-haul
model.”263
Overall, the three Middle Eastern carriers seem to achieve
common objectives by enhancing the connectivity between the
four corners of the world. They operate in different but comple-
mentary strategies to ensure the growth of their network: Open
Skies for Emirates, equity minority interests for Etihad, and alli-
ances for Qatar Airways.264 As a result, this strategy is continu-
ously challenging the other legacy carriers, which have
traditionally operated direct routes between “strong local mar-
kets,” including the local market of the flag carriers.265 Accord-
ingly, the three Middle Eastern carriers have raised competition
to a new level in the international air travel market.
To conclude, as long as the allegations against the major Mid-
dle Eastern carriers—Emirates Airlines, Etihad Airways and
Qatar Airways—are not proven to distort the market, passengers
are left with no choice but to admit that these carriers are dis-
ruptive innovators in the air travel industry.
V. CONCLUSION
In their analysis of Gulf carrier competition with U.S. airlines,
Dresner et al. said: “Claims that the Gulf carriers have an unfair
competitive advantage and harm local markets and airlines have
resulted in ‘a barrage of legal and political challenges to the
Gulf carriers’ and calls to restrict further Gulf carrier access to
markets in Europe and Canada, for example.”266 “[T]he West’s
legacy airlines have not lacked for state protection of their





264 See Flanagan, supra note 113; International and Government Affairs: Connectiv-
ity, Competition and Consumer Choice, supra note 99.
265 SWELBAR, supra note 118, at 5–6.
266 Dresner et al., supra note 136, at 3 (internal citations omitted).
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own,”267 yet it seems that the situation is changing when the De-
partment of Justice has expressed concern over limiting Gulf
carrier competition.268 Perhaps policy makers are concerned
about protecting the interests of other stakeholders, such as
Boeing and big U.S. airports, which benefit from the tremen-
dous growth of the Middle-Eastern carriers.
In June 2016, the State Department held separate meetings to
hear the concerns of two main groups of aviation stakeholders
with respect to the alleged subsidies. The first group included
players who oppose the position of the three U.S. airlines, in-
cluding FedEx, Alaska Air Group, JetBlue Airways, Hawaiian
Holdings, and the U.S. Travel Association. The second group
represented mainly the plaintiff (i.e the three major U.S. air-
lines) and several airline labor unions.269 Thereafter, in July
2016, the State Department held informal meetings with Qatar
and UAE government officials.270 While no official announce-
ments have been made yet, some sources reported a victory for
the Middle Eastern carriers and others reported that both sides
claimed triumph following the informal meetings.271 Besides,
the State Department is expected not to request official consul-
tations despite the intense lobbying from the three major U.S.
airlines.272 Another meeting is expected “in the coming months”
according to UAE Economy Minister Sultan Saeed Al
Mansouri.273
267 Super-Connecting the World, supra note 261.
268 The DOJ Doesn’t Think Much of Lobbying Against Gulf Airlines, FORTUNE (Oct.
13, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/10/13/airlines-justice-doj-gulf-trade-dis
pute/ [https://perma.cc/L4ZW-U958].
269 Susan Carey, U.S. to Hold Talks with U.A.E., Qatar in Airline Dispute; But the




271 Anthony McAuley, Victory For Gulf Airlines as US Government Ends Open Skies
Row With No Further Action, THE NATIONAL (July 26, 2016), http://www.thena-
tional.ae/business/aviation/victory-for-gulf-airlines-as-us-government-ends-open-
skies-row-with-no-further-action [https://perma.cc/M2U8-N7QL]; see also Brian
Sumers, U.S. Airlines Set to Lose Major Battle Against Gulf Carriers in Open Skies De-
bate, SKIFT (June 28, 2016), https://skift.com/2016/06/28/u-s-airlines-set-to-lose-
major-battle-against-gulf-carriers-in-open-skies-debate/ [https://perma.cc/7C4C-
Z4UV].
272 Sumers, supra note 271.
273 Fareed Rahman, Al Mansouri Optimistic About US-Gulf Carriers Spat Outcome,
GULF NEWS (Aug. 31, 2016), http://gulfnews.com/business/aviation/al-man
souri-optimistic-about-us-gulf-carriers-spat-outcome-1.1888751 [https://perma.cc
/U5GB-UANH].
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In the context of Canada, the current approach toward re-
strictive bilateral ASAs with countries like the UAE benefits its
national carrier Air Canada, but not consumers.274 Therefore,
passengers [and tourists] are left with no choice but to pay high
taxes and bear the cost of investments on airports.275 This situa-
tion probably persists because the Canadian company Bombar-
dier has not benefited from the expanding Middle Eastern
carriers’ large aircraft orders for long-haul flights, as U.S. com-
panies Boeing and Airbus have.276 Perhaps the new liberal Tru-
deau-led government may reconsider the merits of maintaining
Canada’s existing policy settings.
The aforesaid analysis of this article highlighted the conflict
of interest with regard to subsidy allegations against the three
major Middle Eastern carriers. This conflict might lead to politi-
cal risks as a result of widely advertised allegations, which are
fueled by accusations, counter-accusations, or rebuttals on the
basis of analysis conducted separately by both sides. When such
accusations persist with no way out, it is also because of a weak
regulatory framework with respect to the procedure of settle-
ment of disputes.
It must be noted that competition should not sound like a
threat, but instead a driving force of an engine that requires
checks on a regular basis. In other words, the process of air
transport liberalization must be continuously assessed from both
national and international perspectives. In fact, liberalization
does not imply a shift toward less or weak regulation, but on the
contrary, a milestone on the path towards a comprehensive ap-
proach for a strengthened and proactive regulation. That is, an
approach by which competent bodies should put more empha-
sis on the continuous assessment of both effects and counter-
effects of global regulatory measures. All of that requires
growth-enhancing investments all along the process of
liberalization.
The demand stimulation is of interest to global stakeholders,
but at different levels; in fact, low fares as a result of the demand
stimulation do not necessarily work in favor of airlines whose
274 See EMIRATES SUBMISSION TO THE CANADA TRANSPORTATION ACT REVIEW,
supra note 162, at 3–4.
275 See id. at 5.
276 See Benjamin Zhang, This Canadian Giant is Being Haunted by Its Decision to
Challenge Airbus and Boeing, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.businessin
sider.com/bombardier-challenge-airbus-boeing-succeed-2015-10 [https://perma.
cc/XHH5-8B5T].
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profit margins are the worst in the air transport chain. Besides,
the quality of service and passengers’ rights are often compro-
mised in the midst of growing demand. Hence the importance
of a proactive and collaborative approach to achieve applicable
regulations, to be elaborated and enhanced in concert with di-
verse stakeholders; the latter must include the passengers who
are still very poorly represented in the global air transport
system.
On the other hand, in a restricted market, regulations are
generally rigid and contain clauses designed to protect the inter-
ests of (almost) one major player—the national carriers. Some-
times it is even difficult to tell who these clauses and regulatory
texts benefit as a whole: the regulatory bodies or the flag
carriers?
That being said, a comprehensive and proactive regulation
has to take into consideration the disparate interests of the
global community, where the end-users (passengers) are sup-
posed to be the core of the air transport system as a whole (i.e.
they are the raison d’eˆtre of the businesses and, most importantly,
the regulators). Yet this is not the part that the main stakehold-
ers would argue about when assessing a certain policy, but
rather the weight attributed to different effects and counter-ef-
fects. Consequently, a balanced analysis is needed to assess exis-
tent and potential impacts of liberalization on each of the
various stakeholders, many of which are emphasised in this arti-
cle. In fact, it is clear that there is often a conflict of interest to
be considered when political interests are on the table. In such a
case, it would be a conflict in which one of the stakeholders
might be considered a secondary player.
In that regard, a cost-benefit analysis should be considered for
a balanced assessment of the current and potential impacts of a
liberalization policy. The impacts on connectivity, tourism, em-
ployment, airlines, and other related industries (e.g. aircraft
manufacturers in the United States and Europe) are among the
areas that should be assessed in a cost-benefit analysis frame-
work. On the basis of this, eventual corrective measures or regu-
latory texts, if any, could be recommended. Furthermore, as
mentioned earlier, the assessment of air transport liberalization
must be conducted on a regular basis. In that sense, the
database and methodology of QUASAR is an important tool de-
signed by the WTO to assess the degree of liberalization
achieved by using a synthetic universal index, Air Liberalisation
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Index (ALI).277 QUASAR methodology is carried out using four
steps. The first is assessing the degree of liberalization of an ASA
(i.e. the level of openness of the main market access features of
bilateral ASAs) to construct a synthetic universal index, the
ALI.278 For that purpose, the value of an ALI is determined by
summing the attributed “points” to various features and their
variant ASA provisions (e.g. capacity, withholding, tariffs, and
designation).279 “The value of [an] ALI varies between zero, for
very restrictive ASAs, and fifty, for very liberal ones.”280 The sec-
ond step is categorizing ASAs by type; seven standard types of
ASAs have been identified by combining the different clauses of
an ASA relating to freedoms of air, capacity, withholding, tariffs,
and designation.281 The third step is combining the calculated
ALIs with traffic data so as to obtain a Weighted ALI (WALI) by
contracting state, region, pair of regions, type, level of traffic,
etc.282 For a given contracting State, the WALI provides an ag-
gregate measure of the openness of its aviation policy.283 The
fourth step is comparing the ASA network with the commercial
network, which corresponds to the services that are effectively
operated by airlines.284
Throughout this process, WTO works in concert with other
stakeholders such as ICAO and IATA depending upon the data
required by this analysis.285 ICAO has an important role to play
in integrating this methodology in its TASA and facilitating its
adoption by member States. But beforehand, ICAO should as-
sist, in coordination with WTO, its member States in determin-
ing how to evaluate their air transport liberalization policy using
QUASAR methodology.
Any concerns are to be resolved in a spirit of cooperation and
in accordance with regulations in force, which should not be
limited to the provisions of the bilateral ASAs when the subject
matter of a mutual dispute is not covered by an existing ASA, as
discussed earlier in this article (i.e. WTO and commercial dis-
277 WTO Secretariat, Part A: Introduction to QUASAR, WTO Doc. S/C/W/270,
12 (Nov. 30, 2006).
278 Id. at 11.
279 Id. at 12.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 16. Over 70% of QUASAR bilateral ASAs fall under one of these seven
types. Id.
282 Id. at 17.
283 See id.
284 Id. at 18.
285 See id. at 10.
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putes). Most importantly, any compromise must not ignore pas-
senger rights. In fact, it is in nations’ overall interest to serve the
fundamental need of the people in terms of air transport con-
nectivity. This will not be possible without a clear vision and con-
crete actions through a proactive approach. Clearly, “[v]ision
without action is a daydream . . . [and a]ction without vision is a
nightmare.”286
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I. “IT’S TIME TO FLY”2: INTRODUCTION
“SPIRIT AIRLINES PASSENGERS battered . . . ,”3 “Lawsuit:American Airlines Failed to Protect Girl,”4 “JetBlue [ ]
passenger . . . interfering with flight safety . . . ,”5 “$10 million
[passenger assault] lawsuit filed against [a]irlines . . . .”6 These
2 United Airlines Deepens Commitment to ‘It’s Time to Fly’ Ad Campaign, Selects Barrie
D’Rozario Murphy as New Advertising Agency, PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 4, 2007, 1:00 PM),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/united-airlines-deepens-commitment
-to-its-time-to-fly-ad-campaign-selects-barrie-drozario-murphy-as-new-advertising-
agency-57853677.html [https://perma.cc/7KHQ-BW4A] (discussing focus of
United’s slogan “It’s Time to Fly”).
3 Nancy Dilon, Spirit Airlines Passengers File Suit after In-Flight Fight, DAILY NEWS
(Apr. 7, 2016, 6:05 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/spirit-air
lines-passengers-file-suit-in-flight-fight-article-1.2592341 [https://perma.cc/6KM5
-CF6J].
4 Mary Beth Quirk, Lawsuit: American Airlines Failed to Protect Girl from Passenger




5 Parver v. Jet Blue Airlines Corp., 649 F. App’x 539, 541 (9th Cir. 2016).
6 Francesca Fontana, $10 Million Lawsuit Filed Against American Airlines, Man
Accused of Groping 13-Year-Old on Portland Flight, THE OREGONIAN/OREGONLIVE
(July 6, 2016, 11:42 AM), http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2016/
07/10_million_lawsuit_filed_again.html [https://perma.cc/GHX7-88LS].
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are the types of headlines splattered over the front of newspa-
pers and internet homepages. Despite the Transportation Secur-
ity Administration (TSA) being the forefront of aviation security
and safety, the typical TSA litigation tends to center around em-
ployment issues, corporate compliance, or petitioners’ attempts
to have their names removed from a “No-Fly” List.7 However,
airline carriers are constantly defending themselves and bearing
the brunt of safety litigation. In an attempt to mitigate safety
concerns, flight attendants are no longer trained for just service
in the sky. Today, stewards and stewardesses are trained in the
fundamentals of aviation, security procedures, self-defense ma-
neuvers, emergency protocol, and so much more.8 Sadly, it sim-
ply is not enough. In the past few years, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), who asserts jurisdiction in-flight, has logged
around 170 crimes per year during flights.9 Airlines need to take
more proactive steps to ensure safer skies for their passengers
and their companies.
This comment proposes a new security program which should
be implemented by airlines individually. Previous legal works
have discussed the past aviation security systems, which were
under private security companies; however, since the September
11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks, the federal government has im-
plemented a government controlled security system for air
travel. So, current legal scholars discuss the constitutionality and
legality of the current government safety procedures. Thus, for
context, Part II seeks to discuss past and current security mea-
sures by TSA and airlines alike. Part III recommends the security
protocol that should be adopted by the individual airlines; this is
proposed as being an additional level of security which works in
7 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913, 916 (2015) (hearing a
suit from an air marshal after TSA fired him for talking to a reporter); Ardila
Olivares v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 819 F.3d 454, 458 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (hearing a
suit against TSA for the denial of an applicant to a Federal Aviation Administra-
tion certified flight school); Coleman v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., 649 F.
App’x. 128, 129 (3rd Cir. 2016) (addressing a transportation security officer’s suit
for harassment under the ADA); Ibrahim v. U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d
1048 (9th Cir. 2016) (regarding a woman challenging placement on No Fly List
and attorney’s fees).
8 Customized Compliance Training, DELTA AIR LINES, http://www.delta.com/con
tent/www/en_US/about-delta/business-programs/training-and-consulting-ser
vices/flight-attendant-training/customized-compliance-training.html [https://
perma.cc/24VQ-LJNR] (last visited July 8, 2017).
9 Corinne Purtill, Unfriendly Skies: The Disturbing Reality of Sexual Assault on Air-
planes, QUARTZ (Oct. 27, 2015), https://qz.com/533256/the-disturbing-reality-of-
sexual-assault-on-airplanes/ [https://perma.cc/5ESF-JMVW].
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conjunction with the existing government security scheme. Part
IV discusses the feasibility of the program in regard to finances,
public opinion, and effectiveness. Finally, Part V analyzes poten-
tial legal issues, addressing how the program is not bound by the
Constitution due to lack of state action and the aviation indus-
try’s additional protection for safety-related decisions under cer-
tain statutes.
II. THE “WINGS OF MAN”: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
OF PAST AND CURRENT SAFETY PROGRAMS10
A. “ONE MISSION. YOURS.”11: THE CAPPS I PROGRAM
The first American airplane to be hijacked was over fifty-five
years ago.12 And, as the federal government has continued to
improve aviation security through the years, terrorists and
criminals continue to work to evade the system and find kinks in
its armor. In 1998, with the sweeping advances in technology,
the United States created the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-
Screening System (CAPPS I).13
Being the first of its kind, this program was not without its
flaws. The CAPPS I terrorism prevention program was used and
funded independently by each airline.14 Despite being a
mandatory program, many felt that leaving the system to the dis-
cretion of the individual airlines created fundamental flaws in
the system, such as cutting into profit incentives and airlines not
having uniform security thresholds.15 However, the main identi-
fiers of suspicious behaviors stemmed from passengers’ conduct
in the airport, their travel history, their home address, travel
companions, date and method of ticket purchase, their destina-
tion, whether the tickets were round trip, as well as many other
10 The Wings of Man, WRITE NOW & THEN (June 30, 2015), https://write-now-
and-then.com/2015/06/30/the-wings-of-man/ [https://perma.cc/9BZ5-JHZ9]
(discussing Eastern Airline’s “Wings of Man” slogan campaign).
11 Trevor Jensen, TWA at Your Service in New DMB&B Ads, ADWEEK: BRAND
MARKETING (Sept. 20, 1999), http://www.adweek.com/brand-marketing/twa-yo
ur-service-new-dmbb-ads-33622/ [https://perma.cc/MU7P-BADD] (explaining
Trans World Airline’s advertising history including their slogan “One mission.
Yours.”).
12 Ian David Fiske, Failing to Secure the Skies: Why America has Struggled to Protect
Itself and How it Can Change, 15 VA. J.L. & TECH. 173, 176 (2010).
13 Id. at 180.
14 Id. at 180–81.
15 Id.
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factors.16 However, less than one year after implementation, the
CAPPS I program was limited only to screening checked luggage
out of the public’s fear for its civil liberties.17 Thus, with CAPPS I
not being employed to screen passengers and carry-on luggage,
nineteen men walked onto four planes with box cutters and ne-
farious plans on September 11, 2001.18
B. “WE REALLY MOVE OUR TAILS FOR YOU”19: QUICK,
COMPREHENSIVE, CAPPS II
While eleven of the nineteen terrorist responsible for 9/11
were identified as high-risk by the CAPPS I program, none were
stopped or questioned because the terrorists did not check any
baggage as required under the restricted system.20 After this at-
tack shook the nation, Congress created a more assertive system
through the passing of the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act.21 This Act officially created the aviation security agency
known as TSA and amplified the current CAPPS I program
through several modifications, creating CAPPS II.22
The CAPPS II program differed from CAPPS I in that it not
only monitored flight purchasing and travel patterns, but it also
used data from commercial and government databases to con-
firm passengers’ true identities and compare the identity against
criminal wanted lists (both domestic and international), terror-
ist threat lists, and “No-Fly” and potential no fly lists.23 Based on
16 Id. at 180; Leigh A. Kite, Note, Red Flagging Civil Liberties and Due Process
Rights of Airline Passengers: Will a Redesigned CAPPS II System Meet the Constitutional
Challenge?, 61 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1385, 1394 (2004).
17 Michael J. DeGrave, Note, Airline Passenger Profiling and the Fourth Amendment:
Will CAPPS II be Cleared for Takeoff?, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 125, 130–31 (2004);
Fiske, supra note 12, at 182 n.70 (citing DeGrave, supra, at 130).
18 Katie Cristina, Comment, The TSA’s New Precheck Is Beginning to Look a Lot
Like CAPPS II: The Privacy Implications of Reviving the Tenets of the Failed Predecessor,
78 J. AIR L. & COM. 617, 623–24 (2013).
19 A History of Flight Attendants, FEMININITY IN FLIGHT, http://femininityin
flight.com/laborhistory.html [https://perma.cc/G89P-KX6Z] (last visited July 8,
2017) (explaining how Continental Airline’s well thought out slogan, “We really
move our tails for you,” was poorly received by many stewardesses).
20 DeGrave, supra note 17, at 148 (stating eleven of the nineteen September 11
attackers were identified through data patterns).
21 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 49 U.S.C. § 44903(j)(2) (2006);
Cristina, supra note 18, at 624.
22 Fiske, supra note 12, at 182.
23 Cristina, supra note 18, at 625 (quoting Deborah von Rochow-Leuschner,
CAPPS II and the Fourth Amendment: Does It Fly?, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 139, 147
(2004)) (stating commercial and government databases would be used to con-
sider certain factors of each traveler such as “‘race, religion, political affiliations,
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the data compiled, all travelers were then to be coded into one
of three risk categories.24 A passenger’s category then deter-
mined the amount of security screening they were subjected to
before boarding, if they were even allowed to fly at all.25 Finally,
this program was to be completely in the control of and fi-
nanced by the federal government, rather than by each airline
individually as before.26
Opposite the public’s fear for national security and personal
safety was the looming worry of Big Brother. The public’s outcry
over the intrusiveness of the government’s reach in the name of
security was deafening.27 Constitutional fears of the government
encroaching on American’s Fourth,28 Fifth,29 and Fourteenth30
Amendment liberties, as well as concerns in regard to the Pri-
vacy Act, caused Congress to halt the CAPPS II implementation
until the potential issues had an identifiable solution.31 Due to
these gaps in the program, and the failure to remedy them,
CAPPS II never came to fruition.32
credit history, employment, spending habits, charitable donations, unusual books
purchased or checked out, and visits to certain websites.’ But, . . . the TSA ex-
pressed . . . precise sources relied on were confidential.”); Fiske, supra note 12, at
183.
24 Cristina, supra note 18, at 624–25; Fiske, supra note 12, at 182–83.
25 Cristina, supra note 18, at 624–25; Fiske, supra note 12, at 182–83.
26 Fiske, supra note 12, at 183.
27 CAPPS II: Government Surveillance via Passenger Profiling, ELECTRONIC FRON-
TIER FOUNDATION, https://w2.eff.org/Privacy/cappsii/background.php [https://
perma.cc/W2FU-DA3M] (last visited July 8, 2017) (“CAPPS II would force you to
surrender more of your privacy in order to travel . . . How much of your private
life should the government be allowed to examine . . . CAPPS II could come to
serve as an all-purpose dragnet . . . All of this “mission creep” has taken place
before . . .”) (emphasis added).
28 U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, . . . and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, . . . but upon probable cause . . . ”).
29 U.S. CONST. AMEND. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . .”).
30 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”).
31 Cristina, supra note 18, at 626 (referencing U.S. Gov’t Accounting Office,
GAO-04-385, Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening Sys-
tem Faces Significant Implementation Challenges 4–5 (2004) (citing concerns
such as data accuracy, inadequacy of appeal process, data security protocol, ab-




C. THE SECURE FLIGHT PROGRAM: “YOU ARE NOW FREE TO
MOVE ABOUT THE COUNTRY”33
After the failure of the CAPPS programs, TSA was tasked with
creating a new program which did not employ commercial
data.34 Specifically, the government wanted a program which
identified terrorists only, rather than screening any potential
passenger who might pose a risk.35 Thus, Secure Flight was born.
The program’s inspection process is limited to cross-referencing
names with the “No-Fly” list,36 “Selectee” databases37 (which are
a step below no-fly status), and the Center for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) “Do Not Board List” only; this program
does not cross-check any name with criminal lists or commercial
databanks.38 Secure Flight is even touted by TSA as “pro-
33 Bernadette, Southwest Airlines “Ding!” Commercial, YOUTUBE (July 5, 2010),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dohsnU7c7X0 [https://perma.cc/2B6C-
P2PY] (showcasing Southwest’s “Ding! You’re now free to move about the
country” tagline).
34 Privacy Impact Assessment for the Secure Flight Program, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND
SEC. 1, 5 (Aug. 9, 2007), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/pri-
vacy_pia_tsa_secureflight.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PQF-9724] (“Secure Flight
does not utilize commercial data verify identities, nor does it use algorithms to
assign risk scores to individuals.”); see also Security Screening, TRANS. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.tsa.dhs.gov/what_we_do/layers/secureflight/index.shtm [https://
perma.cc/BME5-7DGT] (last visited July 8, 2017) (“Secure Flight does NOT as-
sign a score to individuals, use commercial data, or predict behavior.”); Secure
Flight Q & A, THE TSA BLOG (June 2, 2009), http://blog.tsa.gov/2009/06/se-
cure-flight-q.html [https://perma.cc/F4HS-QFD9] (“TSA does not collect or use
commercial data to conduct Secure Flight watch list matching.”).
35 Cristina, supra note 18, at 627–28; Privacy Impact Assessment for the Secure Flight
Program, supra note 34; see also Security Screening, supra note 34; Secure Flight Q & A,
supra note 34.
36 Ibrahim v. U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., 538 F.3d 1250, 1255 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“. . . an agency called the Terrorist Screening Center ‘actually compiles the list
of names ultimately placed on the No-Fly List.’ And the Terrorist Screening
Center isn’t part of the Transportation Security Administration or any other
agency named in section 46110; it is part of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion.”); Green v. Trans. Sec. Admin., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1121 (W.D. Wash.
2005) (“[Those], identified on a “No-Fly List,” consist[ ] of individuals who are
prohibited from flying altogether. [Those], identified on a “Selectee List,” con-
sist[ ] of individuals who must be ‘selected’ by air carriers for additional screen-
ing before they are permitted to fly.”).
37 Ibrahim, 835 F.3d at 1255; Green, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 (“[Those], identi-
fied on a “Selectee List,” consist[ ] of individuals who must be ‘selected’ by air
carriers for additional screening before they are permitted to fly.”).
38 Fiske, supra note 12, at 186–87; Michael Isaac, Note, Privatizing Surveillance:
The Use of Data Mining in Federal Law Enforcement; 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 1057, 1069
(2006) (“. . . Congress barred the Secure Flight Program from accessing commer-
cial databases . . . .”).
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tect[ing] privacy . . . [by] collect[ing] the minimum amount of
personal information . . . necessary . . . .”39 Despite the fact Se-
cure Flight matches passengers on all flights entering, exiting,
and flying over the United States,40 some still have concerns
about this program’s ability to detect threats using such a lim-
ited pool of information.41
D. GLOBAL ENTRY AND TSA PRE-CHECK VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS:
“A WHOLE DIFFERENT ANIMAL”42
The United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and
TSA have recently created two voluntary screening programs to
aid them and passengers, Global Entry and Pre-Check.43 Global
Entry is CBP’s expedited clearance program for travelers enter-
ing the United States who have been pre-approved and deter-
mined to be low-risk.44 In order to be approved for Global Entry,
applicants must provide correct and complete information, be a
citizen of certain countries, and be free of any criminal convic-
tions or pending criminal charges.45 Applicants must also verify
39 Security Screening: Secure Flight, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., www.TSA.gov/travel/se-
curity-screening (click the plus sign beside the “Secure Flight” title to drop-down
information regarding this program) [https://perma.cc/R9TB-KJGW] (last vis-
ited July 8, 2017).
40 Steve Sadler, TSA Secure Flight Program, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN.: MEDIA: PRESS
(Sept. 18, 2014), tsa.gov/news/testimony/2014/09/18/tsa-secure-flight-
program.
41 Security Screening, supra note 39.
42 Frontier’s ‘A Whole Different Animal’ Livery Has a Heartbeat, AIRPIGZ (May 14,
2010, 10:10 PM), http://airpigz.com/blog/2010/5/14/frontiers-a-whole-dif
ferent-animal-livery-has-a-heartbeat.html [https://perma.cc/PVM6-KM6K]
(explaining how Frontier implemented its slogan, “Frontier. A Whole Different
Animal,” in an innovative way).
43 Trusted Traveler Programs: Global Entry, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT.,
https://www.cbp.gov/travel/trusted-traveler-programs/global-entry [https://per
ma.cc/VES6-TVVV] (last visited July 8, 2017); TSA Pre✓®, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.tsa.gov/precheck [https://perma.cc/9MJW-425U] (last visited July
8, 2017).
44 Elizabeth Stern, Ins and Outs of US Trusted Traveler Programs, LAW 360 (Nov.
23, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/730929/ins-and-outs-of-us-trusted-
traveler-programs [https://perma.cc/4AA8-6HKN].
45 Id.; Trusted Traveler Programs: Global Entry: Eligibility for Global Entry, U.S. CUS-
TOMS & BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/travel/trusted-traveler-programs/
global-entry/eligibility [https://perma.cc/3C3K-K2KT] (last visited July 8, 2017)
[hereinafter Eligibility for Global Entry] (allowing U.S. citizens, U.S. lawful perma-
nent residents, and citizens of Colombia, the United Kingdom, Germany, the
Netherlands, Panama, Singapore, South Korea, and Mexican nationals to apply
for Global Entry, but there may be additional requirements of individuals de-
pending on their country of citizenship).
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they have never been sentenced for a customs, immigration, or
agriculture regulation violation, and they are not currently be-
ing investigated by any federal, state, or local law enforcement
agency.46 After completing the required forms, an applicant
must then schedule an interview and biometrics scan at a pre-
selected location.47 With Global entry approval, members also
receive TSA Pre-Check benefits.48 The processing time for
Global Entry may vary, but on average the CBP says it takes on
average about “[fifteen] business days to be conditionally ap-
proved for the program,” and once approved “membership will
be valid for [five] years unless [ ] revoked . . . .”49 The Global
Entry security system reduces the time it takes passengers to nav-
igate the airport by about seventy percent because it provides
more surety for the airlines and their passengers.50
Pre-Check is a TSA program which allows for accelerated
movement through airport security.51 At available airports, TSA
Pre-Checked travelers do not need to remove their shoes, belts,
or coats or remove laptops and liquids from their bag.52 Pre-
Check members also stroll through a standard metal detector
rather than the now typical x-ray body scanners or pat downs.53
The program also requires an online application, an interview,
and fingerprinting.54 According to TSA’s Former Administrator,
Pre-Check strengthens security because the TSA’s ability to “find
the proverbial needle in the haystack is improved every time [it
is] able to reduce the size of the haystack.”55 While some individ-
uals still express constitutional and privacy concerns, these are
46 Stern, supra note 44; Eligibility for Global Entry, supra note 45.
47 Trusted Traveler Programs: Global Entry, supra note 43.
48 Seth Kugel, Global Entry and Company: Worth the Price?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/travel/global-entry-and-company-
worth-the-price.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/X3UJ-TZGR] (stating over “1.3
million people have” applied for Global Entry and about “3,200 people [ ] sign[ ]
up [for TSA PreCheck] each day”); Stern, supra note 44.
49 Applying for Global Entry: How Do I Apply for Global Entry?, U.S. CUSTOMS &
BORDER PROT., https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/1671/~/apply
ing-for-global-entry [https://perma.cc/4PPM-YVUZ] (last visited July 8, 2017).
50 Kugel, supra note 48.
51 Id.
52 TSA Pre✓®, supra note 43.
53 Id.
54 TSA Prs✓®: Applying for TSA Pre✓®, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://
www.tsa.gov/precheck/faq [https://perma.cc/VSG2-SC53] (click the plus sign
beside the question “How do I apply for TSA Pre✓®?” for information regarding
the application process).
55 John S. Pistole, Addressing Counterterrorism, Risk-Based Security, and TSA’s Vi-
sion for the Future of Aviation Security, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN.: MEDIA: PRESS (Mar. 5,
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minimal, if not nonexistent, due to the program’s voluntary na-
ture and the fact that benefits are conferred on passengers ap-
proved as “low-risk,” but the ability to fly is not taken away if a
passenger is not approved.56 However, while airport security has
made leaps and bounds since the 9/11 attacks, the skies are still
not safe enough to protect the airline industry from litigation.
III. “YOU’RE GOING TO LIKE US.”57: THE PROPOSED
SECURITY MEASURES
Not only do airlines struggle with the constant fear of another
terrorist attack, which would be a crippling economic hit,58 but
airlines also combat unruly passengers daily, which cost them
substantial amounts of money.59 From 2007 to 2015, there have
been over 49,084 cases reported of unruly passengers during
flight.60 Examples of what is considered unruly passenger behav-
2012), https://www.tsa.gov/news/speeches/counterterrorism-risk-based-security-
and-tsa’s-vision-future-aviation-security-0 [https://perma.cc/ZXR9-Y2XM].
56 Jay Stanley, TSA Once Again Considering Using Commercial Data to Profile Passen-
gers, ACLU: FREE FUTURE (Jan. 11, 2013, 11:09 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/
tsa-once-again-considering-using-commercial-data-profile-passengers [https://
perma.cc/MPL4-KLPM].
57 jlt30, 1983 TWA Commercial, YOUTUBE (Dec. 31, 2008), https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=OMVi8H1gNjg&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/V3ZC-
HGVF] (posting a previously aired Trans World Airline commercial with the
written and sung slogan “You’re going to like us.”).
58 Christ Kjelgaard, New Terror Attack Could Be Costly for Airlines, NBC NEWS
(Aug. 30, 2007), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/20515498/ns/business-
us_business/t/new-terror-attack-could-be-costly-airlines/ [https://perma.cc/
WFK9-TZQX] (estimating another aviation attack would cost the airline industry
“anywhere from $214 billion to $420 billion”); Matthew Philips, Why Do Airlines
Always Lose Money? Hint: It’s Not Due to Taxes or Fuel Costs, FREAKONOMICS BLOG
(June 24, 2011, 12:01 PM), http://freakonomics.com/2011/06/24/why-do-air-
lines-always-lose-money-hint-its-not-due-to-taxes-or-fuel-costs/ [https://perma.cc/
C2TT-VMMV] (discussing the huge economic hit after the September 11 terror-
ist attacks which caused a low demand for air travel while the airlines refused to
raise flight prices to close the gap).
59 Alex Davies, Unruly Passengers Are Becoming A Serious Problem For Airlines, BUSI-
NESS INSIDER (Dec. 18, 2013, 11:31 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/unruly-
passengers-airlines-flight-rising-expensive-2013-12 [https://perma.cc/JJ3U-
79QW] (citing the Int’l Air Transp. Ass’n quoting the cost of defusing an unruly
passenger between $10,000 and $200,000); Fact Sheet: Unruly Passengers, INT’L AIR
TRANPS. ASS’N, https://www.iata.org/pressroom/facts_figures/fact_sheets/Docu-
ments/fact-sheet-unruly-passengers.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LN3-AFQQ] (“Un-
ruly passenger incidents . . . lead to significant operation disruption and costs for





ior include illegal consumption of narcotics, verbal and physical
confrontations with crew members or passengers, making
threats, sexual abuse or harassment, riotous behavior, and the
list goes on.61 The majority of these unruly incidents are related
to the passenger’s consumption of alcohol.62 These incidents
are unique in that cabin crew cannot call the authorities in-
flight for immediate assistance; this is one of the many reasons
crew members and airlines must put themselves in the best posi-
tion to prevent or mitigate these situations. Crew members are
alone in the air, and they are the sole authority. While airlines
train crews to deal with the situation in the air, it would be more
beneficial to them and their passengers if crew were never put
in that situation. A spokesperson for the House Transportation
Committee commented on the use of private contractors in avia-
tion security, stating “They exceed[ ] or provide[ ] the same
level of security as TSA screeners.”63 A dual program utilizing
advanced data screening and an in-airport system implemented
by individual airlines could provide crew and passengers such a
safe guard.
A. DATA “IS READY WHEN YOU ARE”64: RECOMMENDED USE OF
DATA
These days, companies now use big data to produce big re-
sults: hotels use it to identify bad weather and stranded travelers,
and then send targeted emails; pizza companies also detect bad
weather and power outage areas; and some retailers even use it
to determine when a shopper is likely pregnant.65 With such
amazing capabilities, how can airlines not use it for the safety of
their passengers and the protection of their companies? Big
61 INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N, GUIDANCE ON UNRULY PASSENGER PREVENTION AND
MANAGEMENT 13 (2d ed. 2015), available at https://www.iata.org/policy/Docu
ments/2015-Guidance-on-Unruly-Passenger-Prevention-and-Management.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5AVN-2YBZ].
62 Id. at 18.
63 Ron Nixon, New Law Clears the Way for Airports to Drop T.S.A. Screeners, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/us/airports-with-
new-law-are-freer-to-split-from-tsa.html [https://perma.cc/2QXG-ABRV].
64 Trademarks & Slogans, DELTA AIR LINES, INC., http://www.delta.com/
content/www/en_US/about-delta/corporate-information/trademarks-slogans.
html [https://perma.cc/3BMU-SKJP] (last visited July 8, 2017) (providing a list
of Delta’s slogans through their company’s history).
65 Chuck Schaeffer, 5 Retail Big Data Examples with Big Paybacks, CUSTOMER RE-
LATIONSHIP MGMT. SOFTWARE SOLUTIONS, http://www.crmsearch.com/retail-big-
data.php [https://perma.cc/QJA5-E3WN] (last visited July 8, 2017).
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data is “[e]xtremely large data sets that may be [analyzed] com-
putationally to reveal patterns, trends, and associations, espe-
cially relating to human [behavior] and interactions.”66 When
people or companies mention big data use, images of dystopian
societies and dehumanizing effects flash in people’s minds.
However, big data is not near as perverse as people imagine;
rather, it is the most effective solution for an ideal means of
travel.
Through commercial databases, airline carriers can cross-ref-
erence names, dates of birth, addresses, phone numbers, and
more to confirm a traveler’s identity,67 as well as identify poten-
tial security risks. Commercial data can then be used to inform
airlines of possible suspicious activity through alerts of suspi-
cious websites recently visited, unusual books purchased, erratic
spending habits (such as gun purchases, large qualities of am-
munition, unusual chemicals, etc.), length of residence,
whether a residence is owned or rented, key words from emails,
occupation, and so much more. For instance, data could have
flagged the recent Fort Lauderdale Airport shooter, who had
begun selling all his belongings, including big items like his
car.68 Airlines can even take into account whether a passenger
has gone through and been cleared by a trusted traveler pro-
gram or Pre-Check. With this information, airlines can do their
own security scans of checked bags, or perhaps code a person’s
boarding pass to alert gate agents to double check this passen-
ger’s person and carry-on. However, it is important to note this
66 Big data, ENGLISH OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddiction
aries.com/definition/big_data [https://perma.cc/7DET-D8PE] (last visited July
8, 2017).
67 Cristina, supra note 18, at 624; John Yoo, NSA Surveillance: Issues of Security,
Privacy and Civil Liberty: Article: The Legality of the National Security Agency’s Bulk Data
Surveillance Programs, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 301, 308 (2014) (“The
9/11 hijackers themselves provide an example . . . commercially available data
might have turned up ties between every single one of the al Qaeda plotters . . .
two hijackers [were] known to the CIA in the summer of 2001 to have been in
the country . . . [Two] had rented apartments in their own name[s] and were
listed in the San Diego phone book . . . Both [ ], the leader of the 9/11 al Qaeda
cell, and [another hijacker], who piloted on of the planes into the World Trade
Center, had lived there with them . . . [several] used the same frequent flier
number . . . five hijackers used the same phone number [ ] when booking their
flights; the remaining hijackers shared addresses or phone numbers with one of
[the] hijackers [ ] who was in the United States in violation of his visa at the
time.”).
68 Fort Lauderdale Airport Shooter Charged, Could Face Death Penalty, KTLA 5 (Jan.
7, 2017, 9:04 AM), http://ktla.com/2017/01/07/fort-lauderdale-airport-shooter-
came-here-specifically-to-attack-fbi-says/ [https://perma.cc/MC8J-982M].
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function and added safety measure is not meant to replace the
TSA with private airlines’ own version of security, nor is TSA
meant to rely on the airlines to alert them to potential danger-
ous passengers through their data. TSA should still continue
their normal performance of security, including their “random
screening, regardless of whether an alarm is triggered” by the
airlines.69 Private airline’s ability to screen all passengers against
commercial databases merely provides the industry an extra
layer of safety.
While TSA screens terrorist watch lists, it does not utilize crim-
inal records of local, state, and federal law enforcement agen-
cies; this is a disservice to airline security.70 While some of the
trusted traveler programs use it, the vast majority of people who
travel via airlines are not checked.71 Airlines checking their pas-
senger list against even basic police reports could be immensely
beneficial. Crimes such as public intoxication, disorderly con-
duct, sexual assault, indecent exposure, and battery could alert
the airlines enough to help them take small preventative mea-
sures against potential problems. For instance, if a cross-check
alerts the airline to a sex offender, and the offender’s seat is
slotted beside an unaccompanied minor or such, the airline
could reassign them to window seat or an emergency exit aisle
with the single seats. If a passenger has numerous instances of
public intoxications or disorderly conduct, a note could be
made on the steward’s manifests to be wary of passenger’s alco-
hol intake and mannerisms, so they may offer water and food
consumption to delay serving more alcohol. If air marshals are
on a particular flight, airlines could strategically seat them
amongst potential problem individuals. The use of public
69 Airport Screening Procedures, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., https://
www.dhs.gov/airport-screening-procedures [https://perma.cc/5D8H-CVLG].
70 Improving Pre-Screening of Aviation Passengers Against Terrorist and
Other Watch Lists: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Sec., Infrastructure
Prot., and Cybersecurity of the Comm. on Homeland Sec. House of Representa-
tives, 109th Cong. 78, 29 (2005) [hereinafter Watch Lists Hearings]; Cristina,
supra note 18, at 637–38 (“. . .CBP uses commercial and law enforcement data,
which domestic flights, through Secure Flight, expressly do not have congres-
sional authority to use.”).
71 This parallels nicely with the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under Rule 404(b),
a defendant’s past crimes, wrongs, or other acts can be admissible to prove “mo-
tive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mis-
take, or lack of accident.” Under Rules 413 and 414, past sexual assault or child
molestation charges can be brought in to show propensity. Finally, under Rule
609, an individual’s prior convictions may be introduced in court in order to
impeach their credibility. FED. R. EVID. 404(b), 413, 414, 609.
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records and other data could be extremely helpful in mitigating
potential safety issues in-flight or possible greater threats; with
data, airlines can “know why you fly.”72
B. “MUCH MORE THAN FLYING”73: PROPOSED IN-AIRPORT
RESPONSE SYSTEM
While this is in no way intended to supplant TSA security mea-
sures, added security measures could complement and aid the
government in their goal of a safer America. Many argue that
intelligence based screening is not as effective as physical secur-
ity measures and that data security alone is not sufficient.74 How-
ever, any singular system compounded with other security
measures could prove far more effective. Thus, a dual system
utilizing both data intelligence and physical security agents
could have impressive capabilities.
Upon arrival at Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Air-
port, a series of stanchions and ropes for crowd control were set
up in front of each airline’s check in counters. At the queue’s
entrance two podiums manned by security agents. As two
queues formed behind each podium, people would hand the
security guard their passport and be subjected to a series of
questions: “What are you traveling for today? . . . What was your
business in our country? . . . Oh, you studied abroad, what class
did you take? . . . Who was your professor?” Before a traveler
could even check-in for their flight, check their luggage, and
obtain a boarding pass, the traveler had to get past the first
round of security questions.75 This is not the only airport to im-
plement this type of security measure.76 Israeli airline, El Al, and
highly targeted Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport, are world re-
72 ERAUPRCWA, American Airlines-Home, YOUTUBE (Mar. 21, 2009), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=_rtpszbxaoE [https://perma.cc/MHG2-SQAB] (fea-
turing the advertisement with American Airline’s “We know why you fly” slogan).
73 aomd88, Iberia “Mucho ma´s que volar” (1994), YOUTUBE (June 10, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6iKF4UxIcX4 [https://perma.cc/YFD9-
9C7T] (playing an original 1994 Iberia Airlines commercial with their tagline
“Much more than flying”) (translated for effect).
74 Fiske, supra note 12, at 175, 179.
75 While being blessed with the opportunity to study abroad, the author exper-
ienced this layered security system. It struck the author as surprisingly effective
even at the time.
76 Daniel Wagner, What Israeli Airport Security Can Teach the World, HUFFINGTON
POST (May 17, 2014 8:19 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/
what-israeli-airport-secu_b_4978149.html [https://perma.cc/DAE2-YBA8].
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nowned for their aviation security.77 While some advanced tech-
nology is used, such as the use of pressure chambers to trigger
any possible explosive within checked baggage, ordinary metal
detectors are the standard practice for checking persons.78 Ac-
cordingly, the key to Israeli security does not lie solely in tech-
nology, but rather in the in-airport security guards. Highly
trained personnel focus on travelers’ behavioral cues, eye con-
tact, tone of voice, pace of speech, and other signals while ask-
ing specific inquiries.79 Israeli security is actually working on
creating a similar procedure through kiosks.80 These machines
would assess factors such as traveler’s body temperature, hearth
rate, and blood pressure while the traveler checks in.81 At some
point during the process, certain statements or questions would
be presented which would provoke a response from a guilty
party.82 That traveler could then be subject to a personal one-
on-one screening by an agent. There are some administrators
though who do not want to go this route, for they feel the key
component that makes Israeli security so infallible is the human
element.83
In a 2010 interview with the Cable News Network (CNN), the
former head of security for El Al, Isaac Yeffet, stated the key to
security is to “[s]top relying on technology.”84 He went on to
clarify that “ ‘[t]echnology can help the qualified, well-trained
human being but cannot replace him.’”85 El Al relies on a
unique, and quite controversial, method of passenger monitor-
ing: profiling.86 However, this is not the ugly, hate-based method









83 Wagner, supra note 76.
84 How the Israelis Do Airport Security, CNN (Jan. 11, 2010 5:06 PM), http://
www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/01/11/yeffet.air.security.israel/ [https://
perma.cc/8E3B-A3BU] [hereinafter Yeffet Interview].
85 Id.
86 Ralph Goodman, Guest Post: Why Israeli Airport Security is so Effective, ANNE’S
OPINIONS (Mar. 26, 2016), https://anneinpt.wordpress.com/2016/03/26/guest-
post-why-israeli-airport-security-is-so-effective/ [https://perma.cc/6XQ8-2974]
(last visited July 8, 2017); Palmer, supra note 80; Wagner, supra note 76.
87 Goodman, supra note 86.
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algorithmic process more in the realm of methods like Criminal
Minds and Lie to Me.88 Israel’s aviation security agents are excep-
tionally trained and profile with an eye more neutral and impar-
tial than the average citizen.89 Yeffet demonstrated with the
2002 shoe bomber, “[He] got a British passport in Belgium, not
[ ] England . . . he bought a one-way ticket from Paris to Florida.
He paid cash. He came to the airport with no luggage. What else
do I need to know that this passenger is suspicious?”90 While
hindsight is twenty-twenty, this type of profiling awareness has
proven successful for El Al in real time. This process is done
through questioning every passenger by well-educated, multil-
ingual, and highly trained agents.91 Before any preconceived no-
tions form, agents objectively question passengers and perceive
through their answers and actions whether more screening is
necessary.92 El Al also constantly tests its security measures, and
if a false risk gets past the security agent, they are fired immedi-
ately—for in this line of work, a failure is costly.93 This type of
screening, which gets more rigorous the closer you get to the
plane, could also help airlines watch for overly intoxicated pas-
sengers who could cause problems once in the air.94
But physical procedures do not just stop at questioning. As
mentioned, pressure chambers ensure that checked baggage is
free from pressurized explosives.95 Some have recommended
implementing canine teams into the screening process.96 Dogs
have been aiding and saving their best friends for decades. Law
enforcement agencies have employed the help of canine units
for over a century, and military forces benefited from their help
88 Id.; Criminal Minds: About Criminal Minds, CBS, http://www.cbs.com/shows/
criminal_minds/about/ [https://perma.cc/J7Y9-474Y] (last visited July 8, 2017);
Lie to Me, FOX, 2009–2011 http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1235099/ [https://
perma.cc/Y6FP-GSCB] (last visited July 8, 2017).
89 Goodman, supra note 86; Wagner, supra note 76.




94 Palmer, supra note 80 (“Officials think of passengers as passing through a
series of concentric circles, with increasing scrutiny as they get closer to boarding
the plane.”); Wagner, supra note 76 (citing official’s belief of a circular security
system with increasing intensity the closer a passenger gets to the plane).
95 Wagner, supra note 76.
96 Katherine A. Lowe, Comment, Safety in the Sky: Will Reforming and Restructur-
ing the TSA Improve Our Security or Merely Infringe On Our Rights?, 81 J. AIR L. &
COM. 291, 306–07 (2016).
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in several wars.97 Canine teams have proven to be a highly effec-
tive means for the detection of explosives and accelerants.98
Airlines could also implement more stringent requirements
for individuals who check firearms. When attending any Texas
gun show, before entering the lobby to get tickets, individuals
encounter a large pavilion with a tables where individuals check
and secure all guns. Attendants ensure all firearms are unloaded
and zip-tie the sliding mechanism, revolver chamber, or bolt ac-
tion down to render the firearm inoperable.99 Shows also re-
quire all ammunition be in sealed containers.100 In the
commercial aviation environment, this same process could be
implemented before checked firearms get stored in cargo. Fur-
thermore, checked items that are inherently dangerous in gen-
eral could have a separate pick up location away from the main
baggage claim areas. While airports still have large expanses of
unsecured, public areas, a minor change such as this could pre-
vent tragedies similar to the recent Fort Lauderdale incident.101
Further, security officers could be placed strategically in public
areas to patrol and ensure safety.102 This could be as simple as
inquiring with the local police department if any off-duty police
officers want to pick up a part-time shift.103 While some of these
suggestions seem relatively simple, they could have a huge im-
pact on aviation security as a whole.
97 Police Canines in History, DOGS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (2013), http://
www.dogsforlawenforcement.org/police-canines-in-history.html [https://
perma.cc/35RN-R58W] (last visited July 8, 2017).
98 Id.; see also Lowe, supra note 96, at 306–07.




101 Catherine E. Shoichet et al., Fort Lauderdale Airport Suspect ‘Came Here Specifi-
cally’ to Attack, FBI Says, CNN (Jan. 7, 2017, 1:01 pm), http://www.cnn.com/
2017/01/06/US/fort-lauderdale-airport-incident/ [https://perma.cc/DC3X-MA
4U].
102 Palmer, supra note 80; Wagner, supra note 76 (“Armed security personnel
patrol the terminal.”).
103 The author’s father was a police officer for over thirty-five years, and he
worked a part time job through the department as security for a movie theater on
Friday and Saturday nights.
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IV. “DEFY OBSTACLES”104: THE FEASIBILITY OF THE
PROPOSED SECURITY SYSTEM
While the best laid plans sound fantastic in theory, the practi-
cality of a strategy always needs to be assessed with a skeptical
and realistic view. Three chief concerns arise with the imple-
mentation of such a program: cost, coverage, and constitutional-
ity. However, these concerns are manageable when structuring
this program through the correct scope.
From the airline’s perspectives, the first natural worry is po-
tential efficiency scarifies in implementing and screening all pas-
sengers without delay. One of the core focuses of major airlines
is what is classified as “D0.”105 D0 is the goal of a plane’s esti-
mated departure being exactly on time.106 An airline’s mission is
to be exactly within their projected departure and arrival times,
for every minute is money.107 In 2015, the cost of a U.S. airline
delay was $65.43 per minute.108 So, when it comes to extensive
security measures, it is natural for airlines to be uneasy about
the possibility of delays due to the number of passengers they
transport. A common misconception is that only small airlines
can implement such extensive security, which is why El Al is so
successful.109 This paints an incorrect image in people’s minds
of El Al being a tiny airline, yet the Israeli airline transported
nearly five million passengers in 2015.110 In forty years, El Al has
104 Rick Seaney, If Presidential Candidates Adopted Airline Slogans, ABC NEWS
(Oct. 12, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Travel/presidential-candidates-adopted
-airline-slogans/story?id=17452000 [https://perma.cc/JZ8U-AYLE] (using Air
Canada’s “Defy Obstacles” slogan as an example).
105 Terry Maxon, American Airlines Group to Pay Employee Bonuses if American, US




106 Roseflyer, Airlines Definition of On-time in Various Places?, AIRLINERS.NET
(2012), http://www.airliners.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=535365#p7282059
[https://perma.cc/9DX6-72WG].
107 U.S. Passenger Carrier Delay Costs, AIRLINES FOR AMERICA (2015), http://air
lines.org/dataset/per-minute-cost-of-delays-to-u-s-airlines/ [https://perma.cc/Z9
XZ-R8TH] (last visited July 8, 2017).
108 Id.
109 von Rochow-Leuschner, supra note 23, at 141 (arguing “. . . American flag
carriers transport more people in two days than El Al does in a year.”).
110 El Al Israel Airlines Rebounds in $106 Million 2015 Net Profit, TRAVEL WORLD




not had one aviation tragedy nor any significant delays.111 Yeffet
even confirmed that if a passenger is not a threat, it will not take
trained personnel long to determine that—usually with just a
few questions.112 When flying out of England, while passengers
might be asked questions by several security agents, the process
only takes about five minutes. With most airlines recommending
passengers show up to the airport up to two hours before take-
off, passengers have plenty of time to answer a few questions and
still get to their gate with plenty of time to spare.113
The next fear, no doubt, would be the monetary aspect. While
airlines are profit-driven businesses, the misguided argument
that they have a “strong incentive to provide the most minimal
security possible”114 ignores the toll that security attacks and un-
ruly passengers take on airlines’ profit. After the 9/11 attacks, in
the first week alone, U.S. airlines were estimated to have lost
between one and two billion dollars in revenue.115 When consid-
ering the potential liabilities, $18,000 to fund a canine team
does not seem as excessive.116 The safety and security of passen-
gers has a direct effect on airline’s prosperity. U.S. carriers
should do all they can to aid TSA for the safety of the nation and
the security of their industry.117 As Yeffet stated so eloquently, “It
costs money, but once you save lives, it’s worth all the money
. . . .”118
111 Yeffet Interview, supra note 84.
112 Id.
113 Check-in and Arrival Times, AMERICAN AIRLINES, https://www.aa.com/i18n/
travel-info/arrival-times.jsp [https://perma.cc/X5YM-C37B] (last visited July 8,
2017) (asking passengers arrive “as early as possible” but at least two hours
before, “especially if [their] checking bags”); Check-In Requirements, DELTA AIR
LINES, INC., http://www.delta.com/content/www/en_US/traveling-with-us/
check-in/requirements.html [https://perma.cc/CQH5-JXNU] (last visited July
8, 2017) (stating “The early bird catches the plane” but states under the “Overall
Requirements” section travelers should arrive “at the airport [ two] hours prior to
departure when traveling within the United States . . .”); Check-in and Airport
Processing Times, UNITED AIRLINES, INC., https://www.united.com/web/en-US/
content/travel/airport/process/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/4Q39-HHWA]
(last visited July 8, 2017) (providing travelers with a chart recommending arrival
time based on where their destination is).
114 Fiske, supra note 12, at 181.
115 Naveen Kumar et al., The Economic Impact of September 11, 2001 on the Aviation
Industry, GLOBAL TRADE, TRANSP., & LOGISTICS 1, 2 (Jul. 13, 2003), http://
citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.203.1445&rep=rep1&type
=pdf.
116 Lowe, supra note 96, at 307.
117 Id. at 315.
118 Yeffet Interview, supra note 84.
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V. “A SYMBOL OF FREEDOM”119: THE LEGALITY OF THE
RECOMMENDED SCHEME
But under this proposed system, might airlines open them-
selves up to the ultimate lawsuit, violating the laws of this great
nation? Airlines already fight numerous safety-related law-
suits,120 and some are even still struggling with litigation arising
from the 9/11 attacks.121 As with the CAPPS programs, it seems
the most pressing concerns would be the plan’s legality under
privacy laws and its constitutionality under certain amendments.
Yet, this proposed system does not involve the government, so it
will not be subject to the Constitution’s privacy constraints.122
However, even if some governmental connection was found,
these security procedures are still constitutional and protect in-
dividual liberties due to the system’s lack of deprivation without
process and the aviation industry’s authority under legislative
statute.
A. “FLY THE AMERICAN WAY”123: CONSTITUTIONALITY REQUIRES
STATE ACTION
When an American is deprived of any form of life, liberty, or
property, the rallying cry always tends to be, “This is unconstitu-
tional!” However, in order to invoke the Constitution, the viola-
119 Video Archeology, 1999 - Commercial - Southwest Airlines - A Symbol of Freedom -
1-800-I-FLY-SWA, YOUTUBE (Apr. 20, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=YKlUpV7LX6U [https://perma.cc/63XC-L5BR] (ending the video with
Southwest Airline’s slogan at the time “A Symbol of Freedom”).
120 Unruly Passengers, supra note 59.
121 Justin Bachman, Why Two Airlines Are Still Fighting 9/11 Lawsuits, BLOOM-
BERG (July 19, 2013, 3:16 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-
07-19/why-two-airlines-are-still-fighting-9-11-lawsuits [https://perma.cc/U3K9-
M4K4].
122 Since this program does not trigger constitutional requirements, because of
lack of government involvement, the individual analysis of this program under
the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments are extraneous and beyond the
scope of this article.




repositoryId=undefined [https://perma.cc/QC6N-6VBT] (last visited July 8,
2017); see also The Brar’s, American Airlines-Fly The American Way Commercial,
YOUTUBE (July 4, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cb7qEuJcYrk
[https://perma.cc/PPU2-V5WW] (showcasing American Airline’s past slogan




tion needs to be committed by either the government itself or a
private company acting as an extension of the government, also
known as “state action.”124 In this proposed system, the airline
carriers on their face are private entities that cannot violate the
Constitution, for the document does not reach to private acts of
discrimination.125 The U.S. Supreme Court has carved out two
exceptions where private entities are liable for acting under the
power of the government, the public function exception and
the significant state involvement exception.126
1. “Going Beyond Expectations”:127 The Public Function
Exception
In the first exception, the Court held that where a private en-
tity takes on all the accoutrements of the state and undertakes a
public function, the entity is deemed to be an extension of the
government and is susceptible to constitutional liability.128 How-
ever, this does not mean businesses that are open for public
benefit are automatically liable. Rather, corporations are ac-
countable when they adopt functions which are “traditionally
exclusively reserved to the State.”129 Not only has the govern-
ment never run an air carrier business, the public function ex-
ception has been effectively rendered dead, and courts regularly
avoid applying it.130 So this exception would not pose a prob-
124 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“It is State action of a particu-
lar character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the
subject-matter of the amendment.”).
125 Id.
126 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961);
Marsh v Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
127 S. Jayasankaran, Malaysain Airline Launches Campaign as Firm Recovers, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2002, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB103894404938
5669033 [https://perma.cc/YNA2-G4YZ].
128 Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506 (holding when private “facilities are built and oper-
ated primarily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a pub-
lic function, it is subject to state regulation.”).
129 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
130 Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978) (holding that “a State’s
mere acquiescence in a private action” does not convert that into state action);
Hudgens v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507, 517 (1976) (holding a pri-
vate shopping mall was not subject to the Constitution because it did not fit the
public function test); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350 (holding the mere fact a “business is
subject to extensive state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that
of the state for purposes of [The Constitution].”); Gonza´lez-Maldonado v. MMM
Healthcare, Inc., 693 F.3d 244, 248 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Governments often do pro-
vide healthcare . . . but the public function exception applies to ‘traditionally
exclusively’ public functions. Thus, running a utility company, or running a
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lem, for courts would be unlikely to apply it in any situation,
including this system.
2. “Fly with Friends”131: Significant State Involvement Exception
The second possible exception that triggers constitutional lia-
bility is the significant state involvement doctrine.132 Where a
private entity is using the state in order to enforce their discrimi-
natory action, the court can find that private company liable.133
Yet, this comment’s proposed security system does not rely on
any action by the state or government enforcement. Addition-
ally, even extensive regulation, such as the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration’s (FAA) directives to the airline industry, does not
impart state action on a private entity.134 Thus, due to there be-
ing no “state action,” airline carriers would not be bound by the
Constitution.
3. “Something Special in the Air”135: Not TSA’s Private Program
Offering
As stated previously, this program is not supposed to replace
or work under the discretion of TSA. TSA does currently have a
government allowance titled the “Screening Partnership Pro-
gram.”136 Under this program, an airport can elect, with the ap-
proval of TSA, to privatize their security screening.137 However,
school, do not qualify. Neither does operating a [heath management
organization].”).




(last visited July 8, 2017).
132 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
133 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259–60 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948).
134 Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350–51.
135 GloopTrekker, American Airlines Commercial - 1990, YOUTUBE (Mar. 29,
2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JG_1psnyxB4 [https://perma.cc/
YVC2-M9JQ] (featuring American Airlines’ slogan “Something special in the
air.”); see also 80stvthemes, American Airlines Something Special in the Air 1984
Commercial, YOUTUBE (May 4, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=afy4
RuOmDG0 [https://perma.cc/Z9Q3-RYTZ].
136 Screening Partnership Program, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/for-
industry/screening-partnerships [https://perma.cc/8ET6-WUB2] (last visited
July 8, 2017).
137 Id.; Airports Who Opt Out of TSA Screening are Still Regulated by TSA, TSA BLOG
(Nov. 19, 2010), http://blog.tsa.gov/2010/11/airports-who-opt-out-of-tsa-screen
ing.html [https://perma.cc/Z3JV-YVSQ].
2017] COMMENT 421
despite the security checkpoints being managed by a private se-
curity company, the procedures and techniques are still regu-
lated and controlled by TSA, all the way down to the
technology.138
Under this program, TSA still controls the system in its en-
tirety; the only delegation is the daily passenger screening.139
TSA does not allow an airport to just privatize portions of the
security system; it is an all or nothing approach.140 Additionally,
TSA has only approved certain private security vendors for air-
ports to use and will not approve an airport’s choice of security
firm unless it “determines that there is a need to add additional
vendors to the current . . . [p]rogram . . . .”141 These private
security companies’ employees are also trained at the TSA Acad-
emy in Glynco, Georgia, before receiving employment at an air-
port for aviation security,142 and they are to earn similar wages
and benefits as a normal TSA agent.143 The worst feature of this
government controlled program is airports cannot increase
number of screeners or staff to make the security process more
efficient or quicker because TSA controls the amount of agents
in the contract with the security firm.144
Regrettably, TSA has also been criticized for making the shift
to private screeners arduous on airports, resulting from a
lengthy application process, lack of the airport’s control in the
contract development, absence of information about the transi-
tion process, and regular denial of applications.145 Since TSA
itself reviews the applications, the agency only approves an air-
138 Screening Partnership Program, supra note 136; Airports Who Opt out of TSA
Screening are Still Regulated by TSA, supra note 137.
139 Screening Partnership Program, supra note 136.
140 Id. (under “Can an airport authority apply to use contract screeners at some
airport security checkpoints but not all; a partial opt-out?” question heading)
(“TSA will not accept applications to privatize a portion of an airport’s security




143 Justin Bachman, More Airports May Ditch the TSA and Use Private Security In-
stead, SKIFT (May 27, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://skift.com/2016/05/27/more-air
ports-may-ditch-the-tsa-and-use-private-security-instead/ [https://perma.cc/ZC89
-3XW5]; see also Justin Bachman, How Airports Can Get Rid of TSA Screeners, BLOOM-
BERG (May 27, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2016-05-27/how-airports-can-get-rid-of-tsa-screeners [https://perma.cc/85VV-
2QPT].
144 Bachman, Airports May Ditch TSA, supra note 143.
145 Id.
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port’s request for privately controlled security when “a clear and
substantial advantage to [switch private screeners for govern-
ment agents] emerges.”146 Thus, under this system, airport se-
curity, even privatized, is clearly state action and not truly under
the control of the airports or airlines. The proposed system is in
addition to and separate from government regulation in order
to give airlines better control over the safety of their planes and
passengers.
4.  “To fly. To Serve.”147: Even if Courts Found State Action, The
Program is Still Constitutional
However, even if state action could be found, or TSA is some-
how involved, this program would still not run afoul of the con-
stitution for several reasons. First, while the U.S. Supreme Court
has found the right to travel fundamental,148 it has not found
the right to a specific mode of transportation.149 Thus, to avoid
the system, travelers merely choose a different method of travel-
ing. Additionally, while one issue with CAPPS was the depriva-
tion of traveler’s rights due to banning them from all flights
without redress, this system does not infringe the liberty interest
of international flights or the property interest from contracting
to fly with the air carrier.150 This proposed system does not arbi-
trarily ban a passenger based on data alone; rather, data’s role
simply alerts the airlines to potential for additional screening, a
possible seat change, or a monitoring of alcohol intake. If upon
in-airport questioning the airline realizes a passenger is belliger-
ently drunk or is concerned about a safety issue, the carrier can
bump the passenger to the next flight while they sober up, or
cut off alcohol intake. If safety is a concern, airlines have a spe-
cial authority under law to deny travelers passage.151
146 Brian Finch & David Inserra, Airports are Fed Up with the TSA. Here’s Why it
will be Hard to Break Up with Them, FOX NEWS (May 19, 2016), http://
www.foxnews.com/opinion/2016/05/19/airports-are-fed-up-with-tsa-heres-why-
it-will-be-hard-to-break-up-with-them.html [https://perma.cc/SA97-TNBZ].
147 British Airways, Aviators, British Airways to Fly to Serve, YOUTUBE (Sept. 22,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A4JdQi60an0 [https://perma.cc/
S2UR-6R2A] (promoting British Airways’ slogan “To Fly. To Serve.”).
148 United States v. Guest 383 U.S. 745, 760 (1966); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116, 125 (1958); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1868).
149 Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006); Miller v. Reed,
176 F.3d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1999).
150 Kite, supra note 16, at 1414, 1417–18.
151 49 U.S.C. § 44902 (allowing airlines to refuse service to travelers who “is or
might be inimical to safety”) (emphasis added).
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Under this system, airlines are not conducting searches at the
behest of the government or in conjunction with authorities.152
And, while investigating and interrogating potential sources of
peril is typically a function of government enforcement agen-
cies, courts have held that corporation jobs that investigate the
possibility of crime are not transformed automatically into gov-
ernment actors.153 Similar to how courts found a college cam-
pus, a bank, a racetrack, and an amusement park security system
not to be state action, the airline’s security measures would also
be advancing the interest of the private companies rather than
the government’s interest.154 Moreover, courts have found pri-
vate individuals acting to protect their “financial interest and not
to vindicate the interest of the state” are assuredly not govern-
ment actors subject to the Constitution.155 It is when the govern-
ment takes an active role, establishing control over an entity and
taking responsibility for them, that protection under the Consti-
tution is warranted.156 This security system is not a joint action
with the government or its agents. Rather these are private enti-
152 DeGrave, supra note 17, at 137 (“Administrative searches conducted by the
airlines are considered state action because they are done at the request of the
government. Unlike police searches, administrative searches do not result from a
suspicion of criminal activity, past or present.”).
153 Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1457 (10th Cir.
1995) (a college campus’ security measures were not deemed to be a state func-
tion); United States v. Garlock, 19 F.3d 441, 443–44 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding the
banks’ investigation of disappearance of money was not state action and thus was
not subject to constitutional liability); United States v. Francoeur, 547 F.2d 891,
893–94 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding the amusement park security’s search would
have violated plaintiff’s rights if it had been done by government actors, but the
search does not violate constitutional rights here because it was a private search
conducted for “purely private reasons”); United States v. Maxwell, 484 F.2d 1350,
1352 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding “the fourth amendment [sic] does not apply to
searches and seizures conducted by private parties.”); Minnesota v. Buswell, 460
N.W.2d 614, 619–20 (Minn. 1990) (holding when the government’s involvement
of racetrack security “amounts to no more than responding to requests for arrest”
the constitution and the Fourth Amendment are not triggered).
154 Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1457; Garlock, 19 F.3d at 443–44; Francoeor, 547 F.2d at
893; Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 619–20; Maxwell, 484 F.2d at 1352; Nicholas Poppe,
Discriminatory Deplaning: Aviation Security and The Constitution, 79 J. AIR. L. & COM.
113, 133 (2014).
155 People v. Houle, 91 Cal. Rptr. 874, 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that a
bondsman who seized and arrested the defendant, for being in possession of
drugs, was lawful due to the bondsman protecting his own private interests) (em-
phasis added).
156 Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1457; Garlock, 19 F.3d at 443–44; Francoeor, 547 F.2d at
893; Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 619–20; Maxwell, 484 F.2d at 1352; Poppe, supra note
154.
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ties, the airlines, protecting their own private financial and
safety interests, as well as their passengers’ interest.157
Significantly, immunity from the constitution due to being
private actors holds true “even when the government requires
[ ] certain security measures be taken.”158 So despite airlines be-
ing regulated by the FAA, and given certain security protocol by
other government agencies, security agents would still have the
ability to search passengers and their carry-ons without incur-
ring constitutional liability. Equally distinguishable, the federal
government provides statutory authority to all air carriers to re-
fuse service to passengers, or their property, who “is, or might be,
inimical to safety.”159 Thus, an airline not required to adopt se-
curity, exerting its statutory authority and not implicating the
government in the process, is safe from the Fourth Amendment
and constitutional liability.160
5. “Up[,] Up[,] and Away”161: Airline’s Security Measures are
Protected Under Statute
Apart from the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment,
there is still the fear of discrimination rearing its ugly head, es-
pecially in the light of America’s current cultural tensions.162
Under 49 U.S.C. § 44902, can airlines refuse passengers under
the justification that their race is deemed to be inimical to
safety? Despite the wide latitude given to air carriers in regard to
their power of refusal,163 the same law still respects America’s
core values and protects individuals from discrimination.164
157 Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1457; Garlock, 19 F.3d at 443–44; Francoeur, 547 F.2d at
893–94; Maxwell, 484 F.2d at 1352; Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 619–20.
158 Garlock, 19 F.3d at 444; State v. Sanders, 448 A.2d 481, 486 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1982) (holding that while the government requires casinos to “establish
detailed security procedures,” casino security guards still have the ability to be-
have in a quasi-police manner without government liability.).
159 49 U.S.C. § 44902 (2012) (emphasis added).
160 Poppe, supra note 154, at 134; see also Ibrahim v. U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec.,
538 F.3d 1250, 1257 (9th Cir. 2008).
161 RCA Corp., Photograph of Record Cover, TWA (Trans World Airlines), Up Up
and Away with Arthur Fiedler and the Boston Pops, AVIATION MUSEUM & LIBR.
COLLECTION http://www.flysfo.com/museum/aviation-museum-library/collec
tion/14110 [https://perma.cc/FN36-VM45] (last visited July 8, 2017).
162 Genevieve Wood, Why Has America Become a Fractured Republic? Yuval Levin
Explains., DAILY SIGNAL (June 21, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/2016/06/21/
why-has-america-become-a-fractured-republic-yuval-levin-explains/ [https://
perma.cc/JW8P-8TS2].
163 49 U.S.C. § 44902 (2012).
164 § 40127 (“Prohibitions on discrimination”).
2017] COMMENT 425
While the in-airport response system promotes objective as-
sessments of each person, this calculation is based on a person’s
conduct, traveling methods, data flags, and more. This security
judgment though is not based on race, national origin, or such
factors. Airlines are prohibited from subjecting a passenger “to
discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, relig-
ion, sex, or ancestry.”165 The statute does not give airlines carte
blanche to discriminate; courts have clarified the protection that
is provided under these statutes for the carriers and for the indi-
viduals. While § 44902 provides airlines with broad discretion on
what they deem safety issues, this power is not absolute.166 The
airline’s discretionary authority “under § 44902 is not ‘a license
to discriminate.’”167 A decision to not transport a passenger due
to safety concerns must be based on a rational belief and exer-
cised in good faith,168 and thus the decision is not a subjective
one. Objectively, courts have held that airlines cannot be held
liable for their decisions based on hindsight; the decision must
be assessed as reasonable “in light of th[e] facts and circum-
stances” at the time the opinion was formed.169 If the decision is
found to have been “arbitrary and capricious,” the airline is sub-
ject to lability,170 and a multitude of courts hold actions moti-
vated by race or religious animus are inherently arbitrary and
capricious.171 Prejudice and discrimination can never be legiti-
mate nor does it bear any relation to preserving safe skies.172
165 Id.
166 Dasrath v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 2d 431, 443 (D.N.J. 2006).
167 Adams v. U.S. Airways Group, 978 F. Supp. 2d 485, 499 (E.D. Pa. 2013)
(quoting Bayaa v. United Airlines, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1205 (C.D. Cal.
2002)); see also Alshrafi v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 150, 162 (D. Mass.
2004) (quoting Bayaa, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 1205).
168 Dasrath, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 444.
169 Al-Watan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 2d 816, 824 (E.D. Mich. 2009);
Dasrath, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 444; Al-Qudhai’Een v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 267 F.
Supp. 2d 841, 846 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
170 Adams, 978 F. Supp. 2d at 495; Al-Watan, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 825; Al-Tawan v.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Cerqueira v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 520 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2008); Dasrath, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 434; Ruta
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 391, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Alshrafi, 321 F.
Supp. 2d at 162; Al-Quadhai’Een, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 846.
171 Adams, 978 F. Supp. 2d at 495; Al-Watan, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 825; Al-Tawan,
570 F. Supp. 2d at 931; Cerqueira, 520 F.3d at 14; Dasrath, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 434;
Ruta, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 397; Alshrafi, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 162; Al-Quadhai’Een, 267
F. Supp. 2d at 846.
172 Alshrafi, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 162.
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B. “NEVER FORGET YOU HAVE A CHOICE”173: THE PRIVACY OF A
PERSON’S DATA
Big data is making its way into every field and industry, for it
possesses a way for massive amounts of information to be ana-
lyzed, revealing certain trends and patterns about individuals.
This is done through a process called data mining.174 However,
while big data seems to bring concerns of privacy and data accu-
racy, Americans tend to give their data away like candy for com-
panies like LexisNexis, Oracle, or eBureau to scarf up and offer
to businesses.175 But, the question is still posed, if airlines use
this same tactic but for security purposes, would it be violating
individuals’ privacy?
While airlines are private and not held subject to the Constitu-
tion because there is no state action present, the document
which is the foundation for this country is an excellent starting
point for legal analysis. The Fourth Amendment protects indi-
viduals from unreasonable searches in matters where an individ-
ual has a subjective expectation of privacy which society would
recognize as a legitimate expectation.176 Courts have held fur-
ther that the government cannot create or eliminate privacy ex-
pectations.177 Airlines could not merely disclose what they are
going to search in order to destroy a customer’s expectation of
privacy.178 However, courts have also held what a “person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
173 Traveling Sardar, British Caledonian-We Never Forget You Have a Choice.,
YOUTUBE (Dec. 12, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L32diN0xxO4
[https://perma.cc/YDN7-SCMJ] (advertising British Caledonian’s slogan “We
never forget you have a choice”); see also Video Archeology6, Commercial - British
Caledonian Airlines - We Never Forget You Have a Choice. - Caledonian Girls!, YOUTUBE
(June 9, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pzgEy9WPgrY [https://per
ma.cc/WSH8-R7F4].
174 Data Mining Concepts, ORACLE: HELP CENTER, https://docs.oracle.com/cd/
B28359_01/datamine.111/b28129/process.htm#DMCON002 [https://perma.
cc/8PR7-C7Q9] (last visited July 8, 2017); Anita Ramasastry, Lost in Translation?
Data Mining, National Security and the “Adverse Inference” Problem, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 757, 767 (2006).
175 Isaac, supra note 38, at 1062; EBUREAU, http://www.ebureau.com [https://
perma.cc/7T5D-DJNA] (last visited July 8, 2017); Data Management, LEXISNEXIS
RISK SOLUTIONS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/risk/data-management/ [https://
perma.cc/4SNN-8X9W] (last visited July 8, 2017); Data Mining Concepts, supra
note 175.
176 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
177 von Rochow-Leuschner, supra note 23, at 157.
178 Id.
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not [ ] subject [to] protection.”179 Even when an individual gives
a third party information “for a limited purpose and [in] confi-
dence,” this information is no longer deemed private.180 Para-
doxically though, in order to function in today’s modern
society, divulging personal information is practically
mandatory.181
Amazon uses customer data to make recommendations, iden-
tify buyer preferences, and improve customer service.182 Ameri-
can Express and Capital One use data to predict consumer
behavior and spending habits, to recognize identity theft, and to
retain customers.183 Netflix analyzes streaming habit of individu-
als to recommend programs and determine preferences of en-
tire demographics and even countries.184 Starbucks determines
the success of a potential new store location by assessing traffic,
demographics, and consumer data in that location.185 But big
179 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44
(1979) (holding “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in informa-
tion he voluntarily turns over to third parties,” and thus there is no expectation
of privacy when dialing phone numbers because the number is automatically
turned over to phone company for dialing and billing), partly overruled by statute
18 U.S.C. § 3121(a); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (“checks
. . . contain only information voluntarily conveyed . . . in the ordinary course of
business”), subsequent statute fills in gaps of holding does not overrule; Quon v. Arch
Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v.
Hernandez, 313 F.3d 1206, 1209–10 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A]s with the phone num-
bers they dial, individuals do not enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in
what they write on the outside of an envelope.”); United States v. Choate, 576
F.2d 165, 182 (9th Cir. 1978) (“The information on the outside of envelopes and
packages normally passes through so many hands, public and private, that a mail
cover cannot be said to invade any constitutionally protected zone of privacy.”),
rev’d on other grounds, 560 U.S. 746 (2010); United States v. Springer, 58 M.J. 164,
168 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (quoting Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 72, 733 (1877)) (“[N]o
reasonable expectation of privacy exists in the information visible on the outside
of an envelope. ‘Letters and sealed packages are as fully guarded from examina-
tion and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, . . .’” (emphasis in
original)).
180 Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (citing SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735,
745 n.15 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-1383, p. 34 (1978) (“the purpose of the statute
is to fill the gap left by the ruling in Miller that a bank customer has ‘no standing
under the Constitution to contest Government access to financial records.’”))).
181 Isaac, supra note 38, at 1083 (citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 451).
182 Ramasastry, supra note 175, at 768; Eleanor O’Neill, 10 Companies That Are
Using Big Data, CA TODAY (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.icas.com/ca-today-news/
10-companies-using-big-data [https://perma.cc/XGH7-JZ2M].
183 Ramasastry, supra note 175, at 768; O’Neill, supra note 183.
184 Ramasastry, supra note 175, at 768; O’Neill, supra note 183.
185 Ramasastry, supra note 175, at 768; O’Neill, supra note 183; 5 Companies
Using Big Data Management to Fuel Their Marketing, REACHFORCE (Jan. 6, 2016),
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data is not just for large corporations. Any website a person visits
can pull detailed information about that individual.186 Private
companies have used data for years to exploit consumer im-
pulse.187 Instead of using data to just “maximize profit and [ ]
improve consumer experience,”188 airlines can use big data to
monitor patterns, behaviors, and purchases to improve aviation
safety. Individuals have already disclosed this information to a
multitude of companies who are using it, so the information is
no longer deemed private under United States law. Plus, airlines
are in the unique position to collect their own information from
citizens of many countries. A large issue with the CAPPS and
TSA Pre-Check programs are other nation’s privacy laws.189 For
example, the European Union has stricter privacy laws than the
United States.190 But with loyalty programs, international credit
cards services, and contracts with other travel arrangement com-
panies, air carriers already have a large source of data that is
structured around compliance with all other countries’ laws and
with the passengers they transport.
Another fear is the accuracy of these data sets. Commercial
data, input by humans, may contain errors, which would cause
passengers to get flagged without concrete grounds.191 Some
have warned even “‘law enforcement data should be used with
caution . . . because data may be incomplete or inaccurate.’”192
However, unlike the government’s programs, the airlines’ secur-
ity systems would not flag and code passengers as not allowed to
fly.193 Under the proposed system, a data irregularity simply
means a few more questions at the airport and a double screen
http://www.reachforce.com/blog/5-companies-using-big-data-management-to-
fuel-their-marketing/ [https://perma.cc/8NQ9-49ZT].
186 Isaac, supra note 38, at 1088–89; see also Yoo, supra note 67, at 325.
187 Isaac, supra note 38, at 1057–58.
188 Ramasastry, supra note 175, at 758.
189 Cristina, supra note 18, at 628.
190 Id.
191 Ramasastry, supra note 175, at 760.
192 James Fisher, Comment, What Prices Does Society Have to Pay for Security? A
Look at the Aviation Watch Lists, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 573, 578 (2008) (quoting
Al Gore et al., White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security Final
Report to President Clinton 3.19 (Feb. 12, 1997), available at https://fas.org/irp/
threat/212fin~1.html [https://perma.cc/8BLT-M5TA]).
193 Kite, supra note 16, at 1398–99 (noting under the CAPPS II system, passen-
gers who are “[r]ed-coded . . . will be barred from boarding the plane[, and
a]dditionally, . . . TSA will hand the names of the red-coded passengers over to
appropriate law enforcement officials, thus subjecting the passengers to police
questioning and possible arrest.”).
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of the passenger’s bag. There is no data error under this system
that could stop a passenger from traveling without further scru-
tiny. An additional concern based on faulty or triggering data is
its ability to actually alert airlines of a safety concern. Several
people have expressed concern that after frequent travelers or
terrorists have experienced the system, they can trick the data to
bypass and fail to flag them.194 However, individuals’ commer-
cial data is constantly being updated through their own ac-
tions.195 Furthermore, this fails to recognize that people cannot
evade detection because the proposed system is two-part. Every
passenger is subject to questions, dogs walk around all bags, and
everyone’s behavior is monitored and analyzed. Data is just a
tool to aid the in-airport check and on board passenger manage-
ment. Data checks are not a stand-alone, fail proof system but
rather a tool in a symbiotic relationship. Moreover, unlike the
federal system, which provides no real redress or ways to correct
bad information, airlines can add to their own data sets when
passengers clear their name. For instance, travelers who get pre-
check approval, or have occupations that require rigorous back-
ground checks (such a military, law enforcement, teachers, bar
admission, etc.), can share the extensive informational findings
with airlines, allowing them to further clear the passengers in
their security processes.
VI. “SINCERELY YOURS, . . .”196: CONCLUSION
Despite all the government does to protect this great nation
and aid the airline industry, sadly, it is not enough. Airlines are
hemorrhaging money out of safety litigation, disruptive passen-
ger incidents, and terrorist occurrences.197 The current, jet-
194 Fisher, supra note 193, at 581; Ramasastry, supra note 175, at 771.
195 Jaykishan Panchal, Stay in the Know: How to Keep Up with Digital Marketing
Trends, BUSINESS.COM (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.business.com/online-marketing
/how-to-keep-up-with-digital-marketing-trends/ [https://perma.cc/YKE8-QXAS]
(noting due to individuals constantly updating and plugging into the digital
world through the use of social media, Google connectivity, and more, big data
can help businesses stay apprised and continually target customers in the best way
possible).
196 Aeroflot New Slogan, AEROFLOT RUSSIAN AIRLINES: NEWS (July 29, 2004),
https://www.aeroflot.ru/ru-en/new/1116 [https://perma.cc/B4GS-QVLG]
(announcing Aeroflot’s new slogan “Sincerely Yours, Aeroflot”).
197 Parver v. Jet Blue Airlines Corp., 649 F. App’x 539, 541 (9th Cir. 2016).;
Dillon, supra note 3; Quirk, supra note 4; Fontana, supra note 6; Bachman, Still
Fighting 9/11 Lawsuits, supra note 121.
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lagged security arrangement is not truly protecting anyone.198
“Above all, [airlines] care,”199 about their trade and about their
passengers. Airlines need to “fly into tomorrow”200 by adopting
their own private, data-aided, in-airport security system.
“‘[P]rivatized security and federal screeners have performed as
well or as badly as the other,’”201 but perhaps this is because the
industry has adopted the either-or approach. The government
and the airlines should adopt systems that work simultaneously
for the same objectives, while also allowing separate goals to
take priority as well. Let the Transportation Security Administra-
tion protect national security, and let airlines protect their in-
dustry. Then, in the end, everyone can “fly the friendly skies.”202
198 Parver, 649 Fed. App’x 539; Dillion, supra note 3; Quirk, supra note 4;
Fontana, supra note 6; Bachman, Still Fighting 9/11 Lawsuits, supra note 121.
199 Lewis Machipisa, ZIMBABWE-TRANSPORT: Airline Tries to Clean Up Its Act,
INTER PRESS SERVICE (Jan. 20, 1997), http://www.ipsnews.net/1997/01/zimba
bwe-transport-airline-tries-to-clean-up-its-act/ [https://perma.cc/NQX8-8827]
(discussing consumer’s spoofs on old slogans of Air Zimbabwe, including their
slogan “Above all We Care”).
200 Joa˜o Marcos Massote, Japan Airlines - Fly Into Tomorrow, YOUTUBE (Aug. 9,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U650zNeCu7s [https://perma.cc/
A93U-T48L] (advertising Japan Airlines’ updated fleet with their slogan “Fly Into
Tomorrow”).
201 Greg Fulton, An Airport Screener’s Complaint, TIME (Aug. 17, 2006), http://
content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1228247,00.html [https://
perma.cc/4QZ6-ZMGP].
202 Levere, supra note 1; see also FrienldySKy, supra note 1.
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I. INTRODUCTION
After an air ambulance transported Ivan Mitchell’s wife from
Grand Forks, North Dakota to the Mayo Clinic in Rochester,
Minnesota, Mr. Mitchell received a bill for about $54,000.1 The
total bill was $67,325, but the Mitchells’ insurance only covered
approximately $9,000, leaving the Mitchells on the hook for the
balance.2 After a cluster of cases like the Mitchells’ experience,
the North Dakota state legislature attempted to regulate the air
ambulance industry in an effort to help its citizens afford neces-
sary medical care in times of crisis.3 The North Dakota legisla-
ture passed House Bill 1255,4 requiring providers of air
ambulance services “to become participating providers with cer-
tain North Dakota health insurance companies in order to be
listed on a ‘primary call list’ for air ambulance services.”5 A par-
ticipating provider would agree to charge only what is allowed in
insurance contracts, which would leave patients responsible only
for deductibles and any copayments that their policies require.6
The intent behind House Bill 1255 was to “prevent patients
from getting hit with exorbitant bills from out-of-network7 am-
bulance services.”8
1 Patrick Springer, N.D. Law Test Case for Preventing Air Ambulance Price ‘Goug-





4 H.B. 1255, 64th Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2015) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 23-27-04.10 (West 2016)).
5 Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d 930, 934 (D.N.D. 2016).
6 See Springer, supra note 1.
7 “Out-of-network” versus “in-network” is discussed infra Part V., Section B.2.
8 See Springer, supra note 1.
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Like air ambulance providers across the United States, Valley
Med Flight, Inc. (Valley Med), an air ambulance provider in
North Dakota, is an “air carrier” under the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978 (ADA).9 Valley Med filed suit against Terry Dwelle,
the State Health Officer for the North Dakota Department of
Health, to prevent enforcement of House Bill 1255.10 Judge
Hovland of the United States District Court for the District of
North Dakota granted Valley Med’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings, holding:
The clear intent of the legislation is to prevent air ambulance
service providers, who are not participating providers, from im-
posing exorbitant fees on patients who wrongly assume their in-
surance will cover the charges and are not in a position to
discover otherwise. This type of consumer protection law is pre-
cisely the type of law Congress sought to preempt when it en-
acted the ADA.11
Judge Hovland based his decision on House Bill 1255’s effect on
the prices Valley Med could charge for its services, which cre-
ated a conflict with the ADA.12 The ADA reads that “a State . . .
may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision
having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or
service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation.”13
The U.S. Supreme Court has discussed the broad scope of the
ADA preemption clause, noting that “the key phrase ‘related to’
expresses a ‘broad pre-emptive purpose.’”14 That broad preemp-
tion means that “state laws and regulations ‘having a connection
with or reference to airline rates, routes, or services, are pre-
empted by the ADA.’”15 Cases like Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle
and experiences similar to that of Ivan Mitchell showcase the
precarious position that medical patients can be left in when
they require an air ambulance in order to get the treatment they
deserve, and their state lawmakers are unable to do anything
about it.
While preemption of state law is an oft-discussed topic, little
has been written about the specific preemption of air ambu-
9 See Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 934.
10 See id.
11 Id. at 942.
12 See id. at 941–42.
13 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
14 Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1424 (2014) (quoting Morales
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992)).
15 Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 939 (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 383).
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lance regulations under the ADA. Most articles highlight per-
sonal experiences of patients transported by air ambulances,
with just a passing mention of the ADA or state attempts to regu-
late the industry. There have also been other articles that discuss
pending cases, written before those cases were adjudicated by
the courts. One article discusses service preemption under the
ADA with respect to food allergies on flights.16 While this discus-
sion has similar underlying themes with the allergy preemption
article, the focuses are different and distinguished enough to
provide ample room for comment.
This article discusses the ins and outs of the air ambulance
industry, explains the status of air ambulance industry regula-
tory laws, and details why, in light of judicial precedent and in-
dustry practices, Congress should exempt air ambulances from
being classified as “carriers” under the ADA, so that state at-
tempts to regulate the air ambulance industry for the protection
of their citizens are no longer preempted by a law aimed to pro-
mote commercial competition. Part II traces the development of
the air ambulance industry from its wartime start to the present
day. Part III discusses briefly the different ways in which an air
ambulance provider receives payment for its services, as a means
of providing background for the impetus behind the state at-
tempts discussed in Part IV. Part IV lays out the legal framework
for ADA preemption based on Supreme Court precedent and
developments in lower courts related to attempts by states to cir-
cumvent the ADA. Part V explains why, given legislative intent,
industry practices, and judicial precedent, exempting air ambu-
lances from the ADA is the logical move.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIR AMBULANCE INDUSTRY
The carnage that accompanied World War I brought with it a
new innovation: the first instance of an aircraft transporting
medical patients when “an open cockpit biplane was used to res-
cue injured soldiers and bring them to field hospitals.”17 Fast
forward nearly sixty years, and the first non-military dedicated
air ambulances began flying across the skies.18 An “air ambu-
16 See Laci Verdusco Resendiz, Comment, Food Allergies on Flights–How A Narrow
Interpretation of “Service” Preemption Under the Airline Deregulation Act Could Give Aller-
gic Passengers Much Needed Protection, 81 J. AIR L. & COM. 321 (2016).
17 Todd Lovshin, Air Ambulance Providers: Providers’ Refusal to Contract with Insur-
ers Costing Many Montanans Thousands, 41 MONT. LAWYER 32 (2016).
18 See id. (stating that “[i]n 1973 the first civil airplanes dedicated to emergency
medical services began operations”).
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lance” is exactly what it sounds like: helicopters or planes that
transport patients (and in some cases, donated organs) to and
from the hospital or scene of an accident.19 Air ambulances are
more than just aircraft designated specifically for transporting
medical patients; they are also “equipped with state-of-the-art
medical equipment and staffed by paramedics, emergency medi-
cal technicians and sometimes doctors and nurses.”20 This
equipment allows air ambulances to effectively transport “pa-
tients with time critical injuries and conditions to medical facili-
ties” as well as “provid[e] patients with advanced care while en
route.”21 The advanced technology and qualified medical per-
sonnel onboard the ambulances has led to the widely-held belief
that air ambulances “improve the chances of survival for trauma
victims and other critical patients,”22 such as those with “preg-
nancy complications, heart attacks, strokes and respiratory dis-
eases.”23 As of 2014, more than 550,000 patients per year are
transported via air ambulances,24 a number that has grown over
the years.25 The increasing usage of air ambulances has pushed
the regulation issue to the forefront and necessitates action.
III. PAYING FOR AIR AMBULANCE SERVICES IS
COMPLICATED
By their nature, medical services are expensive, and paying for
them can be complicated and involve multiple sources. The av-
erage distance covered by an air ambulance trip is fifty-two
miles, and will cost between $12,000 to $25,000 per flight,
before insurance kicks in.26 Air ambulance providers garner pay-
19 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-627T, AVIATION SAFETY: POTEN-
TIAL STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS AIR AMBULANCE SAFETY CONCERNS 1 (2009).
20 Consumer Alert: Understanding Air Ambulance Insurance, NAT’L ASS’N. OF INS.
COMM’RS (Apr. 2., 2014), http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_alert_
understanding_air_ambulance_insurance.htm [https://perma.cc/DR3K-PXK5].
21 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-907, AIR AMBULANCE: EFFECTS
OF INDUSTRY CHANGES ON SERVICES ARE UNCLEAR 3 (2010) [hereinafter GAO-10-
907].
22 Id.
23 Consumer Alert: Understanding Air Ambulance Insurance, supra note 20.
24 Id.
25 See GAO-10-907, at 3 (stating that “[a]ir ambulances transported more than
270,000 patients in 2008”).
26 DIFS Consumer Counselor Insurance Information Sheet: Understanding Coverage for
Air Ambulance Services, MICH. DEP’T INS. & FIN. SERVS. (July 2015), https://
www.michigan.gov/documents/difs/Air_Ambulance_Insurance_482626_7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KHF5-JGVX]; see also Consumer Alert: Understanding Air Ambu-
lance Insurance, supra note 20.
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ment for their services in several ways, including, among others,
Medicare, private health insurance, and the patient himself.27
“Medicare is the principal government program that helps
pay for healthcare furnished by nongovernment providers.”28
There are a number of ways that an individual can qualify for
Medicare coverage. A person can “automatically qualify for
Medicare Part A” upon reaching the age of sixty-five.29 Those
who qualify for Part A coverage “are automatically enrolled in
Part B when they become eligible for Part A unless they opt
out.”30 Some individuals who do not qualify for Medicare cover-
age on their own have the ability to purchase coverage.31 Addi-
tionally, some “state Medicaid programs . . . buy Medicare
coverage for low-income individuals . . . .”32Ambulance services,
if covered, fall under Medicare Part B.33
Medicare may cover transportation by air ambulance if the pa-
tient’s condition necessitates ambulance transport that cannot
be accommodated by ground ambulance and one of the follow-
ing conditions applies: either (1) ground transport cannot easily
reach the patient’s pickup location; or (2) distance or obstacles
could interfere with ground transportation efforts and prevent
the patient from getting care quickly.34 Transport by air ambu-
lance is also “limited to taking the patient to the nearest appro-
priate facility.”35 While not listed explicitly under the details of
air ambulance coverage, the Medicare website does include a
caveat to the section on “emergency ambulance transporta-
tion”—“Medicare coverage depends on the seriousness of your
medical condition and whether you could’ve been safely trans-
ported by other means.”36 This caveat serves as a yellow flag for
Medicare patients, as the website does not state explicitly that
Medicare will “pay for emergency ambulance transportation in
27 See GAO-10-907, at 5 fig.1 (reproduced infra Figure 1).
28 TERRY S. COLEMAN, MEDICARE LAW 1 (2001).
29 See id. at 2 (“Individuals age sixty-five or over who qualify for Social Security
or Railroad Retirement monthly cash retirement benefits automatically qualify
for Medicare Part A.”).
30 Id. at 3.
31 See id.
32 Id. at 4.
33 See id. at 20 (“§ 2:2 The Part B Benefits Package”), 34 (“§ 2:2(f)(1)
Ambulance”).
34 See U.S. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Your Medicare Coverage,
Ambulance Services, https://www.medicare.gov/coverage/ambulance-services.html
[https://perma.cc/6VH8-JLXB] (last visited July 7, 2017).
35 COLEMAN, supra note 28, at 35.
36 Your Medicare Coverage, Ambulance Services, supra note 34.
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an airplane or helicopter,” but rather that “Medicare may pay for
emergency ambulance transportation in an airplane or helicop-
ter . . . .”37 That small difference in wording, combined with the
caveat, will force patients in critical situations to utilize whatever
forms of emergency medical transport they can get, and hope
that Medicare will provide coverage. Nevertheless, patients ulti-
mately will not know for sure if they are covered until after the
fact.
For those who are not enrolled in Medicare, their use of air
ambulances may be covered in whole or in part by their private
insurance, and if they do not have applicable insurance, the en-
tire cost will come out-of-pocket.38 “Balance billing” is when a
provider of medical services bills the patient for the “difference
between the provider’s charges and the amount” covered by in-
surance, or covered by an organization’s fee schedule.39 “For ex-
ample, if the provider’s charge is $100 and the allowed amount
is $70, the provider may bill [the patient] for the remaining
$30.”40
Figure 1, below, illustrates the many sources from which air
ambulance providers collect payment in order to satisfy a pa-
tient’s bill.
37 Id. (emphasis added).
38 See Steve Jordon, Few Think About Insurance When Air Ambulance Lifts Off; Then
. . . Surprise, OMAHA WORLD HERALD (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.omaha.com/
money/few-think-about-insurance-when-air-ambulance-lifts-off-then/article_1175
9ecf-182f-59a2-8cde-7c804ecf9913.html [https://perma.cc/CX4B-ACJG] (Ne-
braska’s insurance director saying that some individuals “have found that there’s
a huge balance to pay even after their health insurance pays.”).
39 Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d 930, 937 (D.N.D. 2016); see
also Balance Billing, HEALTHCARE.GOV GLOSSARY, https://www.healthcare.gov/glos
sary/balance-billing/ [https://perma.cc/HB3X-GQJZ] (last visited July 7, 2017).
40 Balance Billing, supra note 39.
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Figure 1: Percentage of Payments for Air Ambulance
Transports Received from Different Sources41
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Figure 1 shows the percentage of payment received by four air
ambulance providers from each of four sources: private insur-
ance, Medicare, Medicaid, and from the patient himself (which
would be the amount that was “balance billed” after the other
sources made their contributions). Figure 1 shows the unique
nature of each air ambulance transport, and how each source of
payment does not necessarily contribute the same amount or
percentage in every patient’s case.
IV. WHAT IS THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
PREEMPTION UNDER THE AIRLINE
DEREGULATION ACT?
As Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle illustrates, states at first
glance appear to have little to no options for regulating42 the
41 GAO-10-907, at 5 fig.1.
42 For purposes of this discussion, unless otherwise noted, any mention of reg-
ulating the air ambulance industry refers to regulating the prices and rates associ-
ated with air ambulance services, as states are free to regulate other aspects of the
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costs associated with the air ambulance industry on their own
due to the ADA.43 As the following sections discuss, state regula-
tion of air ambulance costs unfortunately appears to be nearly
impossible at this time. There may be a glimmer of hope for
states wanting to do something to help their citizens, but it is not
without its own potential legal hurdles to conquer when the
time comes.44
A. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND THE ADA EXPRESSLY PREEMPT
STATE REGULATION OF THE AIR AMBULANCE INDUSTRY,
BECAUSE AIR AMBULANCES ARE “CARRIERS”
Preemption of state law is possible because of the Supremacy
Clause,45 which “invalidates state laws that interfere with, or are
contrary to, federal law.”46 In 1978, Congress came to the con-
clusion that “deregulation of the airline industry would lead to
greater reliance on market forces resulting in greater efficiency,
innovation, lower prices, and enhanced quality and variety of air
transportation services,” and passed the ADA.47 The ADA dic-
tates that “a State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation,
or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a
price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air trans-
portation.”48 The ADA therefore has an express preemption
clause, meaning that Congress has explicitly stated that the ADA
preempts state law.49
Specifically, the ADA is concerned with “air carrier[s].”50
While the ADA is silent as what constitutes an “air carrier,”51 Ti-
tle 49 defines the term as “a citizen of the United States under-
taking by any means, directly or indirectly, to provide air
transportation.”52 “As a general rule an air carrier is a common
carrier . . . .”53 Title 49 supports this statement, referencing “air-
industry. See GAO-10-907, at 23, 37; Lovshin, supra note 17, at 34 (“states do have
limited regulatory authority over air ambulance providers around medical and
quality standards of care”).
43 See Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 941–42.
44 See infra Part V., Section B.3.
45 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
46 Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 938 (internal quotations omitted).
47 Id. (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992)).
48 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
49 See Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 938.
50 See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
51 See id.
52 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(2) (2012).
53 THOMAS A. DICKERSON, TRAVEL LAW § 2.05 (2016).
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craft [acting] as a common carrier for compensation.”54 While
that statute does not define the term, “it has been said that a
common carrier . . . holds [itself] out to the public as engaged
in the business of transporting persons or property from place
to place, for compensation, offering [its] services to the public
generally.”55 “The public, however, does not mean everybody all
the time.”56 It is irrelevant whether the entire population will
utilize the service, or whether it is a specialized service like air
ambulances.57 Therefore, air ambulances are considered to be
carriers under federal legislation.58
B. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
The U.S. Supreme Court has weighed in on how the ADA’s
express preemption clause should be construed in three cases.59
The Supreme Court first took up the issue of the scope of ADA
preemption in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.60 In Morales,
the Supreme Court explained that the broad applicability of the
ADA’s preemption language prevents states from enforcing leg-
islation “relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier
. . . .”61 The Court found that the key words “relating to” have a
broad plain language meaning, which in turn gives rise to “a
broad pre-emptive purpose.”62 The Court rejected the argument
that the ADA only preempts state laws that “actually prescrib[e]
rates, routes, or services” because such an interpretation would
have the effect of eliminating the words “relating to” from the
ADA.63 That effect would go against the Court’s own rules of
54 See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(25).
55 D. E. Buckner, Annotation, Air Carrier as Common or Private Carrier, and Result-
ing Duties as to Passenger’s Safety, 73 A.L.R. 2d 346 (1960) (internal quotations
omitted).
56 Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton, 581 F. Supp. 2d 721, 733 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (quot-
ing Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U.S. 252, 255 (1916)) (internal citations
omitted).
57 See id.
58 See id. at 732; Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d 930, 933
(D.N.D. 2016).
59 See Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422 (2014); Am. Airlines, Inc. v.
Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374
(1992).
60 Morales, 504 U.S. 374.
61 Id. at 383 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 385.
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construction.64 The Court expressed its findings simply: “State
enforcement actions having a connection with or reference to
airline rates, routes, or services are pre-empted” by the ADA.65
The Supreme Court next considered the scope of ADA pre-
emption in American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens.66 The statute at issue
in Wolens, the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act,
declare[d] unlawful “[u]nfair methods of competition and un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices, including but not limited to
the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense,
false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment, suppres-
sion or omission of any material fact, with intent that others rely
upon [it] . . . in the conduct of any trade or commerce . . .
whether any person has in fact been misled, deceived or dam-
aged thereby.”67
The Court found that Illinois’ Consumer Fraud Act was “pre-
scriptive; it controls the primary conduct of those falling within
its governance” and “serves as a means to guide and police the
marketing practices of the airlines . . . .”68 The Court held that
the ADA preempted claims under the Consumer Fraud Act be-
cause the purpose behind the ADA was to “to leave largely to the
airlines themselves, and not at all to States, the selection and
design of marketing mechanisms appropriate to the furnishing
of air transportation services . . . .”69 The Court agreed with
American Airlines that “Congress could hardly have intended to
allow the States to hobble [competition for airline passengers]
through the application of restrictive state laws,”70 when promo-
tion of “competitive market forces” underlies the ADA itself.71 A
stable and efficient market depends on enforcing freedom of
contract ideals, a reality that “is key to sensible construction of
the ADA.”72
64 Id. at 383 (“The question . . . is one of statutory intent, and we accordingly
begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordi-
nary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” (in-
ternal quotations omitted)).
65 Id. at 384 (internal quotations omitted).
66 513 U.S. 219, 221–22 (1995).
67 Id. at 227 (citing ILL. COMP. STAT., ch. 815, § 505/2(1992) (formerly codi-
fied at ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 121 1/2, 262 (1991)).
68 Id. at 227–28.
69 Id. at 228.
70 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 27, Wolens, 513
U.S. 219 (No. 93-1286)).
71 Id. at 230.
72 Id.
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Finally, the Supreme Court again considered the broad pre-
emptive range of the ADA in Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg.73 The
Court had “little difficulty rejecting” the argument that ADA
preemption only applies to laws enacted by state legislatures and
to state administrative agency regulations, and not to common
law developments.74 The ADA preempts state “‘law[s], regula-
tion[s], or other provision[s] having the force and effect of
law,’”75 and the Court noted that it is normal practice to refer to
common law developments as “provisions.”76 Further, the Court
noted that common law developments have “the force and ef-
fect of law” that the ADA prohibits.77 The Court elaborated,
pointing out that the central purpose of the ADA would not be
served by exempting common law rules or developments from
its purview.78 In the eyes of the Court, exempting common law
rules would provide the states with a way to undo the deregula-
tion intended by the ADA.79 The effect of exempting common
law rules from ADA preemption would therefore allow some
modicum of state regulation of prices, routes, and/or services,
rather than allowing the forces of the free market to dictate
prices, routes, and services.80 The Court recognized this, and
stated the importance of “the effect of a state law, regulation, or
provision, not its form[:] . . . [T]he ADA’s deregulatory aim can
be undermined just as surely by a state common-law rule as it
can by a state statute or regulation.”81
These three Supreme Court cases explored the broad scope
of ADA preemption.82 Are there any niches left unmapped? As
the next section discusses, states have tried to find where the
line is drawn in order to avoid preemption, yet still exert some
facet of control over the air ambulance industry.
C. ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE HAVE MIXED RESULTS
Lawmakers at both the state and federal level have attempted
to effectuate change in terms of state regulation of the air ambu-
73 134 S. Ct. 1422 (2014).
74 See id. at 1429.
75 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1)).
76 Id.
77 Id.




82 See id. at 1428–29.
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lance industry. Unfortunately, these attempts have mostly been
met with precedent-deferential courts or a lack of information,
both leading to the same result: disallowance of state regulations
of the air ambulance industry, with one exception.83
1. State Level84
Several states have attempted to regulate the air ambulance
industry in some way, shape, or form, and seemingly each at-
tempt to regulate is met with resistance by the courts. While the
most common attempt comes via statutory enactment passed by
the state legislature, there are subtle nuances between the ap-
proaches, and some attempts eschew the legislature altogether
and come from the administrative side. Further, Montana has
passed a statute that does not seek to regulate the air ambulance
industry, but gives incentives for air ambulance providers to
make their services more affordable to Montana residents.85
a. North Dakota
North Dakota lawmakers passed a law that gave the North Da-
kota Department of Health the authority to create a “primary
call list” of air ambulance providers.86 The statute required that
for an air ambulance provider to qualify for inclusion on the
primary call list, the provider must become “a participating pro-
vider of the health insurance carriers in the state which collec-
tively hold at least seventy-five percent of the health insurance
coverage in the state as determined by annual market share re-
ports.”87 A participating provider agrees to charge only what is
allowed in the insurance contracts of the carriers the provider
joins, which would leave patients responsible only for deduct-
ibles and any copayments that their policies require.88
The statute also laid out a protocol for emergency medical
services personnel to follow when arranging for an air
ambulance:
83 See infra Part IV., Section C.1.f.
84 This discussion is not meant to be an exclusive or exhaustive list of every
state attempt at air ambulance regulation. There may be other states that have
attempted regulation, but the states included herein are the prominent
examples.
85 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-6-320 (West 2015).
86 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 23-27-04.10(1) (West 2016).
87 § 23-27-04.10(2).
88 See Springer, supra note 1.
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(1) First, the recipient of the request shall call an air ambulance
service provider listed on the primary call list which is within the
designated response zone.
(2) Second, if each of the air ambulance service providers listed
on the primary list is not available or is not able and willing to
respond to the call, the recipient of the request shall notify the
requester of this fact and shall call an air ambulance provider
listed on the secondary call list within the designated response
zone.
(3) Third, if each of the air ambulance service providers listed on
the secondary list is not available or is not able and willing to
respond to the call, the recipient of the request shall notify the
requester of this fact and shall inform the requester of primary
and secondary air ambulance service provider options outside
the designated response zone.89
This protocol leads to medical personnel targeting participating
providers first, and means medical personnel can contact prov-
iders on the secondary list only when the entirety of the primary
list has turned down the call.90 The statute throws another wrin-
kle at air ambulance providers, as it instructs the Department of
Health to “establish air ambulance service response zones . . .
based on response times and patient health and safety.”91 Prov-
iders who are outside the response zone organized by the De-
partment of Health become the tertiary option.92
This protocol and the participating provider mandate
prompted Valley Med Flight, Inc. to file suit seeking to prevent
North Dakota from enforcing the statute.93 In North Dakota,
the carrier Blue Cross Blue Shield controls a majority of the
health insurance market.94 Therefore, in order to comply with
the North Dakota statute, an air ambulance provider wanting to
operate in North Dakota “must become a participating provider
with [Blue Cross Blue Shield] in order to be listed on the pri-
mary call list.”95 This meant that in order for Valley Med to get
on the primary call list, it had to agree with Blue Cross Blue





93 See Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d 930, 934 (D.N.D. 2016).
94 See id. at 936 (“Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Dakota (“BCBS”) controls
more than 50% of the health insurance market in North Dakota.”).
95 Id.
96 See id. at 936–37.
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ment led to Valley Med accepting reimbursement rates with
Blue Cross Blue Shield that were “substantially below the market
rate,” so much so that it would be unable to continue operating
if it had to accept these rates.97
While North Dakota argued that providers make “a business
decision” when they choose to become participating providers,
the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota
ruled that when that is the only choice other than discontinuing
operations, it is no choice at all.98 Participating providers on the
primary call list have a “competitive advantage” over providers
on the secondary call list.99 That competitive advantage means
that participating providers will receive more calls, while provid-
ers on the secondary list are only contacted when the entire pri-
mary list refuses the call. This severely restricts the ability of
providers to offer their services.100 The court held that North
Dakota interfered with the market participation of air ambu-
lance providers, which “is precisely the type of state regulation
Congress sought to prevent when it included an express pre-
emption clause in the ADA.”101
The District Court went even further, finding that the North
Dakota statute was preempted on pricing grounds as well.102
The court said that the North Dakota statute indirectly impacted
the prices charged by air ambulance providers by forcing them
to accept the reimbursement rates of carriers in order to be-
come participating providers.103 While the statute’s plain lan-
guage did not restrict the rates an air ambulance provider could
charge, Ginsberg instructed the court that the effect, rather than
the form, of a state law is what is important when analyzing
preemption.104
b. North Carolina
A North Carolina statute stated, “[n]o person shall offer or
develop a new institutional health service without first obtaining
97 Id. at 937.




102 See id. at 941–42.
103 See id. (“There can be little question Section 23-27-04.10 effects [sic] Valley
Med’s prices and thus relates to price under the ADA.”).
104 See id. at 941 (citing Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1430
(2014)).
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a certificate of need from the Department . . . .”105 “New institu-
tional health service[ ]” is defined to include air ambulances.106
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina held that the purposes behind requiring a certif-
icate of need “directly contravene the pro-competition purposes
underlying the ADA.”107 The court held that because the North
Carolina statute prescribed behavior that was necessary for an
air ambulance provider to operate within the state, it was related
to price, route, or service under the ADA and thus pre-
empted.108 The statute substituted the commands of the govern-
ment for the market forces that justify the ADA.109
c. Wyoming
Wyoming Statute Section 27-14-401(e) dictated that “[i]f
transportation by ambulance is necessary, the division shall al-
low a reasonable charge for the ambulance service at a rate not
in excess of the rate schedule established by the director under
the procedure set forth for payment of medical and hospital
care.”110 The fee schedule adopted for air ambulance providers
set maximum allowable reimbursement rates.111 While air ambu-
lance providers would submit bills to the Worker’s Compensa-
tion Division in excess of the maximum rate allowed under the
fee schedule, the Division would only pay the amounts al-
lowed.112 Under the Wyoming statute, “ambulance services are
not considered ‘medical and hospital care,’” so air ambulance
providers are not allowed to balance bill injured workers who
use their services.113 This statutory limit restricts the amount that
air ambulance providers can receive in exchange for their ser-
105 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 131E-178(a) (West 2016) (effective July 5, 2007).
106 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 131E-176(16)(f1)(1) (West 2005) (effective to June
18, 2009) (note that this provision is still present in the current codification of
the statute).
107 Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton, 581 F. Supp. 2d 721, 736 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
108 See id.
109 See id.
110 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-401(e) (West 2016).
111 EagleMed, LLC v. Wyoming, No. 15-CV-26-ABJ, slip op. at 3 (D. Wy. May 16,
2016) (found at http://leg.mt.gov/content/Committees/Interim/2015-2016/
Economic-Affairs/Committee-Topics/Ambulance/WYwork-comp-court-case5-
16.pdf [https://perma.cc/UUZ8-NYJR]).
112 Id., slip op. at 3–4.
113 Id., slip op. at 25.
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vices, setting up a collision course with ADA preemption.114 The
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming found
that by restricting balance billing, the statute was dictating the
maximum rate that air ambulance providers operating within
Wyoming could charge for their services, and held that such
rate restrictions were preempted by the ADA.115
d. Minnesota
In Hiawatha Aviation of Rochester, Inc. v. Minnesota Department of
Health,116 the State Commissioner of the Department of Health
denied a provider’s application to operate an air ambulance ser-
vice in Minnesota. Based on a predecessor to the ADA, the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota ruled that the state, and by
extension, the Commissioner of the Department of Health, was
“preempted from controlling entry into the field of air ambu-
lance service . . . .”117 However, the state supreme court also
noted that this ruling did not “oust the state from its traditional
role in the delivery of medical services-the [sic] regulation of
staffing requirements, the qualifications of personnel, equip-
ment requirements, and the promulgation of standards for
maintenance of sanitary conditions.”118
e. Florida
In Florida, following a fatal motorcycle accident, a plaintiff’s
estate sought declaratory judgment that the billing practices of
an air ambulance provider violated state statutes related to per-
sonal injury protection.119 The United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida held that there was only one way
to view the plaintiff’s claims: as challenging the rates of the air
ambulance provider for its services.120 The court said that al-
lowing the claims to proceed “would naturally affect the provi-
sion of [the provider’s] services in addition to the prices of and
114 Id., slip op. at 30 (“Because the air ambulances cannot collect above the
amount the defendants have set in their fee schedules, the statute and regula-
tions are directly related to air carrier prices.”).
115 Id., slip op. at 33.
116 389 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Minn. 1986).
117 Id. at 509.
118 Id.
119 Bailey v. Rocky Mountain Holdings, LLC, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1376, 1378–79
(S.D. Fla. 2015).
120 See id. at 1382.
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payment for those services.”121 This led the court to view the
Plaintiff’s claims as an enforcement action under state law.122
Such actions are “expressly disallowed by the ADA’s express pre-
emption provision, which intentionally leaves the price of such
services to the competitive market.”123
f. Colorado
The Colorado example is different from the other state exam-
ples discussed above. Colorado’s statute required all air ambu-
lance providers be licensed to operate in the state, and that the
provider must complete an accreditation process by the commis-
sion on accreditation of medical transport systems.124 Eagle Air
Med Corporation, an air ambulance provider, filed suit alleging
that the Colorado statute was preempted by the ADA and seek-
ing a declaratory judgment.125 The defendants moved to stay the
action.126 The United States District Court for the District of
Colorado noted that the Supreme Court has previously said that
“only those state laws having a ‘significant effect’ or a ‘significant
impact’ on the prices, routes, or services, of an air carrier were
preempted under the ADA.”127 The Colorado court construed
the Morales language as indicating that the scope of ADA pre-
emption was narrower than the statute suggests.128 The Colo-
rado court held “that the ADA’s preclusion of state regulation of
carrier ‘price, route, or service’ [did not] conclusively equate[ ]
to state regulation” of air ambulances.129 Therefore, the court
declined to issue a declaratory judgment and granted the de-
fendants’ motion to stay the action.130 In other words, the Colo-
rado court found that ADA preclusion might not be as broad as
the Supreme Court suggested in Morales, and since the Colorado
statute did not outright have a significant effect or impact on




124 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-3.5-307(1)(a) (West 2007) (effective to May 31,
2016).
125 Eagle Air Med Corp. v. Colorado Bd. of Health, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1290
(D. Colo. 2008).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1292 (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 388,
390 (1992)).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 1293.
130 Id. at 1295.
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ration, the ADA did not clearly preempt the Colorado statute at
the time of the filing.131 Since Eagle Air Med Corp. v. Colorado
Board of Health, the Colorado legislature has subsequently
amended Section 25-3.5-307.132 The current statute simplifies
the accreditation language, removing the commission on ac-
creditation of medical transport systems language, and adding
generic references to a department-approved accrediting organ-
ization and compliance with rules set by the board.133
g. Montana
Seeing “a need to assist Montana consumers with regard to
the availability and affordability of air ambulance service[s],”134
the Montana Legislature passed a law exempting air ambulance
providers from insurance statutes.135 Unlike some of the legisla-
tion passed by other states discussed in this section, Montana’s
statute does not attempt to regulate the air ambulance industry,
but rather seeks to entice air ambulance providers to create
membership programs that will make air ambulance services
more affordable.136 A concern137 with air ambulance member-
ship programs is, as Mr. Lovshin states: “You are covered only if
that company is the one to transport you. . . . If a different com-
pany (of the 14 currently operating in Montana) provides the
service, you have no coverage.”138 However, Mr. Lovshin is incor-
rect, at least in terms of the Montana statute. Section 50-6-
320(3) of the Montana Health and Safety Code states: “Any pri-
vate air ambulance service membership program must have ar-
rangements with other air ambulance service providers in
Montana to the extent reasonably possible to ensure maximum
geographic coverage within the state for the subscribers to the
131 Id. at 1292–93 (“There remains at least a question whether the subject Colo-
rado statute and regulations, which specifically relate only to emergency medical
air transport, frustrate these objectives or any other objective of the ADA. This
certainly must be taken into account in determining whether it is ‘facially conclu-
sive’ that Colorado’s statute and regulations are preempted by 49 U.S.C.
§ 41713(b)(1).”).
132 See 2016 Colo. Legis. Serv. ch. 206 (H.B. 16-1280) (West).
133 See id.; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-3.5-307(1)(a)(West 2016).
134 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-6-320(1) (West 2015).
135 See id.; Lovshin, supra note 17, at 32.
136 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-6-320(2) (West 2015).
137 For a detailed discussion of membership program concerns and how they
work, see infra Part V., Section B.3.
138 Lovshin, supra note 17.
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program.”139 Unlike what Mr. Lovshin contends, a subscriber is
not covered only when the provider he or she subscribes to is
the one to transport the subscriber. Section 50-6-320(3) actually
requires air ambulance providers who take advantage of the ex-
emption to work with other air ambulance providers to ensure
their programs are transferrable amongst providers for the ben-
efit of subscribers.140 While not necessarily immune to potential
legal challenges, this Montana statute appears to present a tem-
plate that other states may be able to use to assist their citizens
in making air ambulance services more affordable.141
2. Federal Level
State governments are not the only legislative bodies making
efforts to regulate the air ambulance industry; there are some
members of Congress who have recognized the importance of
the issue and have made an effort to attempt to return some
power back to the states. Coincidentally (or maybe not so), the
two senators at the forefront of the congressional effort are from
states that have already attempted to pass their own legislation
regulating the air ambulance industry: Senator Jon Tester from
Montana142 and Senator John Hoeven from North Dakota.143
Senator Tester and Senator Hoeven became the first members
of Congress to attempt to reclaim air ambulance regulation for
the states when they introduced Senate Amendment 3753.144
Amendment 3753, titled “State Prioritization of Dispatch of
Air Ambulance Service Providers,” sought to grant states the
power to pass legislation “that creates a primary and secondary
call list of air ambulance service providers in the State for distri-
bution to emergency response entities and personnel to priori-
tize the dispatch of air ambulance serve [sic] providers,”
notwithstanding the ADA.145 On April 13, 2016, Senators Tester
and Hoeven introduced this proposed amendment less than a
month after the United States District Court for the District of
139 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-6-320(3) (West 2015).
140 See id.
141 See infra Part V., Section B.3.
142 See Biography, JON TESTER, U.S. SENATOR FOR MONTANA, http://www.tester.
senate.gov/?p=biography [https://perma.cc/SG24-GNXQ] (last visited July 6,
2017).
143 See Biography, U.S. SENATOR JOHN HOEVEN OF NORTH DAKOTA, https://www.
hoeven.senate.gov/about/biography [https://perma.cc/X4UH-BTWW] (last vis-
ited July 6, 2017).
144 See S. Amdt. 3753, 162 CONG. REC. S2048 (Apr. 13, 2016).
145 Id.
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North Dakota issued its ruling in Valley Med Flight, Inc. v.
Dwelle.146 As one of the senators from North Dakota,147 Senator
Hoeven was surely aware of the United States District Court for
the District of North Dakota’s decision, which may explain the
similarities in language shared by Amendment 3753 and the
North Dakota statute.148 Unfortunately, Amendment 3753 “was
ordered to lie on the table,”149 meaning that the Senate wished
to take a negative position on the amendment and wanted to
express its final action on it.150
However, Senator Tester continued working for a way to give
more power in the air ambulance arena back to the states. He
cleared a huge obstacle on June 9, 2016, when the Senate Ap-
propriations Committee submitted a report (accompanying the
2017 Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appro-
priations Bill) that included language directing the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to study “air ambulance services
and payment structures.”151 While the Senate Appropriations
Committee report itself does not immediately give states the
power to regulate the air ambulance industry within their bor-
ders, Senator Tester stressed that this small victory was “a ‘giant’
step in the right direction.”152 Senator Tester elaborated on how
Congress and states could use the results from the report, saying
“[w]e don’t have a lot of information on this quite frankly, and
this will give us some information so that we can talk to the air
ambulance services and potentially develop some rules around
these air ambulances.”153 Having been approved by the Senate
Appropriations Committee, the 2017 Labor, Health and Human
Services, and Education Appropriations Bill was placed on the
146 See id.; Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d 930 (D.N.D. 2016)
(“Signed March 21, 2016”).
147 See Biography, U.S. SENATOR JOHN HOEVEN OF NORTH DAKOTA, supra note
143.
148 Compare S. Amdt. 3753, with N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 23-27-04.10 (West
2016).
149 S. Amdt. 3753, 162 CONG. REC. S2048 (Apr. 13, 2016).
150 Enactment of a Law: Motions, Quorums, and Votes, U.S. SENATE, https://
www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/Enactment_law.htm#6 [https://
perma.cc/F5RS-NMCV] (last visited July 6, 2017).
151 S. REP. NO. 114-274, at 128 (2016).
152 Angela Marshall, Air Ambulance Reform Effort Passes U.S. Senate Committee,
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Senate Legislative Calendar on June 9, 2016.154 Once the GAO
submits its report, members of Congress will have more informa-
tion that highlights the importance of this issue. Senator Tes-
ter’s Communication Director Marnee Banks emphasized the
need for more information when discussing Senator Tester’s
and Senator Hoeven’s earlier failed effort: “ ‘This is the first time
the Senate has tackled the issue of these outrageously high
prices of air ambulances. So it is going to take a while for [Sena-
tor Tester] and Senator Hoeven to educate their colleagues on
[its] importance . . . .’”155 With more than 550,000 patients us-
ing air ambulances each year,156 education is sorely needed, and
will ideally lead to congressional action in the near future.
V. WHY SHOULD AIR AMBULANCES FALL OUTSIDE
THE ADA?
A person in the middle of a medical emergency requiring air
transport for treatment does not have the luxury of making sure
that the transporting air ambulance is a provider covered by the
patient’s insurance, nor does the patient have the luxury of even
inquiring as to the price of using such a service.157 To account
for this problem, this article argues that Congress must exempt
air ambulances from the purview of ADA preemption because of
conflicting congressional intent, because Supreme Court prece-
dent has all but handcuffed the courts, and because of the se-
vere inequality of power that exists in the air ambulance
provider-patient relationship.
A. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
When interpreting express preemption clauses, the “task is to
ascertain Congress’ intent in enacting the federal statute at is-
sue.”158 The United States District Court for the District of
North Dakota in Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle said that legisla-
tion intending “to prevent air ambulance service providers . . .
from imposing exorbitant fees on patients . . . is precisely the
154 Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2017, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.
gov/resources/display/content/Appropriations+or+Fiscal+Year+2017 [https://
perma.cc/4QRS-AF74] (last visited July 7, 2017).
155 Corin Cates-Carney, Air Ambulance Reform Effort Dies in US Senate, MONTANA
PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 15, 2016), http://mtpr.org/post/air-ambulance-reform-ef
fort-dies-us-senate [https://perma.cc/K79X-X6LR].
156 See Consumer Alert: Understanding Air Ambulance Insurance, supra note 20.
157 See Jordon, supra note 38.
158 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983).
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type of law Congress sought to preempt when it enacted the
ADA.”159 While Congress has demonstrated its intent “to rest
sole responsibility for supervising the aviation industry with the
federal government,”160 Congress surely did not intend to allow
providers to charge exorbitant fees on patients concerned about
their health. Many of the courts rely on the argument that state
statutes regulating the air ambulance industry are the exact type
of laws that Congress meant to preempt when it enacted the
ADA.161 However, would Congress really intend for medical pa-
tients to be taken advantage of just to get treatment that could
save their lives? While there is evidence to suggest that Congress
did not intend for the ADA to preempt safety measures,162 the
ADA makes it clear that Congress did intend to preempt pricing
regulations imposed by states.163 The point where one draws the
line between price and safety is unclear. Equally unclear is
whether the law views one as being out-and-out more important
than the other, or whether the two are to be treated equally,
notwithstanding any arguments of morality.
An analysis of the legislative intent behind the ADA sheds
light on Congress’ true goals when passing the ADA.164 When
examining legislative or “statutory intent,” the starting point is
“the language employed by Congress and the assumption that
the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the
legislative purpose.”165 The policy statement contained in 42
U.S.C. § 40101 confirms that Congress felt “assigning and main-
taining safety [was] the highest priority” and that Congress is
committed to “preventing deterioration in established safety
procedures . . . .”166 Further, Congress noted that its “clear in-
tent, encouragement, and dedication [is] to further the highest
degree of safety in air transportation . . . .”167 As air ambulances
are a medical service,168 surely the air ambulance industry would
fall under the safety umbrella.
159 Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d 930, 942 (D.N.D. 2016).
160 Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 1999).
161 See, e.g., Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 942; Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton, 581 F.
Supp. 2d 721, 736 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
162 See Resendiz, supra note 16, at 343–44.
163 See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2012).
164 See Resendiz, supra note 16, at 343.
165 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
166 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101(a)(1), (a)(3) (2012).
167 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(3) (2012).
168 See supra Part II.
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However, the plain language of the ADA makes it clear that
Congress meant to preempt state regulation of prices charged
by air ambulance providers.169 Thus, an inevitable conflict exists
between whether state air ambulance regulations control mea-
sures governing the safety of patients or whether they control
prices. The answer, in reality, appears to be that under the ADA,
state air ambulance regulations can control either measures as-
sociated with patient safety or prices. Clearly, the courts have
taken the position that the state regulations discussed herein
lean toward the pricing side of the conflict.170 On the other
hand, there are instances holding that some issues are not pre-
empted, therefore allowing the states to regulate some air ambu-
lance issues. Those issues revolve largely around aspects related
to the quality and standard of medical care given to patients.171
While these findings do not provide a conclusive answer to the
question, because of this dichotomy it appears state regulation
must relate to standards of medical care in some capacity if they
are to survive ADA preemption challenge.
Preemption is no longer the best option because competition
does not effectively serve emergency medical situations. Con-
gress enacted the ADA after determining “that deregulation of
the airline industry would lead to greater reliance on market
forces resulting in greater efficiency, innovation, lower prices,
and enhanced quality and variety of air transportation ser-
vices.”172 Congress thought this “reliance on competitive market
forces and on actual and potential competition” would best
serve the aircraft industry.173 Congress even included a preemp-
tion provision in the ADA to prevent states from getting around
deregulation by passing their own regulatory laws.174 However,
Congress was also clear in the difference between safety and
169 See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2012); see also Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle,
171 F. Supp. 3d 930, 942 (D.N.D. 2016).
170 See, e.g., Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 942; Eagle Air Med Corp. v. Colorado Bd.
of Health, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1292 (D. Colo. 2008) (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at
388, 390–91).
171 See Hiawatha Aviation of Rochester, Inc. v. Minnesota Dep’t of Health, 389
N.W.2d 507, 509 (Minn. 1986); GAO-10-907, at 23 tbl.3, 36–40 app. III (2010)
(reproduced infra Appendix); Lovshin, supra note 17, at 34 (“states do have lim-
ited regulatory authority over air ambulance providers around medical and qual-
ity standards of care”).
172 Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 938 (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 378).
173 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(6) (2012).
174 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 378.
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pricing regulations.175 Clearly Congress believed that a competi-
tive market would lead to lower prices, but it is doubtful that
Congress would really intend for competition to govern the safe,
timely, and effective administration of healthcare in emergency
situations.
However, competition won out against healthcare services in
Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton, where the court found that North Car-
olina’s prescription of behavior (requiring a certificate of need)
necessary for an air ambulance provider to operate in the state
directly contravened the pro-competition purposes of the ADA,
and those requirements limiting the ability of an air ambulance
provider to operate in the state were thus related to the pro-
vider’s prices, routes, or services.176 Additionally, in Valley Med
Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, the court actually ruled in favor of a result
that was the direct opposite of what Congress intended.177 By
holding that the North Dakota statute was preempted, the court
essentially said that the state could not “prevent air ambulance
service providers, who are not participating providers, from im-
posing exorbitant fees on patients.”178 That flies directly in the
face of Congress’ intent in enacting the ADA: that a competitive
market would lead to lower prices.179
B. PATIENTS REMAIN AT THE MERCY OF PROVIDERS DUE TO
UNEQUAL BALANCE OF POWER
Air ambulance providers control virtually every aspect of air
ambulance services, and oddly enough, the patient has little to
no control. From setting the price, to working with different in-
surance carriers, the air ambulance providers are in near-total
control. The patient is simply along for the ride. The following
subsections will discuss the costs of air ambulance services, the
complications that come with in-network versus out-of-network
providers, and a possible template for state action based on the
Montana statute.180
175 See supra Part V., Section A.
176 Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton, 581 F. Supp. 2d 721, 736 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
177 Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 942.
178 Id.
179 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 378.
180 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-6-320 (West 2015) (discussed in Part IV., Section
C.1.g.).
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1. Costs of Services
Use of an air ambulance can be an expensive event. The aver-
age air ambulance trip will cost $12,000 to $25,000 per flight,
before insurance kicks in.181 Providers justify the costly charges
by citing the cost of equipment,182 maintenance, their round-
the-clock on-call flight and medical personnel, and the intrinsic
value of the air ambulance service.183 When setting prices, prov-
iders must estimate the volume of patient transports and how
many of those transports will and will not end up paying for the
service.184 Some air ambulance providers recognize the costs of
their services, and offer programs designed to help would-be pa-
tients in the future. For example, LifeNet, for an annual fee of
just $49, will pay $10,000 if a subscriber’s family member has a
medical necessity that requires transportation by air ambu-
lance.185 Some air ambulance providers have also created mem-
bership-based subscription programs that will cover transport
between hospitals186 or that can cover the patient’s full cost
when that patient needs an air ambulance.187 However, mem-
bership programs come with a large caveat: generally, to take
advantage of the benefits offered by a membership subscription,
the provider that offers the membership must be the air ambu-
lance that transports the patient.188 Unfortunately, patients
often do not have any input or choice in the air ambulance pro-
vider that responds when they require transport.189
2. Choice of Provider: In-Network vs. Out-of-Network Providers
When an air ambulance provider is part of an insurance car-
rier’s network (in-network), the provider accepts the reimburse-
ment rate of the insurance carrier, and any additional cost to
the patient is written off.190 In contrast, an out-of-network pro-
vider may accept the reimbursement rate of the insurance car-
181 See DIFS Consumer Counselor Insurance Information Sheet, supra note 26; see also
Consumer Alert: Understanding Air Ambulance Insurance, supra note 20.
182 See DIFS Consumer Counselor Insurance Information Sheet, supra note 26 (“The
high price accounts for the initial aircraft cost which can reach $6 million . . . .”).
183 See Lovshin, supra note 17.
184 See Bernard F. Diederich, Air Ambulance, Rescuer or Rescuee?, 62 FED. LAW. 67,
71 (2015).
185 See Jordon, supra note 38.
186 See id.
187 See GAO-10-907, at 6 n.7.
188 See id.
189 See infra Part V, Section B.2.
190 See Jordon, supra note 38.
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rier, but has the option to balance bill191 the patient for the
remainder of the cost.192 However, patients rarely are aware
whether the air ambulance that responds is in-network or out-of-
network.193 Even worse, in emergency situations, patients may
not even be capable of asking if the ambulance is an in-network
provider, or what their insurance coverage looks like.194 Douglas
County’s Chief Deputy Sheriff Tom Wheeler said: “ ‘A lot of
times the person is unconscious or there’s trauma or shock.
We’re not asking them what to do. We’re providing the best re-
sponse we can, and you’ve got to make decisions right now.’”195
The patient is typically not even the party that requests an air
ambulance; that determination falls to the paramedics on the
scene, and scope of insurance coverage is a non-factor in that
decision.196 Even the providers do not consider whether they are
in or out of a patient’s coverage network; such is the case with
emergency situations, where every second counts.197
3. A Possible Template for State Action
States looking to “assist [their] consumers with regard to the
availability and affordability of air ambulance service” may be
able to take a cue from the Montana statute.198 As an incentiviz-
ing measure, rather than a regulatory one, statutes similar to the
Montana statute may be better equipped to survive ADA chal-
lenge. Air ambulance providers would actually be making “a
business decision” when they choose to take advantage of
whatever exemptions or benefits the state chooses to offer in
exchange for compliance with the statute (in the Montana stat-
ute, the state exempted providers from insurance statutes),199
and would not be forced into working with other providers in
order to continue operating. This would overcome the point
191 See supra text accompanying notes 39–40.
192 See Jordon, supra note 38.
193 See Springer, supra note 1.
194 Kathleen Woodford, Air Ambulance Charges Can Reach $100,000, CLARK FORK
VALLEY PRESS (May 4, 2016), https://www.tester.senate.gov/?p=news&id=4566
[https://perma.cc/E68W-49ZJ].
195 See Jordon, supra note 38.
196 See id.
197 See id. (“In emergencies, ‘we never even ask . . . . We just respond. Insur-
ance never comes to our thoughts at that time. Hopefully they have insurance,
and if they don’t, we work with them on a case-by-case basis.’”).
198 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-6-320(1) (West 2015); see discussion supra Part IV.,
Section C.1.g.
199 See § 50-6-320(2).
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made by the court in Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle.200 Providers
would only have to work with other providers and accept mem-
bership programs offered by other providers if they wanted to
be exempted from insurance statutes: “Any private air ambu-
lance service membership program must have arrangements
with other air ambulance service providers in [the state] to the
extent reasonably possible to ensure maximum geographic cov-
erage within the state for the subscribers to the program.”201 If
the provider does not wish to work with other providers, they
can carry on with business as usual, and will not be in danger of
having to cease operations as a result.202
Subscription-based membership programs do not escape the
problems facing the air ambulance industry, nor are they a per-
fect solution. For patients to benefit from these programs, gen-
erally the transporting provider must be the same one that
offers the membership subscription.203 But, since patients have
little say in what provider picks them up,204 they cannot be sure
that their subscription will cover their use of the air ambulance.
The Montana statute solves this conundrum. To take advantage
of the benefits that accompany exemption from insurance stat-
utes, providers must arrange with other air ambulance providers
to reasonably “ensure maximum geographic coverage within the
state for the subscribers to the program.”205 More providers ac-
cepting the subscriptions offered by rival providers would no-
ticeably increase the likelihood that a responding air ambulance
provider would accept the membership subscription of a pa-
tient. This would avoid patients having to worry about whether it
will be their subscribing provider that responds, and would also
keep patients from sacrificing valuable time waiting for their
subscribing provider to be available to respond. While it would
be imprudent to suggest that every air ambulance provider
within a state would avail themselves of the benefits offered by
200 See Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d 930, 941 (D.N.D.
2016) (“The State argues that becoming a ‘participating provider’ is simply a
business decision made by air ambulance operators. However, it is clear to the
Court that air ambulance operators who work in the North Dakota market have
no choice but to become a ‘participating provider’ (and accept an insurer’s
rates) or discontinue operating in the state.”).
201 § 50-6-320(3).
202 See §§ 50-6-320(2), (3).
203 See GAO-10-907, at 6 n.7.
204 See supra Part V., Section B.2.
205 § 50-6-320(3).
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such a statute, one might presume that some air ambulance
providers would explore the opportunity.
This approach does not solve the overall issue, but is a step in
a more affordable direction. While consumers would have to
purchase membership subscriptions in order to benefit, if stat-
utes like this were to become more commonplace, that small
investment could mean a difference of multiple thousands of
dollars in the event an air ambulance is needed.206 It is impor-
tant to note that the Montana statute has yet to be challenged
on ADA preemption grounds, but as it is merely incentivizing,
not prescriptive, there is reason to believe that it would survive
such a challenge.
C. PRECEDENT LEAVES NO OTHER OPTION
Decisions by the Supreme Court and lower courts appear to
have halted efforts by state legislators in their tracks.207 Further,
despite the intentions of Congress, it is increasingly clear that
the courts are handcuffed on the inevitable conflict created by
this issue.208
Chandler v. Roudebush209 seems to support the argument that
the federal courts should take up the air ambulance industry
preemption issue. The Court noted that issues that “require[ ]
non-partisan judgment” are best heard by federal judges.210 This
is because federal jurists are, in theory, shielded from outside
influence.211 Given the unequal balance of power that exists be-
tween patients and providers, the air ambulance industry pre-
emption issue clearly would benefit from non-partisan
judgment.212 As numerous federal courts have already addressed
the issue, that leaves the Supreme Court as the best judicial op-
tion. The Court should be able to remove politics from the
206 Compare GAO-10-907, at 6 n.7, with DIFS Consumer Counselor Insurance Infor-
mation Sheet, supra note 26 (“The average air ambulance trip . . . costs between
$12,000 to $25,000 per flight.”).
207 See, e.g., Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995); Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992); Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F.
Supp. 3d 930, 942 (D.N.D. 2016).
208 See Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 942 (“While the policy choices the State is
attempting to impose . . . are well-intentioned and enacted in good faith, it is
clear that Congress has assumed the field in the arena of air carrier regulation
and noble intent does not save the law from preemption.”).
209 425 U.S. 840 (1976).
210 Id. at 851 (internal quotations omitted).
211 See id.
212 See supra Part V., Section B.
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formula completely, as the life tenure enjoyed by Supreme
Court justices would, theoretically at least, make the Court
“more likely to withstand political pressures and render their de-
cisions in a climate tempered by judicial reflection and sup-
ported by historical judicial independence.”213
Indeed, the Supreme Court has addressed the preemption is-
sue. In American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, the Court held that the
ADA preempted prescriptive, conduct-controlling laws.214 The
problem facing states post-Wolens is figuring out how they can
regulate the air ambulance industry without controlling air am-
bulance providers’ conduct. That problem is multiplied when
reminded of the Supreme Court’s earlier holding in Morales v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. that the ADA’s broad preemptive pur-
pose stems from the “relating to” language.215 It would appear to
be a difficult road for state lawmakers to pass legislation that
could survive scrutiny under both Morales and Wolens.
In United States v. Carolene Products Co., the Supreme Court ex-
pressed the idea that there would be general discretion to the
legislature as to the laws that are passed, in the assumption that
they “rest[ ] upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators.”216 The Court also suggested, in
the famous footnote that has come to be known as “the most
important footnote in constitutional law,”217 that the judicial sys-
tem can step in to prevent the legislative exploitation of those in
weaker or less powerful positions, especially when there “may be
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the opera-
tion of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
. . . .”218 In the case of the air ambulance industry, there is such a
special condition: federal courts repeatedly holding that state
regulation of the air ambulance industry is preempted by the
ADA,219 as well as the holdings in Morales220 and Wolens.221 The
holdings in these cases have effectively shut off the ability of
213 Chandler, 425 U.S. at 851 (internal quotations omitted).
214 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 227–28 (1995).
215 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992).
216 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
217 Lincoln Caplan, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Footnote Four, THE NEW YORKER,
Sept. 13, 2013.
218 See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
219 See, e.g., Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d 930, 942 (D.N.D.
2016); Med-Trans Corp. v. Benton, 581 F. Supp. 2d 721, 736 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
220 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 383.
221 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 227–28 (1995).
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state lawmakers to pass legislation regulating the air ambulance
industry that will protect their citizens.
However, the courts have about as much likelihood of success-
fully ruling in favor of state regulation as state lawmakers do, as
Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg suggests that the ADA preempts state
common law developed by the courts.222 While the Supreme
Court could still easily address the issue by nature of its chief
status, doing so would fly in the face of years of precedent be-
cause it would directly oppose Ginsberg. Further, while the Su-
preme Court is a possible option to resolve this issue, there is a
temporal component to the issue as well: it can take years before
a case is adjudicated by the Supreme Court. That rules out wait-
ing on the Supreme Court as the best option, as countless pa-
tients will suffer in the meantime.223 By process of elimination,
responsibility for regulating the air ambulance industry falls to
the United States Congress. In the wake of EagleMed, LLC v. Wyo-
ming, the Wyoming Insurance Commissioner, Tom Glause, even
went so far as to opine that “Congress needs to exempt the air
ambulances from the Aviation Deregulation Act. ‘Once that
happens, then the states can take a look at it and address legisla-
tion to deal with the issue . . . .’”224
VI. CONCLUSION
In times of serious medical crisis, patients depend on emer-
gency services personnel to arrive quickly and transport them so
that they may receive life-saving treatment. The air ambulance
industry has grown a great deal since its beginnings on the bat-
tlefields of World War I, and advances in technology have
helped develop the industry. However, because of legal prece-
dent and air ambulance industry norms, medical patients are
the ones who suffer under the ADA. Maintaining that technol-
ogy and staffing air ambulances is expensive, and without regu-
lation, the patient is left to figure out how to pay an expensive
bill while recovering from the injuries he sustained. The legal
framework of the ADA has left the courts handcuffed, forcing
222 Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1429–30 (2014).
223 See Consumer Alert: Understanding Air Ambulance Insurance, supra note 20
(“The Association of Air Medical Services estimates that more than 550,000 pa-
tients in the U.S. use air ambulances each year.”).
224 Ben Neary, Federal Judge Rejects Wyoming Air Ambulance Regulation, WASH.
TIMES (May 25, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/may/25/
federal-judge-rejects-wyoming-air-ambulance-regula/ [https://perma.cc/PPG2-
SMA2].
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them to find state attempts at regulation to be preempted by the
ADA, no matter the intent behind the regulatory legislation.
The best solution is for Congress to exempt air ambulances
from ADA preemption. Congressional intent shows that safety
and aspects of medical care are not meant to be preempted.
The cost of an air ambulance transport is as much a part of med-
ical care as the surgery that follows transportation. The fact that
the ambulance is a helicopter or a plane rather than a ground
vehicle should not be a determining factor, especially when an
air ambulance is the only available method of transport. Compe-
tition governs in a business setting, but in a life and death
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Table 4 summarizes key court cases related to the air ambulance industry. 
Table 5 summarizes DOT or state Attorneys General Opinions related to 
the air ambulance industry. 
Table 4: Summary of Key Court Cases Related to the Air Ambulance Industry 
Court case Issues court determined to be preempted 
Issues court determined not to be 
preempted 
Med-Trans Corp. v. 
Benton, 581 F. Supp. 2d 
721 (E.D. N.C. 2008) 
Safety and operational standards 
• “Flight” equipment requirements that cannot be 
detached from aviation safety and associated solely with 
EMS. 
• Prohibiting structural or functional defects affecting the 
“safe operation of the aircraft.” 
• Regulations requiring crew members to be trained in “in 
flight emergencies specific to the aircraft used in the 
program” and “aircraft safety.” 
• Requiring a helicopter pilot to provide backup medical 
care for EMS personnel. 
Economic requirements 
• Requiring air ambulances to provide service 24 hours 
per day. 
• Certificate of need requirement. 
• Requirement to document “defined service area.” 
• Requirements to document “a written plan for 
transporting patients to appropriate facilities when 
diversion or bypass plans are activated.” 
• Requirements to install very high frequency aircraft 
transceivers. 
• Requiring an air ambulance provider to undergo an EMS 
Peer Committee Review that provides local government 
officials with a mechanism to prevent an air ambulance 
provider from operating within the state. 
 
Medical aspects 
• Requirement for air ambulances to 
synchronize voice radio 
communications with local EMS 
resources (requiring air ambulances to 
be equipped with special two-way 
radios to communicate with public 
safety entities). 
• Requirements that are primarily medical 
in nature. 
• Requirement for air ambulances to be 
inspected for compliance with medically 
related regulations. 
• Medically related equipment, and 
sanitation, supply and design 
requirements 
• Requirement for air carriers to 
document a plan for inspecting, 
repairing, and cleaning medical and 
other patient care related equipment. 
• Requirement for vehicle or equipment-
related training undertaken specifically 
for the purposes of ensuring proper 
patient care (i.e., training regarding 
cabin pressurization as it relates to 
specific medical conditions). 
• Requirement for air ambulance to be 
staffed by at least two persons. 
Abdullah v. American 
Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 
363 (3rd Cir. 1999) 
Safety and operational standards 
• Standards of care in the field of aviation safety.  
Safety and operational standards 
• Traditional state and territorial law 
damage remedies for violation of federal 
aviation standards. 
Hiawatha Aviation of 
Rochester v. Minn. Dept. 
of Health, 389 N.W.2d 
507 (Sup. Ct. Minn. 
1986) 
Economic requirements 
• Requirement for license from the state to operate.  
Medical aspects 
• Requirements for equipment and 
promulgation of standards for 
maintenance of sanitary conditions. 
• Regulation of staffing requirements and 
qualifications of personnel as part of 
traditional role in delivery of medical 
services. 
Appendix III: Key Court Cases and Opinion 
Letters from DOT or State Attorneys General 
225 See GAO-10-907, at 36–40 app. III (note that not all cases included in these
tables are ADA cases, and when holding that safety measures are preempted, the
ruling body is referring to general aviation safety measures, rather than measures
related to patient safety).
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Court case Issues court determined to be preempted 
Issues court determined not to be 
preempted 
Air Evac v. Robinson, 
486 F. Supp. 2d 713 
(M.D. Tenn. 2007) 
Flight and safety requirements 
• Requirement for helicopters licensed in the state to have 
certain avionics equipment on board.  
 
Eagle Air Med Corp. v. 
Colorado Board of 
Health, 570 F. Supp. 2d 
1289, (D. Col. 2008) 
Safety standards 
• Requirement for air ambulance providers to acquire and 
maintain accreditation by the Commission on 
Accreditation of Medical Transport Systems, whose 
standards primarily address aviation safety issues.  
 
Rocky Mountain 
Holdings, LLC v. Cates, 
Director, Mo. Dept. of 
Health, No. 97-4165-CV-
C-9 (W.D. Mo. Central 
Div. September 3, 1997) 
Economic requirements 
• Making the determination that the “public convenience 
and necessity” requires a proposed air ambulance 
service. 
 
Source: GAO analysis of key court cases. 
Note: State court decisions are generally limited to the state, and federal appellate decisions, the 
circuit, in which the challenge was raised. However, these decisions could be used as support for 
legal challenges in other states or circuits. 
 
Table 5: Summary of DOT or State Attorneys General Opinions Related to the Air Ambulance Industry 
DOT and State 
Attorneys General 
letters  
Issues DOT and State Attorneys General determined 
to be preempted 
Issues DOT and State Attorneys General 
determined not to be preempted 
DOT to Texas 
 2/20/2007 
Safety and operational standards 
• Regulation of flight safety aspects of medical 
services, such as safe storage of equipment. 
• Regulating aviation safety, including minimum 
standards for aircraft, pilots, and “weather 
minimums.” 
• Requiring accreditation by outside body that sets 
aviation standards. 
Economic requirements 
• Regulating when and where ambulances can fly, 
scheduling, routing, and rates. 
• Limiting federal preemption to interstate 
transportation. 
• Regulating advertising. 
• Insurance requirements (air carrier liability 
insurance for injuries, death, and/or property 
damage to third parties caused by crash of aircraft).
 
Medical aspects 
• Minimum requirements for medical 
equipment. 
• Regulating medical services, particularly as 
delivered to patients/passengers in the 
cabins of aircraft. 
• Training and licensing requirements for 
medical crew. 
• Insurance addressing “other perils” (such as 
medical malpractice by the medical staff) 
would be considered on a case-by-case 
basis. 
• Requiring accreditation of an outside body 
that deals exclusively with medical care. 
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DOT and State 
Attorneys General 
letters  
Issues DOT and State Attorneys General determined 
to be preempted 
Issues DOT and State Attorneys General 
determined not to be preempted 
DOT to Texas  
5/23/2007 
Flight requirements 
• Requiring certain avionics equipment. 
• Licensing requirements to ensure ambulances are 
following FAA flight requirements. 
• Taking punitive action, in context of a state 
licensing regime, if FAA requirements are not being 
followed.  
Flight requirements 
• Review of air ambulance records and 
documents to ensure air ambulances are 
following FAA requirements. 
• Bringing to the attention of FAA or DOT 
enforcement office any information or 
evidence that a carrier may be violating 
federal requirements.  
DOT to Texas  
11/3/2008 
Economic requirements 
• Requiring air ambulance service be available to all 
people, including nonsubscribers. 
• Establishing minimum standards for the creation 
and operation of an EMS subscription program, 
including obtaining State Health Services 
department approval (which depends on many 
levels of approval from state and local officials) 
prior to soliciting, advertising, or collecting 
subscription or membership fees. 
• Requiring air ambulance provider based in another 
state to obtain an EMS license from the state. 
• Compliance with state and federal rules on billing 
and reimbursement. 
• Requirement to show financial responsibility 
through bonding or self-insurance in order to 




466 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
 
Appendix III: Key Court Cases and Opinion 
Letters from DOT or State Attorneys General 
 
 
Page 39 GAO-10-907  Air Ambulance 
DOT and State 
Attorneys General 
letters  
Issues DOT and State Attorneys General determined 
to be preempted 
Issues DOT and State Attorneys General 
determined not to be preempted 
DOT to Hawaii 
4/23/2007 
Safety and operational standards 
• Regulating aircraft operation and equipment. 
• Medical equipment installation and storage aboard 
aircraft. 
• Regulating pilot qualifications. 
Economic requirements 
• State operating certificates based on state’s 
determination of “public need” for it, the 
“reasonableness” of the “cost of the … service,” 
and other criteria including “quality, accessibility, 
availability and acceptability.” 
• Requirement to operate 24 hours per day. (Note: A 
24-hour requirement may be pursued through 
contractual means rather than through regulatory 
actions.) 
• A state medical program, ostensibly dealing with 
only medical equipment/supplies aboard aircraft, 
that is so pervasive or so constructed as to be 
indirectly regulating in the preempted economic 
area of air ambulance prices, routes, or services. 
• Accident liability insurance. 
Flight requirements 
• Requirements as to medical training for flight crew.  
Medical aspects 
• Requirements for patient oxygen masks, 
litters, blankets, sheets, and trauma 
supplies. 
 
DOT to San Diego 
1/2/1997 
Flight requirements 
• Aircraft configuration and airman certification. 
 
DOT to Nebraska 
12/5/1989 
Economic requirements 
• Controlling entry into the field of interstate air 
ambulances, or imposing economic regulations. 
Medical aspects 
• Equipment requirements as part of 
regulation of medical services. 
• Staffing requirements, personnel 
qualifications, and sanitary condition 
standards. 
• Governing medical services. 
DOT to Arizona 
6/16/1986 
Economic requirements 
• Certificate of public convenience and necessity. 
• Regulating rates. 
• Regulating operating and response times and the 
base of operations. 
• Bonding requirements. 
• Accounting and report systems. 
  
DOT to Florida 
10/10/2007 
Economic requirements 
• Certificate of public convenience and necessity 
from each county within the state where it wants to 
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DOT and State 
Attorneys General 
letters  
Issues DOT and State Attorneys General determined 
to be preempted 
Issues DOT and State Attorneys General 
determined not to be preempted 
Letter from Richard E. 
Israel, Assistant Attorney 
General, Maryland, to 
Sen. John J. Hafer 
(4/11/02) 
 
Safety and operational requirements 
• For intrastate commercial air ambulances: 
“Clearance” regulations, including regulation that air 
ambulance can only respond to scene of public 
safety emergency if cleared by the state 
communication center. 
Economic requirements 
• For intrastate commercial air ambulances, 
requirements that responses to transports shall be 
carried out without regard to patient’s ability to pay 
and with no charge to the state or a jurisdictional 
EMS program. 
• For interstate commercial air ambulances: 
“Clearance” regulations that place limitations on 
charges. 
• For interstate commercial air ambulances: 
“Clearance” regulations dealing with helicopter 
landings that allow clearance decisions based on 
considerations of economic competition.  
Medical requirements 
• For interstate commercial air ambulances: 
“Clearance” regulations that reference a 
determination of the safety and 
appropriateness of a helicopter landing for 
patient transport that are concerned only 
with the health and safety of the patient.  
Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. GA-
0634, 2008 WL 4964344 
(Tex. A.G.) 
Medical aspects 
• Regulation by Department of State Health Services 
of EMS providers’ subscription programs for 
emergency medical services.  
 
1987 Ariz. Op. Atty. Gen. 
261, 1987 WL 121388 
(Ariz. AG 1987) 
Economic regulations 
• Economic regulation under certificate of need 
statutes.  
Safety and operational requirements 
• Essential public health and safety matters 
(regulation of transport of sick, injured, 
wounded, or otherwise incapacitated or 
helpless individuals by air ambulance only in 
critical and emergency situations and only 
with regard to essential medical health and 
safety aspects of such transport).  
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